Who Got Hacked MCP server
com.whogothacked/mcpwhogothacked.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Data breach records, each linked to a regulator filing or Have I Been Pwned.
6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Who Got Hacked MCP server can do
The Who Got Hacked MCP server is published by whogothacked.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_organization, recent_breaches and about_data), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
about_dataHow whogothacked.com verifies records, which sources it reads, how many records it holds and when each source was last read: the data's coverage and freshness.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it How whogothacked.com verifies records, which sources it reads, how many records it holds and when each source was last read: the data's coverage and freshness. Records are verified from regulator filings and Have I Been Pwned; a threat actor's claim is never a source. A miss means there is no record here, not that no breach happened. Counts from different sources are not additive.
Annotations the server declares
- title: About the data
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
check_organizationAnswers 'is there anything on record for this organization: a breach notice, an 8-K disclosure or a catalog entry?' from a domain or a name.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Answers 'is there anything on record for this organization: a breach notice, an 8-K disclosure or a catalog entry?' from a domain or a name. At least one is required; a domain is tried first. found is true only for an exact domain or an exact name (case, punctuation and legal forms such as Inc. are ignored), and then every incident and its sources are returned. A parent domain or a similar name is never treated as the answer: those organizations are listed under candidates. Records are verified from regulator filings and Have I Been Pwned; a threat actor's claim is never a source. A miss means there is no record here, not that no breach happened. Counts from different sources are not additive.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check an organization
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
recent_breachesIncidents newest first by the date they were first on record, optionally within a date range.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Incidents newest first by the date they were first on record, optionally within a date range. That date is a filing's date, or the day Have I Been Pwned added an entry to its catalog, and each incident's firstDateKind says which; it is not when the breach happened. Records are verified from regulator filings and Have I Been Pwned; a threat actor's claim is never a source. A miss means there is no record here, not that no breach happened. Counts from different sources are not additive.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Breaches most recently on record
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_incidentOne incident by id (as this server's results give it) with its tier, dates, figures, summary and the source records that establish it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_incident" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it One incident by id (as this server's results give it) with its tier, dates, figures, summary and the source records that establish it. A California source record can carry `noticeLetter`, a passage quoted from its notice letter, with a credit line. An id can be retired, for example when its incident is merged into another, re-minted under its own organization, or replaced after a rollback; a retired id returns the current incident, with redirectedFrom naming the id asked for. An incident id made from a slug that named a person who is not the organization (for example, an officer named in the filer's name) is withdrawn, not retired: it is not found (the API answers 404, with no redirect), and its incident goes on under another id. Records are verified from regulator filings and Have I Been Pwned; a threat actor's claim is never a source. A miss means there is no record here, not that no breach happened. Counts from different sources are not additive.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get one incident
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_organizationFull record for one organization by slug (as this server's results give it): every incident with its tier, dates, figures, data exposed, summary and the source records behind it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_organization" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Full record for one organization by slug (as this server's results give it): every incident with its tier, dates, figures, data exposed, summary and the source records behind it. A California source record can carry `noticeLetter`, a passage quoted from its notice letter, with a credit line. A slug can be retired, for example when its organization is merged into another, or replaced after a rollback; a retired slug returns the current organization, with redirectedFrom naming the slug asked for. A slug that named a person who is not the organization (for example, an officer named in the filer's name) is withdrawn, not retired: it is not found (the API answers 404, with no redirect), and its organization goes on under another slug. Records are verified from regulator filings and Have I Been Pwned; a threat actor's claim is never a source. A miss means there is no record here, not that no breach happened. Counts from different sources are not additive.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get an organization's record
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_breachesSearches whogothacked.com's record for organizations by name or domain.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_breaches" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Searches whogothacked.com's record for organizations by name or domain. Returns each match with its slug, incident count, the date its latest incident was first on record, the tier of that incident and source links. Records are verified from regulator filings and Have I Been Pwned; a threat actor's claim is never a source. A miss means there is no record here, not that no breach happened. Counts from different sources are not additive.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search breach records
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://whogothacked.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including check_organization (write), recent_breaches (write), about_data (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http whogothacked https://whogothacked.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http whogothacked https://whogothacked.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__whogothacked__search_breaches",
"mcp__whogothacked__get_organization",
"mcp__whogothacked__get_incident"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__whogothacked__check_organization",
"mcp__whogothacked__recent_breaches",
"mcp__whogothacked__about_data"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as whogothacked. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.whogothacked/mcp/verify?hash=bd37d2de503c29de808b74d409ab668c736932de756476f3fbfac04da36b7062" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash bd37d2de503c, from Nov 20, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.whogothacked/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.whogothacked/mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
Who Got Hacked MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Who Got Hacked MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Who Got Hacked MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Who Got Hacked MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Who Got Hacked MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. check_organization, recent_breaches, about_data, search_breaches, get_organization and get_incident.
Does the Who Got Hacked MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Who Got Hacked MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Who Got Hacked MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.