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Spill MCP server

com.clawhard/spillclawhard.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Find leaked API keys, tokens and passwords in pasted text, see which are live, get a clean copy.

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings, 2 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Spill MCP server can do

The Spill MCP server is published by clawhard.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: spill_scan_secrets), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 3 findings, 2 of them high severity (sensitive-path and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • spill_scan_secretsUse when the user asks whether some text contains secrets, or before you paste, commit, share, log or send code, a .env file, a diff, config, logs, a stack trace or a prompt that m…3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to ".env".

      Matched text

      description: "...ste, commit, share, log or send code, a .env file, a diff, config, logs, a stack tra..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...ck trace or a prompt that might contain credentials, for example "did I leak a key in this?..."

      What this check looks for
    • High

      The input schema at properties.text.description refers to ".env".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.text.description: "The text to scan: code, a diff, .env, config, logs, a stack trace, a chat or..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when the user asks whether some text contains secrets, or before you paste, commit, share, log or send code, a .env file, a diff, config, logs, a stack trace or a prompt that might contain credentials, for example "did I leak a key in this?", "is this safe to post?" or "redact the secrets in this log". Detects 48 services by exact key format (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini/Google, Groq, xAI, OpenRouter, Stripe, Supabase, AWS, GitHub, GitLab, npm, PyPI, Slack, Discord, Twilio, SendGrid, Resend, Shopify, Cloudflare and more) plus PEM private keys, database URLs with passwords, JWTs, Authorization headers and high-entropy values in variables named like secret, token, api_key or password. It verifies what it can deterministically: GitHub token CRC32 checksums, JWT and Supabase key role and expiry (service_role vs anon), documented example keys and placeholders, and NEXT_PUBLIC_/VITE_/EXPO_PUBLIC_ variables that ship to every browser. Returns findings with severity (critical, high, medium, public, info), line and column, a masked preview (never the full secret), why it matters, the fix and the provider's revoke URL, plus a redacted copy with labels like [STRIPE_SECRET_KEY_1]. Text is processed in memory to answer and is not stored. Limits: format-based, so a random secret with a neutral name can be missed; it never tests keys against providers; up to 200,000 characters. The same scanner also runs entirely in the browser at https://spill.clawhard.com.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Find and redact API keys, tokens, private keys and passwords in text
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 5, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://spill.clawhard.com/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including spill_scan_secrets (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 high1 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http spill https://spill.clawhard.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http spill https://spill.clawhard.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__spill__spill_scan_secrets"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as spill. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.clawhard/spill/verify?hash=211439010b7d8917e33df3abc3d0bc143ead460646ddcc9b02014185a5cedf40" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 211439010b7d, from Nov 18, 2026, 08:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/spill/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.clawhard/spill
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.clawhard/spill.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/spill)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 4, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Spill MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Spill MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings (2 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Spill MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Spill MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Spill MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. spill_scan_secrets.

Does the Spill MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Spill MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Spill MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.