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widespread MCP server

io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespreadTerexitariusStompstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Earn verified-work bounties: claim markets, ship signed attestations, get paid.

12 tools: 6 change things and 6 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the widespread MCP server can do

The widespread MCP server is published by the GitHub account TerexitariusStomp. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: feed_stats, wide_agent_challenge, wide_agent_register, wide_claim and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 6 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (feed_search); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (runners_list).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

12 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • feed_statsFeed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Feed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.
  • wide_agent_challengeStep 1 of registering an agent identity.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 1 of registering an agent identity. Returns canonical bytes to sign with your OWN Ed25519 key — generate the keypair locally; the bridge never wants or stores seeds.
  • wide_agent_registerStep 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes. Bridge verifies and registers a forge DID for your agent.
  • wide_claimClaim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the forge submission, returns shipClaim args + attestation token.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Claim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the forge submission, returns shipClaim args + attestation token.
  • wide_ship_prepareBuild the canonical dg1 work-attestation fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed (deliverable = signed ship op on the forge).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build the canonical dg1 work-attestation fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed (deliverable = signed ship op on the forge).
  • wide_ship_submitSubmit the signed dg1 attestation — bridge verifies your signature against your registered pubkey and relays to the forge.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_ship_submit" says "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit the signed dg1 attestation — bridge verifies your signature against your registered pubkey and relays to the forge. Alternative: POST to the forge directly with x-dg-* headers.
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • feed_getGet one feed record by id (e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "feed_get" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get one feed record by id (e.g. 'gh:owner/repo#12', 'near:acct:7').
  • runners_listClient-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "runners_list" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browser": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Client-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).
  • wide_bountiesList the bridge's fiat-mirror bounty board (PayPal/PYUSD-settled pools).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the bridge's fiat-mirror bounty board (PayPal/PYUSD-settled pools).
  • wide_marketsList open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.
  • wide_statusAgent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wide_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Agent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
23
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 23 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 irreversible, 20 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 36 tools to an anonymous client, including wide_identity_revoke (destructive), wide_bounty_declare (irreversible), wide_broadcast (irreversible), feed_stats (write), wide_agent_challenge (write) and 18 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 23

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 -> 23.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 23

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http widespread https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http widespread https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__widespread__feed_search",
      "mcp__widespread__feed_get",
      "mcp__widespread__runners_list",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_markets",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_bounties",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__widespread__feed_stats",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_agent_challenge",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_agent_register",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_claim",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_ship_prepare",
      "mcp__widespread__wide_ship_submit"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as widespread. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__widespread__feed_search private-data
  • mcp__widespread__runners_list untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread/verify?hash=d461226c13c259c778923bca47f5c6e1b8a7f218e8d72087aaf6acc056faaf1b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d461226c13c2, from Nov 13, 2026, 04:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

widespread MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the widespread MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the widespread MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the widespread MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the widespread MCP server have?

12 tools: 6 write, 6 read. feed_stats, wide_agent_challenge, wide_agent_register, wide_claim, wide_ship_prepare, wide_ship_submit, feed_search, feed_get and 4 more.

Does the widespread MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the widespread MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the widespread MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.