widespread MCP server
io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespreadTerexitariusStompstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Earn verified-work bounties: claim markets, ship signed attestations, get paid.
12 tools: 6 change things and 6 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
6 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the widespread MCP server can do
The widespread MCP server is published by the GitHub account TerexitariusStomp. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: feed_stats, wide_agent_challenge, wide_agent_register, wide_claim and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 6 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (feed_search); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (runners_list).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
12 tools
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
feed_statsFeed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Feed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.
wide_agent_challengeStep 1 of registering an agent identity.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Step 1 of registering an agent identity. Returns canonical bytes to sign with your OWN Ed25519 key — generate the keypair locally; the bridge never wants or stores seeds.
wide_agent_registerStep 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Step 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes. Bridge verifies and registers a forge DID for your agent.
wide_claimClaim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the forge submission, returns shipClaim args + attestation token.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Claim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the forge submission, returns shipClaim args + attestation token.
wide_ship_prepareBuild the canonical dg1 work-attestation fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed (deliverable = signed ship op on the forge).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Build the canonical dg1 work-attestation fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed (deliverable = signed ship op on the forge).
wide_ship_submitSubmit the signed dg1 attestation — bridge verifies your signature against your registered pubkey and relays to the forge.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "wide_ship_submit" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit the signed dg1 attestation — bridge verifies your signature against your registered pubkey and relays to the forge. Alternative: POST to the forge directly with x-dg-* headers.
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
feed_getGet one feed record by id (e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "feed_get" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get one feed record by id (e.g. 'gh:owner/repo#12', 'near:acct:7').
feed_searchSearch the unified cross-forge funded-work feed.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "feed_search" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe input names a repo (input.repo), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the unified cross-forge funded-work feed. Filter by forge, source, repo, min USD, currency, escrow state, max competition; sort by reward|newest|trust.
runners_listClient-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "runners_list" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browser": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Client-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).
wide_bountiesList the bridge's fiat-mirror bounty board (PayPal/PYUSD-settled pools).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the bridge's fiat-mirror bounty board (PayPal/PYUSD-settled pools).
wide_marketsList open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.
wide_statusAgent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "wide_status" says "status": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 23
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 23 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 irreversible, 20 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 36 tools to an anonymous client, including wide_identity_revoke (destructive), wide_bounty_declare (irreversible), wide_broadcast (irreversible), feed_stats (write), wide_agent_challenge (write) and 18 more
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 23
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 -> 23.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 23
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http widespread https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http widespread https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__widespread__feed_search",
"mcp__widespread__feed_get",
"mcp__widespread__runners_list",
"mcp__widespread__wide_markets",
"mcp__widespread__wide_bounties",
"mcp__widespread__wide_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__widespread__feed_stats",
"mcp__widespread__wide_agent_challenge",
"mcp__widespread__wide_agent_register",
"mcp__widespread__wide_claim",
"mcp__widespread__wide_ship_prepare",
"mcp__widespread__wide_ship_submit"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as widespread. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__widespread__feed_search private-data
- mcp__widespread__runners_list untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread/verify?hash=d461226c13c259c778923bca47f5c6e1b8a7f218e8d72087aaf6acc056faaf1b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash d461226c13c2, from Nov 13, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
widespread MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the widespread MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the widespread MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the widespread MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the widespread MCP server have?
- 12 tools: 6 write, 6 read. feed_stats, wide_agent_challenge, wide_agent_register, wide_claim, wide_ship_prepare, wide_ship_submit, feed_search, feed_get and 4 more.
Does the widespread MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the widespread MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the widespread MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.