Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server
com.caelaralabs/socialcaelaralabs.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Caelara Labs Social Analytics tools over remote MCP. Calls need an X-Caelara-Key API key.
10 tools: 9 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 6
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
9 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server can do
The Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server is published by caelaralabs.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (9 tools: video_viral_audit_composite, creator_profile_composite, tiktok_oembed, youtube_metadata and 5 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (thumbnail_analyzer); 6 tools can send data out of your system (video_viral_audit_composite, creator_profile_composite, tiktok_oembed and 3 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Changes things 9Claude Code: ask
bio_link_auditorAudit a link-in-bio page: link count, platforms, CTA and trackingCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "bio_link_auditor" says "link": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Audit a link-in-bio page: link count, platforms, CTA and tracking
caption_hashtag_extractorExtract hashtags, mentions, links and emoji from a captionNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Extract hashtags, mentions, links and emoji from a caption
creator_profile_compositeCreator profile audit: bio-link page audit + engagement benchmarkCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Creator profile audit: bio-link page audit + engagement benchmark
engagement_rate_calcCompute engagement rate metrics and benchmark tierNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Compute engagement rate metrics and benchmark tier
reels_hook_scorerScore the opening hook of a Reel/Short/TikTok script or captionNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Score the opening hook of a Reel/Short/TikTok script or caption
tiktok_oembedTikTok video metadata via public oEmbedCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it TikTok video metadata via public oEmbed
transcript_cleanerClean a raw transcript/VTT/SRT: timestamps, fillers, duplicatesNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Clean a raw transcript/VTT/SRT: timestamps, fillers, duplicates
video_viral_audit_compositeViral audit of a TikTok/YouTube video: metadata + hook score + hashtags + thumbnailCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Viral audit of a TikTok/YouTube video: metadata + hook score + hashtags + thumbnail
youtube_metadataYouTube video metadata via public oEmbed + thumbnail URLsCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it YouTube video metadata via public oEmbed + thumbnail URLs
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
thumbnail_analyzerAnalyze a thumbnail image: format, dimensions, aspect ratio, sizeReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze a thumbnail image: format, dimensions, aspect ratio, size
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out6
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 9
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (9 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://social.caelaralabs.com/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including video_viral_audit_composite (write), creator_profile_composite (write), tiktok_oembed (write), youtube_metadata (write), reels_hook_scorer (write) and 4 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http social https://social.caelaralabs.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http social https://social.caelaralabs.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__social__video_viral_audit_composite",
"mcp__social__creator_profile_composite",
"mcp__social__tiktok_oembed",
"mcp__social__youtube_metadata",
"mcp__social__reels_hook_scorer",
"mcp__social__thumbnail_analyzer",
"mcp__social__caption_hashtag_extractor",
"mcp__social__bio_link_auditor",
"mcp__social__transcript_cleaner",
"mcp__social__engagement_rate_calc"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as social. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__social__video_viral_audit_composite outbound
- mcp__social__creator_profile_composite outbound
- mcp__social__tiktok_oembed outbound
- mcp__social__youtube_metadata outbound
- mcp__social__thumbnail_analyzer untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__social__bio_link_auditor outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.caelaralabs/social/verify?hash=c90b94c1d7947b29d9d38e2a1b2c85f1a8dcd4f64486d9f006b271ce3c786ffd" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c90b94c1d794, from Nov 19, 2026, 14:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.caelaralabs/social/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.caelaralabs/social)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 14:17 UTC.
Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 9 write, 1 read. video_viral_audit_composite, creator_profile_composite, tiktok_oembed, youtube_metadata, reels_hook_scorer, caption_hashtag_extractor, bio_link_auditor, transcript_cleaner and 2 more.
Does the Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server send data to outside services?
- 6 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): video_viral_audit_composite, creator_profile_composite, tiktok_oembed, youtube_metadata, thumbnail_analyzer and bio_link_auditor.
Has the Caelara Labs Social Analytics MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.