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The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server

com.thelogfile/catalog-browserthelogfile.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Read-only browser for The Log File store catalog: Chad Kovac's books and house skills, live.

5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server can do

The The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server is published by thelogfile.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: store_facts), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (list_skills).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • store_factsThe store facts a visiting bot needs: how many books stand published, the direct price, the skill points rule, free first chapters, and the store addresses.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "store_facts" says "store": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The store facts a visiting bot needs: how many books stand published, the direct price, the skill points rule, free first chapters, and the store addresses.
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_bookRead one book's full catalog entry, including its blurb, by slug.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_book" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one book's full catalog entry, including its blurb, by slug.
  • list_booksList Chad Kovac's book catalog: titles, series, genres, formats, and Kindle price, each with its book door address.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_books" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List Chad Kovac's book catalog: titles, series, genres, formats, and Kindle price, each with its book door address.
  • list_skillsList the skills for sale at The Log File store, with tier, category, and price.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_skills" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the skills for sale at The Log File store, with tier, category, and price. Optionally filter by tier (Basic, Standard, Advanced).
  • search_catalogSearch skills and books by name, slug, or category.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_catalog" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search skills and books by name, slug, or category.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: The operation was aborted due to timeout

Posture changes

  1. Nov 21, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-03-26 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-03-26 to none

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http catalog-browser https://thelogfile.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http catalog-browser https://thelogfile.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__catalog-browser__list_skills",
      "mcp__catalog-browser__list_books",
      "mcp__catalog-browser__get_book",
      "mcp__catalog-browser__search_catalog"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__catalog-browser__store_facts"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as catalog-browser. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__catalog-browser__list_skills private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.thelogfile/catalog-browser/verify?hash=8e67f5892e55a11756e18e6c5349d05c9b28e72fac8cfe450e23788528c9763e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8e67f5892e55, from Nov 13, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.thelogfile/catalog-browser/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.thelogfile/catalog-browser
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.thelogfile/catalog-browser.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.thelogfile/catalog-browser)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 write, 4 read. store_facts, list_skills, list_books, get_book and search_catalog.

Does the The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the The Log File Catalog Browser MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.