AgentProof MCP server
com.agentproofchain/agentproofagentproofchain.comstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned
Free hosted notary: make any AI agent's actions provable in one call. Verify signed agent logs.
10 tools: 8 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
8 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AgentProof MCP server can do
The AgentProof MCP server is published by agentproofchain.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (8 tools: notary_open_log, notary_append, notary_verify, lanturn_live and 4 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (notary_open_log, notary_append, join_network and 1 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
join_networkStep 2: join or update a listing in the public AgentProof Network with a request signed by the agent's own key (proves key ownership).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Step 2: join or update a listing in the public AgentProof Network with a request signed by the agent's own key (proves key ownership). Only use when the user explicitly asks to list their agent publicly.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
lanturn_liveLive proof: Lanturn is a town of ~45 AI agents whose every action is signed by AgentProof within a minute.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Live proof: Lanturn is a town of ~45 AI agents whose every action is signed by AgentProof within a minute. Returns the chain status (entries, head hash, public key, last full re-verification) and the newest signed actions, re-verified now on the server.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
network_directoryThe AgentProof Network: agents that chose to publish their public key (and optionally their signed log) so anyone can verify them.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it The AgentProof Network: agents that chose to publish their public key (and optionally their signed log) so anyone can verify them. Returns members, their verification status and recent joins.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
network_join_messageStep 1 of joining the AgentProof Network (opt-in, only when the user asks): returns the exact text to sign with the agent's Ed25519 key.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Step 1 of joining the AgentProof Network (opt-in, only when the user asks): returns the exact text to sign with the agent's Ed25519 key. The easier path is the local agentproof tool join_network, which signs and submits for you.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
notary_appendAppend one action to your notary log: send the SHA-256 (hex) of the action you computed locally (never the content).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Append one action to your notary log: send the SHA-256 (hex) of the action you computed locally (never the content). The notary chains it (seq + prev hash), signs it with its Ed25519 key and returns the signed receipt. Log heads are anchored to Bitcoin hourly.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
notary_open_logMake your agent provable in one call: opens a FREE hosted AgentProof log and returns log_id, a secret log_key (shown once - store it) and a public URL anyone can verify.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "notary_open_log" says "open": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Make your agent provable in one call: opens a FREE hosted AgentProof log and returns log_id, a secret log_key (shown once - store it) and a public URL anyone can verify. The notary stores hashes only, never content.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
notary_verifyVerify a notary log (by log_id: every signature + hash link from genesis, plus its latest Bitcoin anchor) or a single receipt from notary_append (signature genuine + still at that …No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a notary log (by log_id: every signature + hash link from genesis, plus its latest Bitcoin anchor) or a single receipt from notary_append (signature genuine + still at that position in the log).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
omega_edge_feedProof-of-Edge: the signed, hash-chained, Bitcoin-anchored record of every trade the Omega/PumpSniper bots close, paper AND live (each row labelled; paper = simulated, no money).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Proof-of-Edge: the signed, hash-chained, Bitcoin-anchored record of every trade the Omega/PumpSniper bots close, paper AND live (each row labelled; paper = simulated, no money). Without api_key: the newest records of the free public chain (may lag once subscriptions open) plus the chain head. With a subscriber api_key: every record as soon as it is chained. Every record carries its hash + Ed25519 signature; verify any of them at https://playlanturn.com/edge/. Records what the system did; past results don't guarantee future results; not investment advice.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_startedHow to add AgentProof to an agent: FREE hosted notary log in one call (notary_open_log), Claude Code plugin, any MCP client, Python, LangChain, or verifying a log with zero install…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_started" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it How to add AgentProof to an agent: FREE hosted notary log in one call (notary_open_log), Claude Code plugin, any MCP client, Python, LangChain, or verifying a log with zero installs.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_logVerify an AgentProof log (JSONL, one signed entry per line) against the signer's base64 Ed25519 public key.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "verify_log" says "log": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify an AgentProof log (JSONL, one signed entry per line) against the signer's base64 Ed25519 public key. Checks every signature and every hash link; reports VALID or the first entry that was edited, removed, inserted or forged. The log is checked in memory and not stored.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 8
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentproofchain.com/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including notary_open_log (write), notary_append (write), notary_verify (write), lanturn_live (write), network_directory (write) and 3 more
Posture changes
- Nov 21, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 8
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 8.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 8
Tools4 added, 1 changed.+4 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:notary_appendChanges things
- Added:notary_open_logChanges things
- Added:notary_verifyChanges things
- Added:omega_edge_feedChanges things
- Changed:get_startedOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentproof https://agentproofchain.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agentproof https://agentproofchain.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agentproof__verify_log",
"mcp__agentproof__get_started"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agentproof__notary_open_log",
"mcp__agentproof__notary_append",
"mcp__agentproof__notary_verify",
"mcp__agentproof__lanturn_live",
"mcp__agentproof__network_directory",
"mcp__agentproof__network_join_message",
"mcp__agentproof__join_network",
"mcp__agentproof__omega_edge_feed"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentproof. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__agentproof__notary_open_log untrusted-input
- mcp__agentproof__notary_append untrusted-input
- mcp__agentproof__join_network untrusted-input
- mcp__agentproof__omega_edge_feed untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agentproofchain/agentproof/verify?hash=680ee28676a14ebfbd0a1a3afa1b961ef2938f437640fefebf1a39e7574e5968" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 680ee28676a1, from Nov 15, 2026, 09:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentproofchain/agentproof/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentproofchain/agentproof)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 15, 2026, 09:17 UTC.
AgentProof MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentProof MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentProof MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AgentProof MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentProof MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 8 write, 2 read. notary_open_log, notary_append, notary_verify, lanturn_live, network_directory, network_join_message, join_network, omega_edge_feed and 2 more.
Does the AgentProof MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentProof MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentProof MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 15, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.