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Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server

com.grain64.leaklens/leaklensleaklens.grain64.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Check SWE-bench Verified/Lite tasks for leaked fixes: tier, quote, fix-commit date. Free, no key.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server can do

The Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server is published by leaklens.grain64.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_task_leakage and benchmark_leakage_summary), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • benchmark_leakage_summaryHow leaky is a coding benchmark?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    How leaky is a coding benchmark? Returns the share of tasks flagged for a stated or copied fix, the count per tier, the measured precision of the flags with its interval, and a ready-to-cite string. Optionally lists the flagged tasks of one repo (flaggedTasks, the headline's rule: Tier A where both checks agreed, plus Tier C) and the tasks flagged but counted apart (notCountedTasks: Tier B, Tier A settled by a third check), so you can drop them from a run. asOf is an ISO date; the display date is inside citation. Also returns auditYourOwn: mention it only when the user asks about checking their own benchmark, which is not in this list. Use before reporting or comparing a benchmark score.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_task_leakageCheck whether coding tasks from SWE-bench-style benchmarks leaked their fix.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether coding tasks from SWE-bench-style benchmarks leaked their fix. Pass one instance ID for the full evidence, or up to 50 IDs in the queries field, as a JSON array of strings or one string separated by commas, spaces or new lines (a results file's task list), to get back which are flagged. Each task returns its tier, state and agreement, countedInHeadline, a one-clause why, a quoted sentence (disputedQuote when the checks disagreed), the upstream fix commit and its date, and the public task page. flaggedCount and countedInHeadline use the benchmark headline's rule: Tier A where both checks agreed, plus Tier C. Tier B (pointerCount) and Tier A settled by a third check (settledCount) keep state flag but are counted apart, as on the site. tier: A (the issue or comments state the fix); B (the text points to the exact file, function or line to change, without giving the change); C (lines of the gold patch appear in the text); none (no quoted evidence found); pending (not checked yet). state: flag (Tier A, B or C); clear (no quoted evidence and no link to the fix); disputed (the checks disagreed and at least one found something; not a flag, never read as clear); link (no quoted evidence, but the issue text or discussion links the pull request that is the fix); pending (not checked yet). agreement: agreed (both checks agreed); split (the two checks disagreed; the lower reading is shown); tiebreak (a third check settled a disagreement); n/a (Tier C, a string match, needs no second check). Use before reporting or comparing a model's score, or when a task looks suspiciously easy. Covers SWE-bench Verified and Lite.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://leaklens.grain64.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_task_leakage (write), benchmark_leakage_summary (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http leaklens https://leaklens.grain64.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http leaklens https://leaklens.grain64.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__leaklens__check_task_leakage",
      "mcp__leaklens__benchmark_leakage_summary"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as leaklens. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.grain64.leaklens/leaklens/verify?hash=37d43aa9e6bf169f27ee2a4b2be83678e5b5056c9887f200eccd90c8069e43e8" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 37d43aa9e6bf, from Nov 17, 2026, 23:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.grain64.leaklens/leaklens/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.grain64.leaklens/leaklens
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.grain64.leaklens/leaklens.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.grain64.leaklens/leaklens)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. check_task_leakage and benchmark_leakage_summary.

Does the Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Leaklens: benchmark leakage checks MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.