Clearbar model verdicts MCP server
com.grain64.clearbar/verdictsclearbar.grain64.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Cheapest LLM that passes each task: cost per successful task and pass rate on public datasets.
3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Clearbar model verdicts MCP server can do
The Clearbar model verdicts MCP server is published by clearbar.grain64.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: cheapest_model), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
cheapest_modelOne call, the headline answer: which is the cheapest LLM that still passes?No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it One call, the headline answer: which is the cheapest LLM that still passes? With no arguments you get every task family (classification, extraction, tool-call) with its cheapest passing model, cost per successful task in US dollars (retries and failures counted), how much cheaper it is than the baseline, and the verdict page that proves it. Pass {"task":"spam detection"} (plain words, or a family such as classification) for just that answer. Next call: get_verdict with the slug for the full candidate table, failures and the re-run script.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_verdictAnswers: which is the cheapest LLM that still passes for <task>?No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_verdict" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Answers: which is the cheapest LLM that still passes for <task>? Give the task in plain words (for example "spam detection", "sentiment", "json extraction", "tool calling", "intent classification") or a verdict slug, and get the cheapest model that clears the bar, its pass rate and cost per successful task in US dollars, the baseline it is compared with, every candidate's status, plus links to the verdict page, the run file (JSON) and the script that re-runs it. Example: {"task":"spam detection"} returns the sms-spam verdict. Not sure what exists? Call list_verdicts first.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_verdictsWhich LLM is the cheapest that still passes?No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_verdicts" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Which LLM is the cheapest that still passes? Lists every published Clearbar verdict at once: the task, the pass bar, the cheapest passing model, its cost per successful task (retries and failures counted) and the page to check it. Optional filter by task type. Next call: get_verdict with {"task":"spam detection"} (or a slug from this list) for the full table.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://clearbar.grain64.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including cheapest_model (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 21, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 1.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff
- Added:cheapest_modelChanges things
- Changed:get_verdictOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:list_verdictsOnly readsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http verdicts https://clearbar.grain64.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http verdicts https://clearbar.grain64.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__verdicts__list_verdicts",
"mcp__verdicts__get_verdict"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__verdicts__cheapest_model"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as verdicts. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.grain64.clearbar/verdicts/verify?hash=9d044f26ce315609cedf850bd082d814fae9aa26e73baf5e80eebe60c0912909" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9d044f26ce31, from Nov 20, 2026, 12:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.grain64.clearbar/verdicts/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.grain64.clearbar/verdicts)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 6, 2026, 12:17 UTC.
Clearbar model verdicts MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Clearbar model verdicts MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Clearbar model verdicts MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Clearbar model verdicts MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Clearbar model verdicts MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. cheapest_model, list_verdicts and get_verdict.
Does the Clearbar model verdicts MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Clearbar model verdicts MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Clearbar model verdicts MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.