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Doorman MCP server

com.clawhard/doormanclawhard.comstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Check which AI bots a website or a pasted robots.txt lets in, grouped by purpose.

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Doorman MCP server can do

The Doorman MCP server is published by clawhard.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: doorman_check_ai_bot_access), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (doorman_check_ai_bot_access); 1 tool can send data out of your system (doorman_check_ai_bot_access).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • doorman_check_ai_bot_accessUse when the user asks whether their site (or any public site), or a robots.txt they pasted, blocks ChatGPT, Claude, Google AI, Perplexity or other AI crawlers, whether AI can read…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when the user asks whether their site (or any public site), or a robots.txt they pasted, blocks ChatGPT, Claude, Google AI, Perplexity or other AI crawlers, whether AI can read or train on their content, or why AI search does not mention their site. Fetches the live robots.txt and reports, for 22 named AI bots in four groups (AI training, AI search, assistants, search engines), which are let in, kept out or partly blocked, plus the site's content-signal preference and fixes. Example: {"url": "example.com"} or {"robots_txt": "User-agent: GPTBot\nDisallow: /"}. Pass robots_txt instead of url to check a draft or pasted file without fetching anything. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: See which AI bots a website lets in
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://doorman.clawhard.com/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including doorman_check_ai_bot_access (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 10, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 1

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 1.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 1
  2. Tools2 removed, 1 changed.−2 removed~1 changedView diff
    • Removed:doorman_check_robots_txt
    • Removed:doorman_write_robots_txt
    • Changed:doorman_check_ai_bot_accessChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http doorman https://doorman.clawhard.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http doorman https://doorman.clawhard.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__doorman__doorman_check_ai_bot_access"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as doorman. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__doorman__doorman_check_ai_bot_access untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.clawhard/doorman/verify?hash=82a6ffb2f264cfaed4ff9de915dfa87cae821239b407653e367e7d9756dcf319" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 82a6ffb2f264, from Nov 9, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/doorman/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.clawhard/doorman
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.clawhard/doorman.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/doorman)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 9, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Doorman MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Doorman MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Doorman MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Doorman MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Doorman MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. doorman_check_ai_bot_access.

Does the Doorman MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Doorman MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): doorman_check_ai_bot_access.

Has the Doorman MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.