CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server
eu.coudrebros/notarycoudrebros.eustreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Pay-and-anchor a hash or AI decision log on Cardano (CIP-0190). Non-custodial. MCP-native. Mainnet.
6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server can do
The CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server is published by coudrebros.eu, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: prepare_anchor, verify_proof and verify_decision_chain), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
prepare_anchorAnchors content_hash on chain.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Anchors content_hash on chain. Returns a partially-signed transaction (operator co-signed its fee input) -- add your own witness for from_address and submit. idempotency_key (optional) returns the same prior result on retry instead of building a new transaction.
verify_decision_chainIndependently checks a decision-log chain's integrity from chain data alone (gap-free seq, prev matches, each entry anchored).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Independently checks a decision-log chain's integrity from chain data alone (gap-free seq, prev matches, each entry anchored). No auth needed.
verify_proofAuthoritative on-chain check by tx_hash (and/or content_hash to compare against).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Authoritative on-chain check by tx_hash (and/or content_hash to compare against). No auth needed -- anyone holding a tx hash can verify it, like a receipt. Optionally pass content to re-hash locally server-side (never stored/logged).
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
check_anchor_statusLooks up a previously prepared anchor or decision-log entry by proof_id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "check_anchor_status" says "status": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Looks up a previously prepared anchor or decision-log entry by proof_id. Requires the api_key that created it.
get_notary_infoNo auth needed.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_notary_info" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it No auth needed. Price, min confirmations, spec version, and supported hash algorithms.
prepare_decision_logAppends one entry to your hash-chained decision log.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "prepare_decision_log" says "log": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Appends one entry to your hash-chained decision log. content_hash is the hash of your own RFC-8785-canonicalized decision record (never send the record itself -- see docs/decision-record-v1.md). seq starts at 0 and increments by 1 each call; prev must equal the previous entry's content_hash (omit only for seq=0). Returns a partially-signed transaction to sign and submit yourself.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 26, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://nftapi.coudrebros.eu/mcp/notary/: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including prepare_anchor (write), verify_proof (write), verify_decision_chain (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http notary https://nftapi.coudrebros.eu/mcp/notary/claude mcp add --transport http notary https://nftapi.coudrebros.eu/mcp/notary/Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__notary__get_notary_info",
"mcp__notary__prepare_decision_log",
"mcp__notary__check_anchor_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__notary__prepare_anchor",
"mcp__notary__verify_proof",
"mcp__notary__verify_decision_chain"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as notary. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/eu.coudrebros/notary/verify?hash=3d3298c09a5936cbfbe03b96b784904e7c7593f1bdcd11f9a0e4e24e175f0b18" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3d3298c09a59, from Nov 9, 2026, 07:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.coudrebros/notary/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.coudrebros/notary)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 25, 2026, 22:17 UTC.
CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. prepare_anchor, verify_proof, verify_decision_chain, get_notary_info, prepare_decision_log and check_anchor_status.
Does the CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the CBROS Notary & Decision Log MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.