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sanctions MCP server

dev.cz-agents/sanctionscz-agents.devstreamable-httpv0.1.5Scanned

Sanctions screening for KYC/AML — EU FSF + OFAC SDN checks for Czech companies & individuals.

6 tools: 2 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the sanctions MCP server can do

The sanctions MCP server is published by cz-agents.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_ico and rescreen_portfolio), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (search_person, search_entity, check_ico and 3 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.1.5.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_icoCheck whether a Czech IČO (or any company by IČO) appears on sanctions lists.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a Czech IČO (or any company by IČO) appears on sanctions lists. Direct exact-ID lookup; pass `name` to also fuzzy-match if no direct hit.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check IČO Against Sanctions
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • rescreen_portfolioPAID.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAID. Re-screen your own list of subjects against sanctions-list changes since a given date. Answers "which of MY clients were affected", which list_recent_updates cannot: that tool returns the global change feed, this one intersects it with your portfolio. Requires payment via x402; call without payment first to receive the terms.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Re-screen Portfolio Against List Changes (paid)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_listingRetrieve the full record for a single sanctions listing by its ID (format: `${source}:${source_list_id}`, e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_listing" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve the full record for a single sanctions listing by its ID (format: `${source}:${source_list_id}`, e.g. "ofac:12345" or "eu:EU.123.789").

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Sanctions Listing Detail
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_recent_updatesList sanctions added/removed/modified since a given date.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_recent_updates" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List sanctions added/removed/modified since a given date. Use for daily monitoring against a watchlist.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Recent Sanctions Updates
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • search_entityFuzzy-search a sanctioned entity (company, organization) by name.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_entity" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fuzzy-search a sanctioned entity (company, organization) by name. Optional country narrows results.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search Sanctioned Entity
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • search_personFuzzy-search a sanctioned person by name across all loaded lists.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_person" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fuzzy-search a sanctioned person by name across all loaded lists. Optional date of birth and nationality narrow results. Returns matches with confidence scores (0-100). 100 = exact ID match, 80+ = strong fuzzy match, lower = review needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search Sanctioned Person
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including check_ico (write), rescreen_portfolio (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http sanctions https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http sanctions https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__sanctions__search_person",
      "mcp__sanctions__search_entity",
      "mcp__sanctions__get_listing",
      "mcp__sanctions__list_recent_updates"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__sanctions__check_ico",
      "mcp__sanctions__rescreen_portfolio"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sanctions. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__sanctions__search_person untrusted-input
  • mcp__sanctions__search_entity untrusted-input
  • mcp__sanctions__check_ico untrusted-input
  • mcp__sanctions__get_listing untrusted-input
  • mcp__sanctions__list_recent_updates untrusted-input
  • mcp__sanctions__rescreen_portfolio untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.cz-agents/sanctions/verify?hash=961b5bff02ef8aedd49471a0cc845336aff5efb783cbb50abd1e200351178543" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 961b5bff02ef, from Nov 17, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.cz-agents/sanctions/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.cz-agents/sanctions
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.cz-agents/sanctions.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.cz-agents/sanctions)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.

sanctions MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the sanctions MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the sanctions MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the sanctions MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the sanctions MCP server have?

6 tools: 2 write, 4 read. check_ico, rescreen_portfolio, search_person, search_entity, get_listing and list_recent_updates.

Does the sanctions MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the sanctions MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the sanctions MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.