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Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server

com.caelaralabs/mediacaelaralabs.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Caelara Labs Dynamic Media tools over remote MCP. Calls need an X-Caelara-Key API key.

10 tools: 8 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 8 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 3
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

8 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server can do

The Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server is published by caelaralabs.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (8 tools: brand_kit_composite, dynamic_social_card_composite, edge_og_svg_generator, qr_code_svg_builder and 4 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (image_meta_inspector); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (image_meta_inspector); 3 tools can send data out of your system (dynamic_social_card_composite, color_palette_extractor and image_meta_inspector). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • aspect_ratio_calcReduce dimensions to an aspect ratio, name the closest standard ratio, scale to a target and map to social-media presetsNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reduce dimensions to an aspect ratio, name the closest standard ratio, scale to a target and map to social-media presets
  • avatar_initials_svgGenerate a deterministic initials avatar SVG with an accessible text colorNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a deterministic initials avatar SVG with an accessible text color
  • badge_shield_generatorGenerate a status badge SVG (label | message) in flat or flat-square styleNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a status badge SVG (label | message) in flat or flat-square style
  • brand_kit_compositeBuild a brand kit from a domain: best-resolution icon, extracted palette with accessible text colors, initials avatar and badge assetsNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a brand kit from a domain: best-resolution icon, extracted palette with accessible text colors, initials avatar and badge assets
  • color_palette_extractorExtract a dominant-color palette from a PNG or SVG image, or normalize a list of colors, with contrast ratiosCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract a dominant-color palette from a PNG or SVG image, or normalize a list of colors, with contrast ratios
  • dynamic_social_card_compositeGenerate a full social-card set (Open Graph, Twitter, square, story) as SVG with a QR code, meta tags and alt textCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a full social-card set (Open Graph, Twitter, square, story) as SVG with a QR code, meta tags and alt text
  • edge_og_svg_generatorRender an Open Graph card (default 1200x630) as SVGNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Render an Open Graph card (default 1200x630) as SVG
  • qr_code_svg_builderEncode text or a URL as a scannable QR code SVGNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Encode text or a URL as a scannable QR code SVG
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • favicon_hd_resolverFind the highest-resolution icon a domain publishes (SVG, apple-touch, Android, favicon) with dimensionsNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find the highest-resolution icon a domain publishes (SVG, apple-touch, Android, favicon) with dimensions
  • image_meta_inspectorInspect a remote image: format, dimensions, animation, alpha, size and content type from the file headerReads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "inspect": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "inspect" and "file": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Inspect a remote image: format, dimensions, animation, alpha, size and content type from the file header

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 untrusted-input tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__media__image_meta_inspector"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
8
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://media.caelaralabs.com/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including brand_kit_composite (write), dynamic_social_card_composite (write), edge_og_svg_generator (write), qr_code_svg_builder (write), color_palette_extractor (write) and 3 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http media https://media.caelaralabs.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http media https://media.caelaralabs.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__media__favicon_hd_resolver"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__media__brand_kit_composite",
      "mcp__media__dynamic_social_card_composite",
      "mcp__media__edge_og_svg_generator",
      "mcp__media__qr_code_svg_builder",
      "mcp__media__color_palette_extractor",
      "mcp__media__avatar_initials_svg",
      "mcp__media__badge_shield_generator",
      "mcp__media__aspect_ratio_calc",
      "mcp__media__image_meta_inspector"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as media. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__media__dynamic_social_card_composite outbound
  • mcp__media__color_palette_extractor outbound
  • mcp__media__image_meta_inspector private-data, untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.caelaralabs/media/verify?hash=741b18a57a493b01bd2a40049c922f3b86d0c6424185f9e11e4faca79f8e5e90" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 741b18a57a49, from Nov 19, 2026, 14:19 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.caelaralabs/media/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.caelaralabs/media
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.caelaralabs/media.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.caelaralabs/media)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server have?

10 tools: 8 write, 2 read. brand_kit_composite, dynamic_social_card_composite, edge_og_svg_generator, qr_code_svg_builder, color_palette_extractor, avatar_initials_svg, badge_shield_generator, aspect_ratio_calc and 2 more.

Does the Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): dynamic_social_card_composite, color_palette_extractor and image_meta_inspector.

Has the Caelara Labs Dynamic Media MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.