Stork MCP Directory
ai.stork/mcp-directorystork.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Find an MCP server for a task. See if its endpoint answers and what its tools cost in context.
5 tools: 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Stork MCP Directory can do
The Stork MCP Directory is published by stork.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (stork_search, stork_server_details, stork_get_install_config and 2 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
stork_compareCompare 2 to 5 MCP servers side by side by slug: how each connects, licence, tool list, and what Stork's last check of each endpoint saw.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "stork_compare" says "compare": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Compare 2 to 5 MCP servers side by side by slug: how each connects, licence, tool list, and what Stork's last check of each endpoint saw.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
stork_get_install_configReady-to-paste client config for one MCP server.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "stork_get_install_config" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Ready-to-paste client config for one MCP server. Check installKnown first: when it is false, config is null because Stork holds no verified install method, and `instructions` links the publisher's own setup guide. Do not invent a command in that case. installMethod is 'remote' (connect by URL) or 'npm' (local stdio). authSummary says when the user must sign in.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
stork_searchFind an MCP server for a task.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "stork_search" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find an MCP server for a task. Say the task or product in plain words, for example: query Stripe payments, or browser automation. Results are ranked for an agent: the vendor's own server first, then servers you can connect to that answered Stork's last check. Each result is short: `connect` (remote URL or npm command, and whether sign-in is needed; null when Stork holds no install method), `publisherDomainVerified`, `toolNames`, and `check`: what Stork's own scheduled request to the endpoint last saw (result: answered | sign_in_required | stream_only | no_answer, lastCheckedAt, toolCount, toolDefinitionTokens = estimated tokens the tool definitions add to your context, toolsLastChangedAt, toolsChangedWithoutVersionChange). `check` is null for local stdio servers, which Stork cannot run. `confidence: weak` means nothing listed is a close match. A check is one initialize and one tools/list without an account: it does not prove a tool call works or that the server is safe. Listings that are duplicates of another listing, or that have not answered three checks in a row, are left out.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
stork_server_detailsGet full details about a specific MCP server, including `check` (what Stork's last request to its endpoint saw, with the estimated token size of its tool definitions) and `toolChan…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get full details about a specific MCP server, including `check` (what Stork's last request to its endpoint saw, with the estimated token size of its tool definitions) and `toolChanges` (each time a check found different tool definitions than the check before, and whether the server's version changed with them).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
stork_smithery_replacementFind where an MCP server lives now that Smithery's hosted URLs are gone.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find where an MCP server lives now that Smithery's hosted URLs are gone. Smithery's run.tools and server.smithery.ai URLs, its API, CLI and SDKs stopped on 2026-10-31. Pass the old URL (e.g. https://server.smithery.ai/@org/name/mcp or https://name.run.tools) or just the server name; returns listings that hold the server's own endpoint or npm package, with what Stork's last check of each endpoint saw. Matches are by name: confirm the publisher before connecting.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.stork.ai/mcp?tools=directory: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including stork_call (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http directory https://mcp.stork.ai/mcp?tools=directoryclaude mcp add --transport http directory https://mcp.stork.ai/mcp?tools=directoryRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__directory__stork_search",
"mcp__directory__stork_server_details",
"mcp__directory__stork_get_install_config",
"mcp__directory__stork_compare",
"mcp__directory__stork_smithery_replacement"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as directory. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__directory__stork_search untrusted-input
- mcp__directory__stork_server_details untrusted-input
- mcp__directory__stork_get_install_config untrusted-input
- mcp__directory__stork_compare untrusted-input
- mcp__directory__stork_smithery_replacement untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.stork/mcp-directory/verify?hash=696d17b7aeb9ede2d58f543b21e16069239b93b27c6afa373f4e9d0dc2236ebf" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 696d17b7aeb9, from Nov 17, 2026, 00:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.stork/mcp-directory/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.stork/mcp-directory)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 00:17 UTC.
Stork MCP Directory: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Stork MCP Directory safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the Stork MCP Directory delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Stork MCP Directory do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Stork MCP Directory have?
- 5 tools: 5 read. stork_search, stork_server_details, stork_get_install_config, stork_compare and stork_smithery_replacement.
Does the Stork MCP Directory need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Stork MCP Directory send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Stork MCP Directory changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.