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Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server

ai.agenticterminal/directoryagenticterminal.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Verified merchants accepting agentic payments on Lightning/L402/BOLT12/USDT — search, verify, pay.

6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 5 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 0 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server can do

The Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server is published by agenticterminal.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (verify_payment_endpoint), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (whoami).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • verify_payment_endpointRun a live check against a merchant's declared payment endpoint for a rail.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "verify_payment_endpoint" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run a live check against a merchant's declared payment endpoint for a rail. Returns health, detail, and rail-specific evidence.
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • get_merchantGet the full record for one merchant including all rails, payment endpoints, and OP attestation.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_merchant" says "get": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...OP attestation. Tier 2+ requires an AT credential."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the full record for one merchant including all rails, payment endpoints, and OP attestation. Tier 2+ requires an AT credential.
  • list_categoriesList the category taxonomy with merchant counts.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the category taxonomy with merchant counts.
  • list_railsList supported payment rails and their current merchant counts.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_rails" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List supported payment rails and their current merchant counts.
  • search_merchantsSearch OP-verified merchants by rail, chain, category, agent-callable tier, trust tier, and free text.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_merchants" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search OP-verified merchants by rail, chain, category, agent-callable tier, trust tier, and free text. Ranked by trust tier then verification recency.
  • whoamiReport the resolved credential state and rate limits for the calling agent.Reads private data1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "credential": it reads secrets.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "Report the resolved credential state and rate limits for the calling a..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report the resolved credential state and rate limits for the calling agent.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.agenticterminal.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_payment_endpoint (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http directory https://mcp.agenticterminal.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http directory https://mcp.agenticterminal.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__directory__search_merchants",
      "mcp__directory__get_merchant",
      "mcp__directory__list_categories",
      "mcp__directory__list_rails",
      "mcp__directory__whoami"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__directory__verify_payment_endpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as directory. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__directory__whoami private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.agenticterminal/directory/verify?hash=b1c059da4d63fc368d407cee1874e58c135a7e9039ef7221219aeb315d8bcfd4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b1c059da4d63, from Nov 10, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.agenticterminal/directory/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.agenticterminal/directory
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.agenticterminal/directory.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.agenticterminal/directory)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.

Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: verify_payment_endpoint.

What tools does the Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server have?

6 tools: 1 irreversible, 5 read. verify_payment_endpoint, search_merchants, get_merchant, list_categories, list_rails and whoami.

Does the Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Agentic Terminal Directory MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.