store MCP server
dev.pages.datanest-stores/storedatanest-stores.pages.devstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Search and preview Datanest developer products, then prepare buyer-authorized Stripe Checkout.
7 tools: 2 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 3
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the store MCP server can do
The store MCP server is published by datanest-stores.pages.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: create_checkout_link and get_purchase_access), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
3 tools read private data (get_product_details, compare_products and get_product_preview); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (get_product_details, create_checkout_link, check_order_status and 1 more).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
create_checkout_linkSIDE-EFFECTING: creates a short-lived Stripe Checkout session/link for ONE product (quantity fixed to 1) and returns only the hosted checkout URL, product summary, exact price, and…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_checkout_link" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it SIDE-EFFECTING: creates a short-lived Stripe Checkout session/link for ONE product (quantity fixed to 1) and returns only the hosted checkout URL, product summary, exact price, and expiry. The price and Stripe price id are resolved server-side from trusted catalogue data — client-supplied price/amount/currency/name/price-id are ignored/rejected. The buyer must explicitly authorize payment in Stripe Checkout; NO card is charged autonomously. Products that are unaudited/deprecated/not agent-sellable are rejected.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Create Stripe checkout link
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_purchase_accessAUTHENTICATED: for a buyer who already completed a purchase, returns a short-lived (~15 min), single-purpose signed download link for THEIR order only.Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_purchase_access" says "get": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: ".... Ownership is proven by an unguessable credential issued at fulfilment — the Stripe sessi..."
- Warn
The server marks "get_purchase_access" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_purchase_access" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it AUTHENTICATED: for a buyer who already completed a purchase, returns a short-lived (~15 min), single-purpose signed download link for THEIR order only. Ownership is proven by an unguessable credential issued at fulfilment — the Stripe session_id or the download token. Reuses the existing entitlement + signed-link service; each call consumes one of the limited downloads. Cannot list or access other purchasers' orders.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
check_order_statusPoll the status of a checkout session created by create_checkout_link.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "check_order_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Poll the status of a checkout session created by create_checkout_link. Returns a coarse status (paid | open | expired | unknown) and the recommended next step, with NO buyer PII. When status is "paid", call get_purchase_access with the same session_id to obtain the download link.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
compare_productsCompare 2–4 products factually, using only stored metadata (price, license, versions, prerequisites, files, verification status, etc.).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "compare_products" says "compare": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "compare" and "file": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Compare 2–4 products factually, using only stored metadata (price, license, versions, prerequisites, files, verification status, etc.). Never fabricates differences or suitability claims. Read-only and public.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_product_detailsReturn the full factual detail for one product: exact title, price/currency, short + detailed description, included files, prerequisites, supported technologies/versions, install t…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_product_details" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "file": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the full factual detail for one product: exact title, price/currency, short + detailed description, included files, prerequisites, supported technologies/versions, install time, license, latest version, last verified date, verification status, compatibility notes, preview URL, product page URL, and stable product_id/SKU. Read-only and public.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_product_previewReturn SAFE public previews only: documentation excerpts, a file-name tree, screenshot/demo links, and sample snippets intended for public display.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_product_preview" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "file": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Return SAFE public previews only: documentation excerpts, a file-name tree, screenshot/demo links, and sample snippets intended for public display. Never returns the purchased ZIP, private storage URLs, secrets, whole paid source files, or signed download URLs. Read-only and public.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_productsSearch the Datanest catalogue of digital technical products.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_products" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the Datanest catalogue of digital technical products. Accepts natural-language intent queries (e.g. "add authentication to my SaaS", "reduce my AWS bill", "prepare for a system design interview") — stopwords and phrasing are handled, and synonyms are expanded. Returns concise product cards ranked by relevance, with stable canonical URLs. If a query matches little, the result includes suggestions/did_you_mean/available_domains so you can refine. Read-only and public. By default only agent-purchasable products are returned; set include_unsellable=true to also surface unaudited/deprecated items (clearly flagged, not buyable).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data3
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:52 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://datanest-stores.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including create_checkout_link (write), get_purchase_access (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "get_purchase_access" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_purchase_access" says "get": a word for reading.
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: ".... Ownership is proven by an unguessable credential issued at fulfilment — the Stripe sessi..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http store https://datanest-stores.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http store https://datanest-stores.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__store__search_products",
"mcp__store__get_product_details",
"mcp__store__compare_products",
"mcp__store__get_product_preview",
"mcp__store__check_order_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__store__create_checkout_link",
"mcp__store__get_purchase_access"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as store. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__store__get_product_details private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__store__compare_products private-data
- mcp__store__get_product_preview private-data
- mcp__store__create_checkout_link untrusted-input
- mcp__store__check_order_status untrusted-input
- mcp__store__get_purchase_access untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.pages.datanest-stores/store/verify?hash=0f0891eb88f5dcc7737aeb63261d476d90691e012746c88fe3348832663e0c23" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 0f0891eb88f5, from Nov 11, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.pages.datanest-stores/store/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.pages.datanest-stores/store)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.
store MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the store MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the store MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the store MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the store MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 2 write, 5 read. create_checkout_link, get_purchase_access, search_products, get_product_details, compare_products, get_product_preview and check_order_status.
Does the store MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the store MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the store MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.