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Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server

ai.stork/corestork.aistreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Web search, page reading and library docs for agents. No key. Routed to the best measured server.

6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server can do

The Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server is published by stork.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: stork_docs, stork_repo and stork_install), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (stork_search, stork_scrape, stork_docs and 3 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (stork_scrape).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • stork_docsLook up current documentation for a code library or framework.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up current documentation for a code library or framework. Returns the passages and code examples that fit a question. The lookup is run by a documentation provider (Context7, or the vendor's own documentation server for Microsoft, AWS and Cloudflare), which is named in the reply's `via` field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Look up library documentation
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • stork_installGet the configuration for adding a named MCP server (for example Notion, Supabase, Sentry, Postgres or a browser) to a given client.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "stork_install" says "install": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "stork_install" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "stork_install" says "install": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the configuration for adding a named MCP server (for example Notion, Supabase, Sentry, Postgres or a browser) to a given client. Returns the config, what the user must supply (a sign-in or keys), and who publishes the server. Where a vendor publishes its own server, that one is returned.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Set up an MCP server
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • stork_repoAnswer a question about the code in a public GitHub repository: how something is implemented, where it lives, how it is used.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Answer a question about the code in a public GitHub repository: how something is implemented, where it lives, how it is used. The answer comes from DeepWiki, which has indexed the repository, and is named in the reply's `via` field. Can take 10 to 20 seconds.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Ask about a GitHub repository
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • stork_find_serverFind MCP servers for a task or product (for example: Stripe payments, browser automation).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "stork_find_server" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "browser": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find MCP servers for a task or product (for example: Stripe payments, browser automation). Returns matching servers from Stork's directory, each with how to connect, whether its endpoint answered Stork's last check, how many tokens its tool definitions take, and what Stork's own test calls saw.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Find an MCP server
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • stork_scrapeRead one public web page.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "stork_scrape" says "scrape": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one public web page. Returns the page's main content as markdown for a given address. The page is fetched by a page-reading provider (Firecrawl today), which is named in the reply's `via` field. The page is third-party content.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Read a web page
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.stork.ai/core: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including stork_docs (write), stork_repo (write), stork_install (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "stork_install" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "stork_install" says "install": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http core https://mcp.stork.ai/core
claude mcp add --transport http core https://mcp.stork.ai/core

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__core__stork_search",
      "mcp__core__stork_find_server"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__core__stork_scrape",
      "mcp__core__stork_docs",
      "mcp__core__stork_repo",
      "mcp__core__stork_install"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as core. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__core__stork_search untrusted-input
  • mcp__core__stork_scrape untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__core__stork_docs untrusted-input
  • mcp__core__stork_repo untrusted-input
  • mcp__core__stork_install untrusted-input
  • mcp__core__stork_find_server untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.stork/core/verify?hash=9c0fffd03b4fc2091ee2dcd532749f4ca63e99989ea4c3b9f9cbb8944e5ba19e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 9c0fffd03b4f, from Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.stork/core/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.stork/core
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.stork/core.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.stork/core)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server have?

6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. stork_docs, stork_repo, stork_install, stork_search, stork_scrape and stork_find_server.

Does the Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): stork_scrape.

Has the Stork: search, scrape and docs MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.