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CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server

eu.coudrebros/nft-mintingcoudrebros.eustreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Pay-and-mint Cardano NFT (CIP-25) in one atomic tx. Non-custodial. MCP-native. Mainnet.

6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server can do

The CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server is published by coudrebros.eu, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (prepare_payment) and create or change data (3 tools: register, mint and prepare_atomic_mint), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • prepare_paymentBuild an unsigned transaction that pays the mint fee from from_address to the operator, with change returned to from_address.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "prepare_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build an unsigned transaction that pays the mint fee from from_address to the operator, with change returned to from_address. You (or your human operator) sign and submit it yourself -- this server never sees or holds private keys. Entirely optional: you can send the payment with any tool of your choice and skip this.
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • mintMint an NFT after separately paying the mint fee (see prepare_payment or pay any other way, then wait for on-chain confirmation -- check_payment_status).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mint an NFT after separately paying the mint fee (see prepare_payment or pay any other way, then wait for on-chain confirmation -- check_payment_status). Pin your asset (and a thumbnail, for video) to IPFS yourself first; this server never stores files. Each payment transaction hash can only be used once -- a failed mint attempt does not consume it, retry with the same payment_tx. You are solely responsible for the content referenced by ipfs_hash.
  • prepare_atomic_mintBuild a single transaction that pays the mint fee from from_address AND mints the NFT to destination_address at the same time -- no separate payment step, no payment_tx.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a single transaction that pays the mint fee from from_address AND mints the NFT to destination_address at the same time -- no separate payment step, no payment_tx. Either both happen or neither does. The operator co-signs its own two witnesses (minting policy + its own fee-covering input) before returning the transaction -- inspect it before signing. You then add your own witness for from_address and submit: sign partially_signed_tx directly (cardano-cli 'transaction sign --tx-file <this> --signing-key-file <your key>', or a CIP-30 wallet's signTx(_, true) then merge the witness) and submit it yourself -- this server cannot sign or submit on your behalf. Pin your asset to IPFS yourself first. You are solely responsible for the content referenced by ipfs_hash.
  • registerRegister a new API key by paying a one-time fee.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register a new API key by paying a one-time fee. Pay the registration fee (see get_server_info) from the Cardano address you want your key bound to, sending it to the operator's payment_address, then call this with that transaction's hash. The payment must already be CONFIRMED on-chain (wait ~20-30s after submitting, or check with check_payment_status). One active key per address -- registering twice with the same address fails. Each payment transaction can only be used once, for registration or for a mint, not both.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • check_payment_statusCheck whether a payment transaction is confirmed on-chain yet.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_payment_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a payment transaction is confirmed on-chain yet. Poll this after paying and before calling 'register', 'mint', or trusting a payment_tx you're about to reference -- submitting a transaction does not mean it is confirmed.
  • get_server_infoEverything you need before your first call: where to send ADA, and how much.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_server_info" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Everything you need before your first call: where to send ADA, and how much. No API key required -- call this first, before 'register'.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://nftapi.coudrebros.eu/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including prepare_payment (irreversible), register (write), mint (write), prepare_atomic_mint (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http nft-minting https://nftapi.coudrebros.eu/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http nft-minting https://nftapi.coudrebros.eu/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__nft-minting__get_server_info",
      "mcp__nft-minting__check_payment_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__nft-minting__register",
      "mcp__nft-minting__prepare_payment",
      "mcp__nft-minting__mint",
      "mcp__nft-minting__prepare_atomic_mint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as nft-minting. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/eu.coudrebros/nft-minting/verify?hash=1926ca045dfb9c8b0c67ade38370d9a8557cd694658b578785e0e3b74ca5c591" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1926ca045dfb, from Nov 15, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.coudrebros/nft-minting/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for eu.coudrebros/nft-minting
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/eu.coudrebros/nft-minting.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.coudrebros/nft-minting)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.

CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: prepare_payment.

What tools does the CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server have?

6 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read. prepare_payment, register, mint, prepare_atomic_mint, get_server_info and check_payment_status.

Does the CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the CBROS Cardano NFT Minter MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.