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TokenVerdict MCP server

co.youraitools/tokenverdictyouraitools.costreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Base token safety check: simulated buy/transfer/sell, owner powers, liquidity. By Crypto Money Maker

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the TokenVerdict MCP server can do

The TokenVerdict MCP server is published by youraitools.co, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_token), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_token).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_tokenSafety verdict for a Base (chain 8453) ERC-20 token: SAFE / CAUTION / DANGER with a 0-100 score, from a simulated buy-transfer-sell (honeypot and tax detection), owner powers, prox…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.token.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.token.description: "...tract address, e.g. 0x532f27101965dd16442E59d40670FaF5eBB142E4"

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Safety verdict for a Base (chain 8453) ERC-20 token: SAFE / CAUTION / DANGER with a 0-100 score, from a simulated buy-transfer-sell (honeypot and tax detection), owner powers, proxy, liquidity, holders, verification and age. Free preview tier: verdict, score and flag counts. The paid x402 endpoints /v1/lite ($0.005), /v1/quick ($0.015) and /v1/deep ($0.05) add the reasons and evidence. SAFE is not a guarantee and not financial advice.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 14, 2026, 12:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 23, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.youraitools.co/tokenverdict/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including check_token (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The input schema at properties.token.description contains a 42-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.token.description: "...tract address, e.g. 0x532f27101965dd16442E59d40670FaF5eBB142E4"

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http tokenverdict https://api.youraitools.co/tokenverdict/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http tokenverdict https://api.youraitools.co/tokenverdict/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__tokenverdict__check_token"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tokenverdict. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__tokenverdict__check_token untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/co.youraitools/tokenverdict/verify?hash=7b9fc569ab60fbb2efe07014287d12484948249adbb3cb3210f778585cb6783e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7b9fc569ab60, from Nov 8, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/co.youraitools/tokenverdict/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for co.youraitools/tokenverdict
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/co.youraitools/tokenverdict.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/co.youraitools/tokenverdict)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 22, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

TokenVerdict MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the TokenVerdict MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the TokenVerdict MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the TokenVerdict MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the TokenVerdict MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. check_token.

Does the TokenVerdict MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the TokenVerdict MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the TokenVerdict MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.