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MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR

dev.modelmarket/mcp-securitymodelmarket.devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Scan MCP tool definitions for poisoning, look up server history, count tool-list tokens. Free.

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR can do

The MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR is published by modelmarket.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: warden_scan, histor_check and x402_check), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (warden_scan, histor_check, tool_list_cost and 1 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (histor_check).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • histor_checkLook up an MCP server in HISTOR, a public append-only log of MCP tool sets: when its tool set was first pinned, how often it changed, and what the pattern scan found.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up an MCP server in HISTOR, a public append-only log of MCP tool sets: when its tool set was first pinned, how often it changed, and what the pattern scan found. HISTOR answers from its own observations and never contacts the server.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Server history (HISTOR)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • warden_scanScan an MCP server's tools/list with WARDEN, the open-source MCP firewall: static rules and a threat list over every name, description, schema and annotation.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan an MCP server's tools/list with WARDEN, the open-source MCP firewall: static rules and a threat list over every name, description, schema and annotation. Returns allow or block and each finding with its rule and severity. Quoted fragments of the scanned text are left out of the answer.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Scan tool definitions (WARDEN)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • x402_checkCheck a signed x402 USDC payment before submitting it: recovers the EIP-712 signer, runs USDC's own checks and the seller's terms, and when the signature fails names the domain it …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a signed x402 USDC payment before submitting it: recovers the EIP-712 signer, runs USDC's own checks and the seller's terms, and when the signature fails names the domain it was really made for (e.g. Base Sepolia's 'USDC' used on Base, where USDC is 'USD Coin').

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: x402 payment check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • tool_list_costHow many tokens an MCP server's tool list adds to every model request, what that costs per 1,000 requests, the heaviest tools, and where it sits among 18,204 packages and 16,170 re…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "tool_list_cost" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    How many tokens an MCP server's tool list adds to every model request, what that costs per 1,000 requests, the heaviest tools, and where it sits among 18,204 packages and 16,170 remote servers. Send a tools/list or name a server HISTOR observes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Tool list token cost
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including warden_scan (write), histor_check (write), x402_check (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http security https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security
claude mcp add --transport http security https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__security__tool_list_cost"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__security__warden_scan",
      "mcp__security__histor_check",
      "mcp__security__x402_check"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as security. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__security__warden_scan untrusted-input
  • mcp__security__histor_check untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__security__tool_list_cost untrusted-input
  • mcp__security__x402_check untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.modelmarket/mcp-security/verify?hash=c0dbd21d348a1cfb9417ed311344e40dd0ec7900e1f5e086723b78029efd76b7" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c0dbd21d348a, from Nov 17, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.modelmarket/mcp-security/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.modelmarket/mcp-security
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.modelmarket/mcp-security.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.modelmarket/mcp-security)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.

MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. warden_scan, histor_check, x402_check and tool_list_cost.

Does the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): histor_check.

Has the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.