WP Update Radar MCP server
xyz.utilityhouse.updates/wp-update-radarupdates.utilityhouse.xyzstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
WordPress plugin release signals from public support threads, with evidence and explicit unknowns.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the WP Update Radar MCP server can do
The WP Update Radar MCP server is published by updates.utilityhouse.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: wp_update_radar_check_many and wp_update_radar_check), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (wp_update_radar_check_many and wp_update_radar_check).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
wp_update_radar_checkReports what wordpress.org's public support forum says about one plugin release, compared with the releases before it, counted the same way on both sides.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "wp_update_radar_check" says "update": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "wp_update_radar_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "wp_update_radar_check" says "update": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Reports what wordpress.org's public support forum says about one plugin release, compared with the releases before it, counted the same way on both sides. It does not answer whether an update is safe: nothing here can see your site, your theme, your premium plugins or your PHP version. `state` is what the evidence supports doing, `signal` is only what was observed: HOLD elevated public signal for this release WAIT above this plugin's own normal, or the window is still open GUARDED_ROLLOUT no elevated public signal — roll out somewhere low-stakes first NOT_ENOUGH_EVIDENCE too little was attributable to judge; a gap here, NOT a finding about the release, and not a reason to reassure anyone The legacy `verdict` field keeps its five strings (known-bad / wait / update-now / too-new / insufficient-data) for clients that already read it. Use it before applying a plugin update, or when someone asks whether a specific version broke anything. Not a security advisory and not a CVE lookup: it reports what other site owners are saying, which is a different question from whether a release is vulnerable. wordpress.org plugins only — premium and paid plugins have no public forum to read, and themes are out of scope. Covers the most-installed plugins; one outside that set returns an error rather than a guess.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a WordPress plugin release
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
wp_update_radar_check_manyAnswers: which of this site's plugin updates are risky right now?Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "wp_update_radar_check_many" says "update": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "wp_update_radar_check_many" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "wp_update_radar_check_many" says "update": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Answers: which of this site's plugin updates are risky right now? Prefer this over the single check whenever there is more than one plugin to look at — a whole site's plugin list costs one call here instead of one call each. Same five verdicts as the single check (known-bad, wait, update-now, too-new, insufficient-data), per item and independent: a plugin that is not indexed reports its own error and the rest still answer. Returns a count of each verdict, so the risky ones can be found without reading every row. Up to 25 plugins per call; more than that is reported, not silently cut. `insufficient-data` means this service does not know, which is not the same as safe. Not a security advisory and not a CVE lookup: it reports what other site owners are saying, which is a different question from whether a release is vulnerable. wordpress.org plugins only — premium plugins have no public forum to read, and themes are out of scope.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check multiple WordPress plugin releases
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://updates.utilityhouse.xyz/mcp/registry: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including wp_update_radar_check_many (write), wp_update_radar_check (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "wp_update_radar_check_many" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "wp_update_radar_check_many" says "update": a word for a change.
The server marks "wp_update_radar_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "wp_update_radar_check" says "update": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http wp-update-radar https://updates.utilityhouse.xyz/mcp/registryclaude mcp add --transport http wp-update-radar https://updates.utilityhouse.xyz/mcp/registryRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__wp-update-radar__wp_update_radar_check_many",
"mcp__wp-update-radar__wp_update_radar_check"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as wp-update-radar. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__wp-update-radar__wp_update_radar_check_many untrusted-input
- mcp__wp-update-radar__wp_update_radar_check untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/xyz.utilityhouse.updates/wp-update-radar/verify?hash=9dc28c56aad8db153b6f38a1b7c88e075e698ca1d0564c74d7f99532524db7bf" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9dc28c56aad8, from Nov 21, 2026, 07:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.utilityhouse.updates/wp-update-radar/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.utilityhouse.updates/wp-update-radar)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.
WP Update Radar MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the WP Update Radar MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the WP Update Radar MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the WP Update Radar MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the WP Update Radar MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. wp_update_radar_check_many and wp_update_radar_check.
Does the WP Update Radar MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the WP Update Radar MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the WP Update Radar MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.