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Server and secret guardrails MCP server

com.testedtemplates/ops-guardrailstestedtemplates.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Local checks for sudo, systemd, sshd, ufw, and secret leaks before an agent applies them.

4 tools: 1 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Server and secret guardrails MCP server can do

The Server and secret guardrails MCP server is published by testedtemplates.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: install_local), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (list_checks).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • install_localReturn the local install file, its sha256, and client config.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "install_local" says "install": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "install_local" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "install_local" says "install": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the local install file, its sha256, and client config. Optional client: claude-desktop, claude-code, cursor, gemini, codex.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Return the local install
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • list_checksList the local checks (audit_server_snippet, scan_secret_leak, rewrite_safe_curl).Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_checks" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "secret": it reads secrets.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the local checks (audit_server_snippet, scan_secret_leak, rewrite_safe_curl). This endpoint cannot run them on text you send.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List local checks
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • productsReturn the $19 and $39 kit URLs, the install page, and the registry remote.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the $19 and $39 kit URLs, the install page, and the registry remote. This endpoint does not read files.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Kit and registry links
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sample_findingsShow finding ids from built-in public fixtures.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "show": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show finding ids from built-in public fixtures. Does not read the request.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Show sample findings
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:48 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://testedtemplates.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including install_local (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "install_local" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "install_local" says "install": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ops-guardrails https://testedtemplates.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http ops-guardrails https://testedtemplates.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__ops-guardrails__list_checks",
      "mcp__ops-guardrails__sample_findings",
      "mcp__ops-guardrails__products"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ops-guardrails__install_local"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ops-guardrails. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__ops-guardrails__list_checks private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.testedtemplates/ops-guardrails/verify?hash=dbadccdad4045c10201d545d41971aa5c23cc1b677195cfeadebcbeff15fdde5" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash dbadccdad404, from Nov 14, 2026, 13:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.testedtemplates/ops-guardrails/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.testedtemplates/ops-guardrails
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.testedtemplates/ops-guardrails.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.testedtemplates/ops-guardrails)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:06 UTC.

Server and secret guardrails MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Server and secret guardrails MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Server and secret guardrails MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Server and secret guardrails MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Server and secret guardrails MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 write, 3 read. install_local, list_checks, sample_findings and products.

Does the Server and secret guardrails MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Server and secret guardrails MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Server and secret guardrails MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.