Caelara Shield MCP server
com.caelaralabs/shieldcaelaralabs.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Screens prompts, output, URLs, EVM transactions and swaps. Heuristic. Free key at caelaralabs.com.
4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Caelara Shield MCP server can do
The Caelara Shield MCP server is published by caelaralabs.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: shield_scan_prompt and shield_audit_token), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (shield_proxy_fetch); 1 tool can send data out of your system (shield_proxy_fetch).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
shield_audit_tokenScreen a token and/or an EVM transaction: token safety score, decoded transaction risks (unlimited approvals, failed or contract-creating transactions), address-poisoning lookalike…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen a token and/or an EVM transaction: token safety score, decoded transaction risks (unlimited approvals, failed or contract-creating transactions), address-poisoning lookalike check (0.050 USDC per call)
shield_scan_promptScreen untrusted text before it reaches a model: injection patterns, hidden characters, PII and secrets, with an allow/review/block verdict (0.015 USDC per call)No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen untrusted text before it reaches a model: injection patterns, hidden characters, PII and secrets, with an allow/review/block verdict (0.015 USDC per call)
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
shield_proxy_fetchFetch an https URL through an SSRF-guarded proxy and return a JSON envelope with the scanned body (HTTP 200 envelope, upstream status inside) (0.025 USDC per call)Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shield_proxy_fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch an https URL through an SSRF-guarded proxy and return a JSON envelope with the scanned body (HTTP 200 envelope, upstream status inside) (0.025 USDC per call)
shield_validate_outputCheck model output before it is used: secret and PII leakage, exfiltration links, active content, dangerous shell patterns, optional schema and grounding checks (0.015 USDC per cal…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shield_validate_output" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Check model output before it is used: secret and PII leakage, exfiltration links, active content, dangerous shell patterns, optional schema and grounding checks (0.015 USDC per call)
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 429
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 429.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http shield https://shield.caelaralabs.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http shield https://shield.caelaralabs.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__shield__shield_validate_output"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__shield__shield_scan_prompt",
"mcp__shield__shield_proxy_fetch",
"mcp__shield__shield_audit_token"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as shield. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__shield__shield_proxy_fetch untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.caelaralabs/shield/verify?hash=6bfb7ae5755ec37fa97d7d1edf79127a892c772e67d42cb0a53133ea24f3511a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6bfb7ae5755e, from Nov 20, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.caelaralabs/shield/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.caelaralabs/shield)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
Caelara Shield MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Caelara Shield MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Caelara Shield MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Caelara Shield MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Caelara Shield MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. shield_scan_prompt, shield_audit_token, shield_validate_output and shield_proxy_fetch.
Does the Caelara Shield MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the Caelara Shield MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): shield_proxy_fetch.
Has the Caelara Shield MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.