Base Token Verdict MCP server
io.github.theharrisontruong-web/tokenverdicttheharrisontruong-webstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Base token verdict: GO/HOLD/BLOCK decision + score on any Base token address. $0.02/call via x402.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Base Token Verdict MCP server can do
The Base Token Verdict MCP server is published by the GitHub account theharrisontruong-web. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: token_verdict and token_verdict_lite), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (token_verdict and token_verdict_lite).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
token_verdictFull Base token verdict for a token contract address.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...40 hex chars), e.g. 0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed"
Description, as the server wrote it Full Base token verdict for a token contract address. Pulls free public onchain data (Base RPC, DexScreener, GoPlus token security) and runs 10 weighted checks: contract code present, honeypot / cannot-sell flags, mintable supply and hidden owner, owner control surface (proxy, pausable transfers, modifiable taxes, ownership take-back, self-destruct), buy/sell taxes, holder concentration (top-10 share), liquidity depth across Base DEX pairs, liquidity locked/burned share, 24h trading activity, and token age. Returns machine-readable JSON LED BY A FAIL-CLOSED TRADE DECISION — GO / HOLD / BLOCK — plus a one-line plain-language verdict, a 0-100 score, an A-F grade, a risk level, the top flags, per-check pass/partial/fail/unknown with evidence, a token block (name, symbol, supply, holder count), a market block (price, liquidity, 24h volume/txns, main pair, age), the decision basis, and a per-source status map. FAIL-CLOSED: if any key data source fails or returns nothing, the decision can never be GO; if two or more fail, it is BLOCK. HONEST LIMITS: a point-in-time snapshot — liquidity, holders, and flags can change within minutes on young tokens; checks that cannot be evaluated return unknown, never guesses; this is a mechanical risk scan, not financial advice. Cost: $0.02 USDC on Base per call, paid via x402 — the caller's agent pays from its owner's approved wallet; no API key needed. Use this as a pre-trade screen before buying or quoting any Base token.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
token_verdict_liteFREE lite Base token verdict for a token contract address.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...40 hex chars), e.g. 0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed"
Description, as the server wrote it FREE lite Base token verdict for a token contract address. Runs the same 10 checks as token_verdict but returns top-line results only: the GO / HOLD / BLOCK decision, the one-line verdict, 0-100 score, A-F grade, risk level, and the top 3 flag titles — detail is capped (no per-check evidence, no market block). Use this to triage whether a token deserves the full token_verdict report, or call token_verdict directly for the complete evidence-backed scan.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://tokenverdict-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including token_verdict (write), token_verdict_lite (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warntoken_verdict
The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...40 hex chars), e.g. 0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed"
The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...40 hex chars), e.g. 0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed"
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tokenverdict https://tokenverdict-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http tokenverdict https://tokenverdict-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__tokenverdict__token_verdict",
"mcp__tokenverdict__token_verdict_lite"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tokenverdict. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__tokenverdict__token_verdict untrusted-input
- mcp__tokenverdict__token_verdict_lite untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/tokenverdict/verify?hash=971695d0e0046795db339271d21c2cd40db46432b406453bfdbceaa98216379a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 971695d0e004, from Nov 17, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/tokenverdict/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/tokenverdict)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Base Token Verdict MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Base Token Verdict MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Base Token Verdict MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Base Token Verdict MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Base Token Verdict MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. token_verdict and token_verdict_lite.
Does the Base Token Verdict MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Base Token Verdict MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Base Token Verdict MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.