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AgentVerify MCP server

za.co.t-horizon.agentverify/agentverifyagentverify.t-horizon.co.zastreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Trust checks and Data Passports: identity, co-signed receipts, scores, badges, and custody evidence.

6 tools: 4 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AgentVerify MCP server can do

The AgentVerify MCP server is published by agentverify.t-horizon.co.za, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: verify_badge, trust_check, verify_passport and policy_check), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • policy_checkMay a party do an action in a region under a passport policy?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    May a party do an action in a region under a passport policy? allow, deny, or indeterminate. Payment cannot change a denial.
  • trust_checkTrust score for one agent.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Trust score for one agent. Without payment this returns an x402 PaymentRequired tool error. Retry with params._meta['x402/payment']. A registered agent can instead pass params._meta['agentverify/auth'] ({agent_id, ts, signature} over agentverify:free:v1, method MCP, path mcp:trust_check) until the daily free quota.
  • verify_badgeCheck an AgentVerify trust badge against this server's Ed25519 key.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an AgentVerify trust badge against this server's Ed25519 key. Free.
  • verify_passportVerify a data passport's signatures, hash chain, and policy violations.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a data passport's signatures, hash chain, and policy violations. Free. Custody evidence only. Residency is self-asserted unless an attestation reference was presented, and those quotes are not verified here.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_agent_profilePublic agent profile.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_profile" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Public agent profile. Does not include the trust score. Free.
  • get_pricingCurrent AgentVerify prices, network, and payments mode.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_pricing" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Current AgentVerify prices, network, and payments mode. Free.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agentverify.t-horizon.co.za/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_badge (write), trust_check (write), verify_passport (write), policy_check (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 14, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 4

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 4.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 4
  2. Tools2 added, 1 changed.+2 added~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agentverify https://agentverify.t-horizon.co.za/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agentverify https://agentverify.t-horizon.co.za/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agentverify__get_pricing",
      "mcp__agentverify__get_agent_profile"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agentverify__verify_badge",
      "mcp__agentverify__trust_check",
      "mcp__agentverify__verify_passport",
      "mcp__agentverify__policy_check"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentverify. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/za.co.t-horizon.agentverify/agentverify/verify?hash=392c49d9ebe5dca07bd89fbbc75d977092d6f76f42c18db8992496c8b6202091" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 392c49d9ebe5, from Nov 11, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/za.co.t-horizon.agentverify/agentverify/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for za.co.t-horizon.agentverify/agentverify
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/za.co.t-horizon.agentverify/agentverify.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/za.co.t-horizon.agentverify/agentverify)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 11, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

AgentVerify MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AgentVerify MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AgentVerify MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AgentVerify MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AgentVerify MCP server have?

6 tools: 4 write, 2 read. verify_badge, trust_check, verify_passport, policy_check, get_pricing and get_agent_profile.

Does the AgentVerify MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AgentVerify MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the AgentVerify MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.