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Hop With Ann route finder MCP server

com.hopwithann/route-finderhopwithann.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Philippines island-hopping routes, usual ferry times and trip enquiries

3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Hop With Ann route finder MCP server can do

The Hop With Ann route finder MCP server is published by hopwithann.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_enquiry), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (find_route); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (send_enquiry); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_enquiry). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • send_enquirySend the traveller's trip plan to Ann for a free quote.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_enquiry" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "send_enquiry" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send the traveller's trip plan to Ann for a free quote. ONLY use after the traveller has clearly agreed to share their name and contact details with Hop With Ann. Ann replies within 24 hours (usually the same day) by email or WhatsApp. This does not book or charge anything.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • find_routeIsland-hopping route from A to B in the Philippines: legs, usual departure times, notes and a pre-filled link for the traveller to request a quote.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_route" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "note": it reads notes.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Island-hopping route from A to B in the Philippines: legs, usual departure times, notes and a pre-filled link for the traveller to request a quote. No prices, no live availability.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_routesEvery route Hop With Ann has a page for, with door-to-door time.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_routes" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every route Hop With Ann has a page for, with door-to-door time.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__route-finder__send_enquiry"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://hopwithann.com/api/mcp/: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including send_enquiry (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http route-finder https://hopwithann.com/api/mcp/
claude mcp add --transport http route-finder https://hopwithann.com/api/mcp/

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__route-finder__find_route",
      "mcp__route-finder__list_routes"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__route-finder__send_enquiry"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as route-finder. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__route-finder__find_route private-data
  • mcp__route-finder__send_enquiry untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.hopwithann/route-finder/verify?hash=caf7405af82dc6052f58edf7fd7341bd0deafda14e2ebdad80eaa7328fcccbc0" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash caf7405af82d, from Nov 20, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.hopwithann/route-finder/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.hopwithann/route-finder
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.hopwithann/route-finder.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.hopwithann/route-finder)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

Hop With Ann route finder MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Hop With Ann route finder MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Hop With Ann route finder MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Hop With Ann route finder MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_enquiry.

What tools does the Hop With Ann route finder MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 read. send_enquiry, find_route and list_routes.

Does the Hop With Ann route finder MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Hop With Ann route finder MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_enquiry.

Has the Hop With Ann route finder MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.