Sieve MCP server
com.clawhard/sieveclawhard.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Run regexes on real engines (JavaScript, RE2/Go) against test strings, and prove ReDoS safety.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Sieve MCP server can do
The Sieve MCP server is published by clawhard.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: sieve_test_regex and sieve_check_redos), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
sieve_check_redosUse when a regular expression will run on user input or untrusted data (form validation, request routing, log parsing, WAF or search rules) and must not hang the server, or when re…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Use when a regular expression will run on user input or untrusted data (form validation, request routing, log parsing, WAF or search rules) and must not hang the server, or when reviewing a codebase's regexes for ReDoS (signals: "is this regex safe", "ReDoS", "catastrophic backtracking", "regex hangs", "CPU spike on validation", "security review of regexes", "(a+)+"). Analyzes 1 to 20 patterns with recheck (automaton analysis with a fuzzing fallback) for backtracking engines with JavaScript syntax, and returns per pattern: safe (proven linear, or no attack found when backreferences or lookarounds force fuzzing), or vulnerable with the complexity (exponential, or polynomial with its degree), a concrete attack string (repr like 'a'.repeat(31) + '\\x00', plus the string itself when short), the hot part of the pattern and a fix hint. Example: {"patterns":["^(a+)+$","/^([a-z]+\\s)*$/","^[\\w.+-]+@[\\w-]+\\.[\\w.-]+$"]}. Python re, PCRE, Java, .NET and Ruby backtrack the same way on these constructs; RE2, Go regexp and Rust regex are linear-time and not affected. To also run the pattern on test strings, use sieve_test_regex.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check regular expressions for ReDoS (catastrophic backtracking)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sieve_test_regexUse when you have written, been given or are about to commit a regular expression and need to know what it really matches, instead of predicting it (signals: "write a regex for", "…1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,644 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...l when clean), error? and hint? (invalid patterns), notes, checked_at, open_url}."
Description, as the server wrote it Use when you have written, been given or are about to commit a regular expression and need to know what it really matches, instead of predicting it (signals: "write a regex for", "does this regex match", "validate emails/phone numbers/dates/slugs/URLs with a regex", "why doesn't my regex match", "test this pattern", "regex for Go", "is this regex safe", "catastrophic backtracking", "convert this Python regex to JavaScript"). Executes the pattern on the real engine: JavaScript (V8 RegExp, the engine in Chrome, Node.js and Cloudflare Workers; flags d g i m s u v y) or RE2 (re2js, with Go regexp parity: Go, RE2, Google Sheets and BigQuery syntax; flags i m s). Give strings that must match and strings that must not; each case comes back pass/fail with the matched text, index and capture groups (numbered and named), and why a "should not match" string matched (usually a missing ^...$). match: "full" tests the whole string. texts lists every match, replace_with shows the replacement ($1/$<name> in JavaScript, $1/${name} in Go). For JavaScript it also runs a ReDoS analysis (recheck): proven linear, or exponential/polynomial backtracking with a concrete attack string and the hot part of the pattern. Flags patterns that compile but mislead: ^a|b$ anchoring, \A/\Z/\h read as letters, [[:alpha:]], {,3}, [A-z], unescaped dots before extensions. Invalid patterns return the engine's error and a hint (Python (?P<name>), (?i), possessive and atomic groups; lookarounds and backreferences in RE2). Example: {"pattern":"[\\w.+-]+@[\\w-]+\\.[a-z]{2,}","should_match":["ann@example.com"],"should_not_match":["ann@example","see ann@x.io now"]}. Does not run Python, PCRE, Java or .NET engines; it reports what differs for common constructs. Up to 100 strings of 20000 characters; on a ReDoS-vulnerable pattern, long strings are skipped instead of hanging. Returns {valid, verdict: ok|warnings|redos|fails|invalid, summary, engine, engine_name, pattern, flags, match_mode, counts:{should_match, should_not_match, texts, passed, failed, skipped}, group_count, cases:[{text, length, expect: match|no_match|any, matched, pass (null = skipped), match_count, match:{text, index, end, groups?, named?}, matches? (texts only), why?, replaced?, skipped?}], warnings:[{rule, message, fix?, index?}], redos:{status: safe|vulnerable|unknown, complexity: linear|polynomial (degree n)|exponential|no attack found|unknown, attack?:{repr, length, string|null, sample}, hotspots?:[{start, end, text}], explanation?, fix_hint?, note?}|null, fix_message (ready-to-apply list, null when clean), error? and hint? (invalid patterns), notes, checked_at, open_url}.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Run a regular expression on test strings (JavaScript or RE2/Go) and check it for ReDoS
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://sieve.clawhard.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including sieve_test_regex (write), sieve_check_redos (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infosieve_test_regex
The description is 2,644 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...l when clean), error? and hint? (invalid patterns), notes, checked_at, open_url}."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http sieve https://sieve.clawhard.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http sieve https://sieve.clawhard.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__sieve__sieve_test_regex",
"mcp__sieve__sieve_check_redos"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sieve. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.clawhard/sieve/verify?hash=148982dd06365bf15156b31d36df51d6ce8ce35837ac8d508861c31dd8ffe958" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 148982dd0636, from Nov 20, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/sieve/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/sieve)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
Sieve MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Sieve MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Sieve MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Sieve MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Sieve MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. sieve_test_regex and sieve_check_redos.
Does the Sieve MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Sieve MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Sieve MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.