dealer-direct-inventory MCP server
app.web.dealer-direct-mcp/dealer-direct-inventorydealer-direct-mcp.web.appstreamable-httpv2.139.1Scanned
New, Used & Classic car inventory MCP (3486 dealerships in 50 states; 1,035,501 live vehicles).
10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the dealer-direct-inventory MCP server can do
The dealer-direct-inventory MCP server is published by dealer-direct-mcp.web.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_counter_offer) and create or change data (4 tools: submit_lead, start_shielded_inquiry, accept_deal_and_reveal and burn_proxy_thread), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (get_lead_status and get_deal_thread); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (list_dealers, get_lead_status and get_deal_thread); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_counter_offer). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 10 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 2.139.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
send_counter_offerSend a firm, structured Out-The-Door (OTD) counter-offer (and optionally stipulate removal of mandatory dealer add-ons) on an active proxy thread while keeping the buyer's real pho…Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "send_counter_offer" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "send_counter_offer" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send a firm, structured Out-The-Door (OTD) counter-offer (and optionally stipulate removal of mandatory dealer add-ons) on an active proxy thread while keeping the buyer's real phone and email completely hidden.
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
accept_deal_and_revealOnce the buyer approves a dealership's verified Out-The-Door quote, unlock the buyer's real name, email/phone, and preferred appointment window to the dealership.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Once the buyer approves a dealership's verified Out-The-Door quote, unlock the buyer's real name, email/phone, and preferred appointment window to the dealership. Requires explicit buyer permission (consent=true).
burn_proxy_threadOne-click privacy kill-switch: permanently closes a shielded deal thread and revokes its proxy relay email address so any subsequent BDC drip emails or follow-ups from that dealers…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it One-click privacy kill-switch: permanently closes a shielded deal thread and revokes its proxy relay email address so any subsequent BDC drip emails or follow-ups from that dealership are silently dropped.
start_shielded_inquiryOpen a privacy-shielded, buyer-directed AI relay thread ('Verified Buyer #XXXX via DealerDirect AI Relay') with a dealership WITHOUT exposing the buyer's personal email or phone nu…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "start_shielded_inquiry" says "start": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Open a privacy-shielded, buyer-directed AI relay thread ('Verified Buyer #XXXX via DealerDirect AI Relay') with a dealership WITHOUT exposing the buyer's personal email or phone number. 100% FREE ($0.00) during Launch Growth Mode (no credit card required; we may charge $39/$99 for 14-day multi-dealer passes in the future). Operates as 50-state self-serve software where the buyer is sole principal ($0.00 deal/reveal/broker fee, $0.00 dealer fee forever). Dispatches directly into the dealership's native website CRM API + ADF/XML email relay with a 15-second human Deal-Desk link and a machine-to-machine JSON endpoint for Dealership AI Agents, and optionally runs a bounded multi-round Agent Auto-Negotiation Playbook.
submit_leadSubmit a buyer inquiry/lead directly to a participating dealership for a specific vehicle or general inventory inquiry.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_lead" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit a buyer inquiry/lead directly to a participating dealership for a specific vehicle or general inventory inquiry. Requires explicit buyer consent (consent=true) and at least one contact method (buyer_email or buyer_phone). Returns a lead_id and delivery status.
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_deal_threadInspect the current state of a shielded proxy deal thread (or entire Buyer Shield Pass scoreboard), including physical lot verification answers, itemized Out-The-Door (OTD) quote, …Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_deal_thread" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_deal_thread" says "get" and "thread": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "inspect" and "thread": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe name "get_deal_thread" says "get" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "inspect" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect the current state of a shielded proxy deal thread (or entire Buyer Shield Pass scoreboard), including physical lot verification answers, itemized Out-The-Door (OTD) quote, hidden add-on/markup warnings, filtered BDC auto-responder count vs. substantive human manager replies, pass_threads_digest across all cross-shopped VINs, 6-Digit Release Voucher state, and recommended next action.
get_lead_statusCheck the delivery state, webhook/email attempts, duplicate flag, and billing ledger status of a submitted lead.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_lead_status" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Check the delivery state, webhook/email attempts, duplicate flag, and billing ledger status of a submitted lead. Requires dealer_api_key.
get_vehicleRetrieve the complete canonical record for a single vehicle by its vehicle_id, 17-character ISO VIN, or pre-1981 vintage chassis/serial number.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_vehicle" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve the complete canonical record for a single vehicle by its vehicle_id, 17-character ISO VIN, or pre-1981 vintage chassis/serial number. Returns full specifications, classic_details (era, build_style, numbers_matching, odometer_status), auction_details (if live auction), pricing & fee breakdown, pre_inquiry_otd_estimate (50-state tax/title/doc fee estimate + recommended target/walk-away OTD offers), insurance quote payload, all high-res photo URLs, dealer contact info, and source_url.
list_dealersList all indexed dealerships, classic & collector showrooms, and live enthusiast auction platforms across all 50 US states, their physical locations, website platforms, provenance,…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_dealers" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "crawl": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List all indexed dealerships, classic & collector showrooms, and live enthusiast auction platforms across all 50 US states, their physical locations, website platforms, provenance, last crawl timestamps, live available New, Used, and Classic inventory counts, and price ranges.
search_inventorySearch live New, Used, Certified Pre-Owned, and Classic/Collector car inventory across participating US franchise dealerships, 20+ specialist classic & collector showrooms (Streets…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_inventory" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search live New, Used, Certified Pre-Owned, and Classic/Collector car inventory across participating US franchise dealerships, 20+ specialist classic & collector showrooms (Streetside Classics, Classic Auto Mall, GR Auto Gallery, RK Motors, Vanguard Motor Sales, Volo Auto Museum, Worldwide Vintage Autos, Fleming's Ultimate Garage, DriverSource, Park Place LTD, Hagerty Classifieds), and live collector auctions (Bring a Trailer & Hagerty Marketplace). Supports natural free-text query (e.g., '427 4-speed', 'Coyote restomod', 'Slant Nose', 'numbers-matching'), classic_only, era ('pre_war', '1950s', '1960s', '1970s', '1980s', '1990s_radwood', 'modern_classic'), listing_type ('dealer_showroom' vs 'auction'), no_reserve_only, manual_only, origin ('american', 'european', 'german', 'italian', 'british', 'japanese'), build_style ('restomod', 'pro_touring', 'concours', 'survivor', 'original', 'restored', 'custom', 'driver'), numbers_matching, year_min/year_max (1900-2028), price_max (up to $10M), and zip + radius_miles (up to 3500 miles).
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
6 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__send_counter_offer"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 31, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://dealer-direct-mcp.web.app/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including send_counter_offer (irreversible), submit_lead (write), start_shielded_inquiry (write), accept_deal_and_reveal (write), burn_proxy_thread (write)
Posture changes
- Oct 31, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 5
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:get_deal_threadOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:get_vehicleOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:start_shielded_inquiryChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:search_inventoryOnly readsinputSchema
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:send_counter_offerCan't be undoneinputSchema
- Changed:start_shielded_inquiryChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchema
Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff
- Changed:accept_deal_and_revealChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:get_deal_threadOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:search_inventoryOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:start_shielded_inquiryChanges thingsinputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:search_inventoryOnly readsinputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:search_inventoryOnly readsinputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:search_inventoryOnly readsinputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:search_inventoryOnly readsinputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:search_inventoryOnly readsinputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:search_inventoryOnly readsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 2.139.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http dealer-direct-inventory https://dealerdirect.herrington.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http dealer-direct-inventory https://dealerdirect.herrington.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__search_inventory",
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__get_vehicle",
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__list_dealers",
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__get_lead_status",
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__get_deal_thread"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__submit_lead",
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__start_shielded_inquiry",
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__send_counter_offer",
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__accept_deal_and_reveal",
"mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__burn_proxy_thread"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as dealer-direct-inventory. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__list_dealers untrusted-input
- mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__get_lead_status private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__get_deal_thread private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__dealer-direct-inventory__send_counter_offer outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.web.dealer-direct-mcp/dealer-direct-inventory/verify?hash=7077b7508e69c60dc81fbec0f9a437068854e438e2e2f370d228e38cf6547cdd" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7077b7508e69, from Nov 20, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.web.dealer-direct-mcp/dealer-direct-inventory/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.web.dealer-direct-mcp/dealer-direct-inventory)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
dealer-direct-inventory MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the dealer-direct-inventory MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the dealer-direct-inventory MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the dealer-direct-inventory MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_counter_offer.
What tools does the dealer-direct-inventory MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 write, 5 read. send_counter_offer, submit_lead, start_shielded_inquiry, accept_deal_and_reveal, burn_proxy_thread, search_inventory, get_vehicle, list_dealers and 2 more.
Does the dealer-direct-inventory MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the dealer-direct-inventory MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_counter_offer.
Has the dealer-direct-inventory MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 10 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.