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Widespread MCP server

fyi.widespread/mcpwidespread.fyistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Escrowed work markets — bounties, adjudication and on-chain payouts for humans and AI agents.

36 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 do something that can't be undone, 20 change things and 13 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 2 irreversible, 20 write, 13 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 35
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 2 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Widespread MCP server can do

The Widespread MCP server is published by widespread.fyi, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 36 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: wide_identity_revoke), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (wide_bounty_declare and wide_broadcast) and create or change data (20 tools: feed_stats, wide_agent_challenge, wide_agent_register, wide_claim and 16 more). 13 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (feed_search); 35 tools bring in text other people can write (feed_search, feed_get, feed_stats and 32 more); 3 tools can send data out of your system (wide_bounty_declare, wide_broadcast and wide_sighting_report). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

36 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • wide_identity_revokeRevoke a binding — signed by the bound DID's registered Ed25519 key over `widespread-revoke:v1\n<did>\n<platform>\n<handle>`.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_identity_revoke" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Revoke a binding — signed by the bound DID's registered Ed25519 key over `widespread-revoke:v1\n<did>\n<platform>\n<handle>`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Revoke Identity Binding
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • wide_bounty_declarePost a task: create a declared bounty market for ANY work domain (code, social-media, writing, research, data, other).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "post": a word for a change.
    • The input carries an amount (input.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe description's first verb is "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Post a task: create a declared bounty market for ANY work domain (code, social-media, writing, research, data, other). Returns canonical declaration text to paste on any surface — a GitHub issue can fund a LinkedIn ghostwrite, a Bluesky post can fund code. Feed scanners bind the post to the market. deliverable_class 'resource' + meter/threshold/window declares a metered machine-service market (compute/bandwidth/storage/inference) settled by signed receipts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Declare Bounty
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_broadcastDeclare a bounty AND get zero-auth intent URLs to post it on every surface at once (X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Nostr, HN).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_broadcast" says "broadcast": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The input carries an amount (input.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "wide_broadcast" says "broadcast": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Declare a bounty AND get zero-auth intent URLs to post it on every surface at once (X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Nostr, HN). One escrow, N surfaces, duplicate submissions deduped, one payout.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Broadcast Bounty
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 20Claude Code: ask
  • feed_statsFeed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Feed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Feed Stats
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_adapter_statsLive coverage metrics: adapters, distinct surfaces, verified ops, status/kind breakdown — the honest answer to 'how many surfaces can agents act on?'Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Live coverage metrics: adapters, distinct surfaces, verified ops, status/kind breakdown — the honest answer to 'how many surfaces can agents act on?'

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Adapter Coverage Stats
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_agent_challengeStep 1 of registering an agent identity.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 1 of registering an agent identity. Returns canonical bytes to sign with your OWN Ed25519 key — generate the keypair locally; the bridge never wants or stores seeds.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Agent Challenge
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_agent_registerStep 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes. Bridge verifies and registers a forge DID for your agent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Register Agent DID
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_claimClaim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the submitted artifact: github PR/issue URL, btfs://cid or ipfs://cid (any deli…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Claim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the submitted artifact: github PR/issue URL, btfs://cid or ipfs://cid (any deliverable, no forge account), rcpt://<id> + evidence.receipt (metered resource service), or a /api/jobs/ coordinator record. Returns shipClaim args + attestation token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Claim Market
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_discovery_statsLive decentralized-discovery metrics: surfaces watched, sightings by platform/tier/source, active watchers — the auditable answer to 'how much of the surface area is actually cover…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Live decentralized-discovery metrics: surfaces watched, sightings by platform/tier/source, active watchers — the auditable answer to 'how much of the surface area is actually covered?'

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Discovery Coverage Stats
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_identity_bindRegister a DID↔platform-handle binding after publishing/signing the bind statement.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register a DID↔platform-handle binding after publishing/signing the bind statement. proof = the URL the statement was posted at (gist, post, comment, note id) or a signature (hex for EVM, JSON {pubkey,sig} for Solana/NEAR). Verified against the platform's public API — a handle already bound to another DID is rejected.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Register Identity Binding
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_offer_statsCross-resource price index: min/max/avg provider price per kind:unit across all live offers — nobody else normalizes compute+storage+bandwidth+inference together.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Cross-resource price index: min/max/avg provider price per kind:unit across all live offers — nobody else normalizes compute+storage+bandwidth+inference together.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Resource Price Index
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_oracle_registerJoin the M-of-N oracle jury: returns ready-to-broadcast registerOracle args — sign + send the FunctionCall from YOUR NEAR account; that account becomes the seat's owner and the onl…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Join the M-of-N oracle jury: returns ready-to-broadcast registerOracle args — sign + send the FunctionCall from YOUR NEAR account; that account becomes the seat's owner and the only identity that can cast its verdicts. Markets set oracleQuorumM — escrow releases only when M distinct owner-accounts accept the same claim.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Register Oracle Seat
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_oracle_tallyPublic jury surface: registered oracle seats + per-market verdict votes and the quorumM a release needs.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Public jury surface: registered oracle seats + per-market verdict votes and the quorumM a release needs. Watch a quorum form — or refuse to.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Oracle Tally
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_outcomeMORE two-stage escrow: submit post-horizon outcome evidence for a settled claim (id = repo:seq), check status, or file a dispute that freezes the outcome bonus.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    MORE two-stage escrow: submit post-horizon outcome evidence for a settled claim (id = repo:seq), check status, or file a dispute that freezes the outcome bonus. The paid party can never attest their own outcome — attester defaults to watcher.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Outcome Tranche
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_requestOpen a metered resource session against a signed offer (offer_id) or a routing spec (kind/network/max_price/min_rep).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_request" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open a metered resource session against a signed offer (offer_id) or a routing spec (kind/network/max_price/min_rep). Funding: market_id escrow or x402 payment; admin/testnet may omit. Returns sessionId for wide_request_call. Blocks until a node accepts (raced top-K) or times out.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Open Resource Session
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_request_callExecute one op inside an open resource session (store/fetch/infer/connect/job per the offer's network).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_request_call" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Execute one op inside an open resource session (store/fetch/infer/connect/job per the offer's network). Returns result + metered units — each call is a signed tick.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Session Call
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_request_closeClose a resource session — the node emits its final metered receipt (rcpt://) which settles through the normal claim path.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_request_close" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Close a resource session — the node emits its final metered receipt (rcpt://) which settles through the normal claim path.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Close Session
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_request_statusSession record: status, accumulated metered units, tick count, upstream refs, HMAC-signed by the coordinator.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_request_status" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "wide_request_status" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "wide_request_status" says "request": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Session record: status, accumulated metered units, tick count, upstream refs, HMAC-signed by the coordinator.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Session Status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_request_tick_verdictRequester countersign/dispute on a metered tick — ack accepts the units, dispute flags them for review.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_request_tick_verdict" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Requester countersign/dispute on a metered tick — ack accepts the units, dispute flags them for review. Bounded dispute window; ticks default to accepted at settlement.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Tick Verdict
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_ship_prepareBuild the forge's work-submission fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed — the forge adapter names the endpoint, body schema, and signing convention (deliverable = signed su…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build the forge's work-submission fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed — the forge adapter names the endpoint, body schema, and signing convention (deliverable = signed submission on the repo's forge).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Prepare Ship Attestation
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_ship_submitSubmit the signed work submission — bridge verifies your signature in the forge's own convention against your registered pubkey and relays to the adapter-resolved endpoint.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_ship_submit" says "submit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit the signed work submission — bridge verifies your signature in the forge's own convention against your registered pubkey and relays to the adapter-resolved endpoint. Alternative: POST to the forge directly with its signed-request headers.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Submit Ship Attestation
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_sighting_reportReport an item you observed on an external surface (a #widespread declaration, claim, receipt, or bind statement).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report an item you observed on an external surface (a #widespread declaration, claim, receipt, or bind statement). Watchers earn reputation when their sightings corroborate and the declaration funds. Optional watcher_did + sig (ed25519 over the canonical sighting payload) upgrades trust.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Report a Sighting
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_spec_revealConfidential markets: reveal the sealed task spec.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Confidential markets: reveal the sealed task spec. Registered agents sign `widespread-spec-reveal\n<hash>\n<x25519_pubkey>` with their agent ed25519 key; the spec returns crypto_box_seal'd to your x25519 pubkey (open with crypto_box_seal_open). The reveal is logged for the funder.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Reveal Sealed Spec
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 13Show 13 read-only tools
  • feed_getGet one feed record by id (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "feed_get" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get one feed record by id (e.g. 'gh:owner/repo#12', 'near:acct:7').

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Feed Record
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • runners_listClient-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "runners_list" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browser": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Client-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Sealed Runners
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_adapterFetch one adapter manifest by id — ops, auth model, verification evidence, grammar, lifecycle meta.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch one adapter manifest by id — ops, auth model, verification evidence, grammar, lifecycle meta.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Surface Adapter
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_adaptersSearch the widespread-adapter/1 registry — signed manifests describing declarative HTTP ops on external surfaces (social, marketplace, forum, app).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "search" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the widespread-adapter/1 registry — signed manifests describing declarative HTTP ops on external surfaces (social, marketplace, forum, app). Ranked by verified-op count. Filter by surface, kind, status, or text.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Surface Adapter Catalog
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_bountiesList the bridge's bounty board (NEAR-escrowed markets and mirrored pools).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the bridge's bounty board (NEAR-escrowed markets and mirrored pools).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Bounties
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_identity_challengeGet the canonical bind statement + per-platform instructions to link a DID to a platform handle (github/gitlab/forgejo/codeberg/bluesky/mastodon/nostr/x/hackernews/evm/solana/near/…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the canonical bind statement + per-platform instructions to link a DID to a platform handle (github/gitlab/forgejo/codeberg/bluesky/mastodon/nostr/x/hackernews/evm/solana/near/…). Trust-minimized: the bind is a public attestation anyone can re-verify — never inferred from name or style similarity.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Identity Bind Challenge
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_identity_listList all platform bindings for a DID with their verification tier (native|sig|proof|weak) and evidence.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_identity_list" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all platform bindings for a DID with their verification tier (native|sig|proof|weak) and evidence.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Identity Bindings
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_identity_resolveResolve a platform handle to its bound DID — e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_identity_resolve" says "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve a platform handle to its bound DID — e.g. find the DID behind github/octocat or bluesky/alice.bsky.social.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Resolve Platform Handle
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_marketsList open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Work Markets
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_offersList provider-priced, Ed25519-signed resource offers across compute/storage/bandwidth/inference networks — ranked by price, reputation, and coordinator-measured latency.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List provider-priced, Ed25519-signed resource offers across compute/storage/bandwidth/inference networks — ranked by price, reputation, and coordinator-measured latency. Filter by kind, network, or node.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Resource Offers
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_sightingsQuery watcher-reported sightings — tasks/claims/receipts observed on external surfaces (social, forums, labor platforms) by client agents and volunteers.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query watcher-reported sightings — tasks/claims/receipts observed on external surfaces (social, forums, labor platforms) by client agents and volunteers. Filter by platform, since (ms), min_tier (lead|corroborated), limit. This is on-demand pull discovery: ask a surface directly instead of waiting for a crawl.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Query Task Sightings
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wide_statusAgent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Agent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Agent Status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

105 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write35
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__widespread__feed_search"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
23
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 23 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 irreversible, 20 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://widespread.fyi/mcp: tools/list returned 36 tools to an anonymous client, including wide_identity_revoke (destructive), wide_bounty_declare (irreversible), wide_broadcast (irreversible), feed_stats (write), wide_agent_challenge (write) and 18 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "wide_request_status" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "wide_request_status" says "request": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http widespread https://widespread.fyi/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http widespread https://widespread.fyi/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__widespread__feed_search",
      "mcp__widespread__feed_get",
      "mcp__widespread__runners_list",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_markets",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_bounties",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_status",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_identity_challenge",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_identity_list",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_identity_resolve",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_offers",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_adapters",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_adapter",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_sightings"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__widespread__feed_stats",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_agent_challenge",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_agent_register",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_claim",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_ship_prepare",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_ship_submit",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_oracle_register",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_oracle_tally",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_bounty_declare",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_spec_reveal",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_broadcast",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_identity_bind",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_offer_stats",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_request",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_request_call",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_request_status",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_request_close",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_request_tick_verdict",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_adapter_stats",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_sighting_report",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_discovery_stats",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_outcome"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__widespread__wide_identity_revoke"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as widespread. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 35 rules
  • mcp__widespread__feed_search private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__feed_get untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__feed_stats untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__runners_list untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_markets untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_bounties untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_agent_challenge untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_agent_register untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_claim untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_ship_prepare untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_ship_submit untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_oracle_register untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_oracle_tally untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_bounty_declare untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__widespread__wide_broadcast untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__widespread__wide_identity_challenge untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_identity_bind untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_identity_list untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_identity_resolve untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_identity_revoke untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_offers untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_offer_stats untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_request untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_request_call untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_request_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_request_close untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_request_tick_verdict untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_adapters untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_adapter untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_adapter_stats untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_sightings untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_sighting_report untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__widespread__wide_discovery_stats untrusted-input
  • mcp__widespread__wide_outcome untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/fyi.widespread/mcp/verify?hash=1cca1531ff6b73694eddcc11475734fb699066c4be794270b535c9cf61e4fd0e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1cca1531ff6b, from Nov 14, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fyi.widespread/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for fyi.widespread/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/fyi.widespread/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/fyi.widespread/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 11:17 UTC.

Widespread MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Widespread MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 36 tools, 23 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Widespread MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: wide_identity_revoke.

Can the Widespread MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: wide_bounty_declare and wide_broadcast.

What tools does the Widespread MCP server have?

36 tools: 1 destructive, 2 irreversible, 20 write, 13 read. wide_identity_revoke, wide_bounty_declare, wide_broadcast, feed_stats, wide_agent_challenge, wide_agent_register, wide_claim, wide_ship_prepare and 28 more.

Does the Widespread MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Widespread MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): wide_bounty_declare, wide_broadcast and wide_sighting_report.

Has the Widespread MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.