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Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server

com.caelaralabs/ecomcaelaralabs.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence tools over remote MCP. Calls need an X-Caelara-Key API key.

10 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 9 change things.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 9 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 5
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server can do

The Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server is published by caelaralabs.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: price_drop_comparator) and create or change data (9 tools: product_intel_composite, storefront_xray_composite, jsonld_product_parser, shopify_feed_extractor and 5 more). None of its tools only reads.

5 tools can send data out of your system (product_intel_composite, storefront_xray_composite, jsonld_product_parser and 2 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • price_drop_comparatorCompare a price series (or old/new price) and flag drops, lows and target hitsNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "price_drop_comparator" says "drop": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compare a price series (or old/new price) and flag drops, lows and target hits
Changes things 9Claude Code: ask
  • ad_pixel_detectorDetect ad, analytics and marketing pixels (Meta, TikTok, GA4, GTM, Pinterest, etc.) with tag IDsCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Detect ad, analytics and marketing pixels (Meta, TikTok, GA4, GTM, Pinterest, etc.) with tag IDs
  • currency_margin_calcMargin, markup, breakeven and target price with FX rate, fees, shipping and taxNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Margin, markup, breakeven and target price with FX rate, fees, shipping and tax
  • gtin_upc_validatorValidate GTIN-8/12/13/14 (UPC/EAN) check digits and convert formatsNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "validate": a word for reading.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate GTIN-8/12/13/14 (UPC/EAN) check digits and convert formats
  • jsonld_product_parserExtract schema.org Product data (offers, ratings, reviews) from a pageCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract schema.org Product data (offers, ratings, reviews) from a page
  • product_intel_compositeProduct page intelligence: JSON-LD product, GTIN validation, SKU normalization, review sentiment, ad pixels and price signalsCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Product page intelligence: JSON-LD product, GTIN validation, SKU normalization, review sentiment, ad pixels and price signals
  • review_sentiment_parserScore review sentiment with aspect breakdown (quality, price, shipping, fit, service)No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Score review sentiment with aspect breakdown (quality, price, shipping, fit, service)
  • shopify_feed_extractorExtract the public Shopify products.json catalog with pricing and stock summaryCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract the public Shopify products.json catalog with pricing and stock summary
  • sku_normalizerNormalize SKUs into canonical, compact and match-key formsNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Normalize SKUs into canonical, compact and match-key forms
  • storefront_xray_compositeStorefront X-ray: platform, ad/analytics stack, payment options, structured data and Shopify catalog sampleCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Storefront X-ray: platform, ad/analytics stack, payment options, structured data and Shopify catalog sample

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out5
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
10
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (1 destructive, 9 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://ecom.caelaralabs.com/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including price_drop_comparator (destructive), product_intel_composite (write), storefront_xray_composite (write), jsonld_product_parser (write), shopify_feed_extractor (write) and 5 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ecom https://ecom.caelaralabs.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http ecom https://ecom.caelaralabs.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ecom__product_intel_composite",
      "mcp__ecom__storefront_xray_composite",
      "mcp__ecom__jsonld_product_parser",
      "mcp__ecom__shopify_feed_extractor",
      "mcp__ecom__gtin_upc_validator",
      "mcp__ecom__ad_pixel_detector",
      "mcp__ecom__currency_margin_calc",
      "mcp__ecom__review_sentiment_parser",
      "mcp__ecom__sku_normalizer"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__ecom__price_drop_comparator"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ecom. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__ecom__product_intel_composite outbound
  • mcp__ecom__storefront_xray_composite outbound
  • mcp__ecom__jsonld_product_parser outbound
  • mcp__ecom__shopify_feed_extractor outbound
  • mcp__ecom__ad_pixel_detector outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.caelaralabs/ecom/verify?hash=1e391002c7d110ea47b54645f5cfc719f50e7965447ba3829acd0863df8df290" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1e391002c7d1, from Nov 19, 2026, 14:19 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.caelaralabs/ecom/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.caelaralabs/ecom
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.caelaralabs/ecom.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.caelaralabs/ecom)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: price_drop_comparator.

Can the Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 destructive, 9 write. price_drop_comparator, product_intel_composite, storefront_xray_composite, jsonld_product_parser, shopify_feed_extractor, gtin_upc_validator, ad_pixel_detector, currency_margin_calc and 2 more.

Does the Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server send data to outside services?

5 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): product_intel_composite, storefront_xray_composite, jsonld_product_parser, shopify_feed_extractor and ad_pixel_detector.

Has the Caelara Labs E-Commerce Intelligence MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.