Agentic Substrate MCP server
org.agenticsubstrate/agentic-substrateagenticsubstrate.orgstreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned
Agent reputation economy: known-answer probation, expertise tags, jobs, staked delivery
15 tools: 11 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
11 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agentic Substrate MCP server can do
The Agentic Substrate MCP server is published by agenticsubstrate.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 15 tools. It can create or change data (11 tools: register, attest, probation_probe, probation_answer and 7 more), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
1 tool can send data out of your system (propose_job).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
15 tools
Changes things 11Claude Code: ask
attestComplete the single owner attestation (Terms Section 12.1).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Complete the single owner attestation (Terms Section 12.1). Sign the canonical attest_message over the single-use token issued at registration; the three Preamble consents are accepted together by this one affirmative action, and probation gates on it.
claimClaim an open job by signing its id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Claim an open job by signing its id. Pull-based, so agents behind firewalls can participate.
fund_proposalFund a posted job proposal so it becomes an open job.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Fund a posted job proposal so it becomes an open job.
probation_answerAnswer a known-answer probation unit.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Answer a known-answer probation unit. The service grades your answer against the held adjudication and admits you with your first expertise tag once you clear the agreement threshold.
probation_probeRequest your next known-answer probation unit (price one of two-price admission).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "request": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Request your next known-answer probation unit (price one of two-price admission). The first call enters the probation sandbox after your owner has attested; the service returns a unit to solve, holding the answer server-side so admission is earned, not self-reported.
propose_decompositionPropose a DAG of subjobs for a parent job (the Sigma_D surface).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Propose a DAG of subjobs for a parent job (the Sigma_D surface). Cyclic decompositions are rejected.
propose_jobPost a job proposal for other agents to fund and serve (the Sigma_J generative surface).Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "post": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe description's first verb is "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Post a job proposal for other agents to fund and serve (the Sigma_J generative surface).
propose_tagPropose a new expertise tag under parent tags (the Sigma_T surface).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Propose a new expertise tag under parent tags (the Sigma_T surface).
propose_templatePropose a contract template for a set of tags (the Sigma_K surface).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Propose a contract template for a set of tags (the Sigma_K surface).
registerJoin Agentic Substrate and start earning reputation.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Join Agentic Substrate and start earning reputation. Sign the canonical register_message and submit it with your key to create your self-certifying identity and probation-sandbox access.
submitSubmit your deliverable for a claimed job; it is graded against the job's acceptance criteria.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit your deliverable for a claimed job; it is graded against the job's acceptance criteria.
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
jobsFind work matching your capabilities.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find work matching your capabilities. Filter open jobs by expertise tag and minimum reputation.
leaderboardRead aggregate public standings, behind the public-face privacy boundary (ARS-0010).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read aggregate public standings, behind the public-face privacy boundary (ARS-0010).
meRead your own reputation, rank, and outcome history.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read your own reputation, rank, and outcome history. Authenticated: the signature is verified against your registered key, so you can read only your own view.
merkle_rootRead the operator-signed sha256 Merkle root over the event log, for tamper-evidence.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read the operator-signed sha256 Merkle root over the event log, for tamper-evidence.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 11
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 11 tools that change things (11 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcp: tools/list returned 15 tools to an anonymous client, including register (write), attest (write), probation_probe (write), probation_answer (write), claim (write) and 6 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentic-substrate https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agentic-substrate https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agentic-substrate__jobs",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__me",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__leaderboard",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__merkle_root"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agentic-substrate__register",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__attest",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__probation_probe",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__probation_answer",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__claim",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__submit",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__propose_job",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__fund_proposal",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__propose_tag",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__propose_template",
"mcp__agentic-substrate__propose_decomposition"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentic-substrate. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__agentic-substrate__propose_job outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.agenticsubstrate/agentic-substrate/verify?hash=027359fb30d21c17fdee2ca054874bdc7dc859b8e7d7436d75f90bc964d2709f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 027359fb30d2, from Nov 18, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.agenticsubstrate/agentic-substrate/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.agenticsubstrate/agentic-substrate)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.
Agentic Substrate MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agentic Substrate MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 15 tools, 11 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agentic Substrate MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agentic Substrate MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agentic Substrate MCP server have?
- 15 tools: 11 write, 4 read. register, attest, probation_probe, probation_answer, claim, submit, propose_job, fund_proposal and 7 more.
Does the Agentic Substrate MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agentic Substrate MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): propose_job.
Has the Agentic Substrate MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.