health-factor MCP server
com.brainonbnb/health-factorbrainonbnb.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Venus health factor of any BNB Chain account, free; liquidation stress paid, free holding 1M $BOBAI.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the health-factor MCP server can do
The health-factor MCP server is published by brainonbnb.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: venus_health_factor and health_factor), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (venus_health_factor and health_factor).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
health_factorVenus health factor & liquidation distance, the paid half (0.10 USD1, or half that in $BOBAI, or nothing for a wallet holding 1,000,000 $BOBAI (holder pass over x402: a signature, …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Venus health factor & liquidation distance, the paid half (0.10 USD1, or half that in $BOBAI, or nothing for a wallet holding 1,000,000 $BOBAI (holder pass over x402: a signature, no transaction — terms in the reply)): Health factor for a Venus position on BNB Chain, computed market by market from the Comptroller, with the collateral drawdown that would liquidate it and a stress table. Cross-checked against the protocol's own getAccountLiquidity — if the two disagree the answer says so instead of guessing. Calling this tool returns the terms; the answer is sold over x402 at https://agent.brainonbnb.com/answer?service=health_factor (or hired through the ERC-8183 escrow for 0.10 $U).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
venus_health_factorHealth factor monitoring, the free half: the Venus health factor of a BNB Chain account right now, computed market by market from the Comptroller and cross-checked against the prot…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at examples[0].address contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.examples[0].address: "0xd319e1F8e987cf78333cEA853F455366640929cF"
Description, as the server wrote it Health factor monitoring, the free half: the Venus health factor of a BNB Chain account right now, computed market by market from the Comptroller and cross-checked against the protocol’s own getAccountLiquidity; health_factor at the top. Give the account. The paid half adds the collateral drawdown that would liquidate it and a stress table.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agent.brainonbnb.com/health-factor/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including venus_health_factor (write), health_factor (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The input schema at examples[0].address contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.examples[0].address: "0xd319e1F8e987cf78333cEA853F455366640929cF"
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:health_factorChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:venus_health_factorChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http health-factor https://agent.brainonbnb.com/health-factor/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http health-factor https://agent.brainonbnb.com/health-factor/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__health-factor__venus_health_factor",
"mcp__health-factor__health_factor"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as health-factor. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__health-factor__venus_health_factor untrusted-input
- mcp__health-factor__health_factor untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.brainonbnb/health-factor/verify?hash=83a4dec48d541e9b9aa446384606a857eab8017802801373722a18ec8222c7e3" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 83a4dec48d54, from Nov 17, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.brainonbnb/health-factor/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.brainonbnb/health-factor)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:52 UTC.
health-factor MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the health-factor MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the health-factor MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the health-factor MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the health-factor MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. venus_health_factor and health_factor.
Does the health-factor MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the health-factor MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the health-factor MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 3, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.