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code-auditor-mcp server

io.github.BenAHammond/code-auditor-mcpBenAHammondstreamable-httpv5.0.2Scanned

Enforces architectural invariants and code quality rules inside your AI agent's edit loop.

4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 3 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the code-auditor-mcp server can do

The code-auditor-mcp server is published by the GitHub account BenAHammond. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: request_rule). 3 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 5.0.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • request_ruleRequest a new Code Auditor rule.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_rule" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Request a new Code Auditor rule. Call lookup_rule or explain_symptom first to confirm no existing rule covers it. Provide a minimal example that should be flagged and a corrected example that should not. Reduce both to the smallest code that shows the difference, and remove secrets and proprietary identifiers. Returns a receipt id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • explain_symptomMap a natural-language symptom (e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "explain_symptom" says "explain": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Map a natural-language symptom (e.g. 'my app is slow', 'hardcoded password', 'infinite react loop') to the relevant Code Auditor rule(s) and their fixes. Call this when a user describes a problem rather than naming a rule.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_install_commandsReturn the exact install commands for Code Auditor for a given AI agent.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_install_commands" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the exact install commands for Code Auditor for a given AI agent. Call this when a user asks how to install Code Auditor, or asks for the command for a specific agent (claude, cursor, codex, gemini, agents, zcode, or all).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • lookup_ruleReturn the rule kind, description, default severity, detection method, and threshold for a given Code Auditor rule or analyzer.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_rule" says "lookup": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the rule kind, description, default severity, detection method, and threshold for a given Code Auditor rule or analyzer. Call this when a user asks what a specific rule does (e.g. import-ban, sql-injection, n+1).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:56 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 destructive). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.codeauditormcp.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including request_rule (destructive)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 5.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http code-auditor https://www.codeauditormcp.com/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http code-auditor https://www.codeauditormcp.com/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__code-auditor__get_install_commands",
      "mcp__code-auditor__lookup_rule",
      "mcp__code-auditor__explain_symptom"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__code-auditor__request_rule"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as code-auditor. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.BenAHammond/code-auditor-mcp/verify?hash=d6e69d5c721f969388e85bbca281c568d40e08906df9dec09d5ab59bc8fa43b7" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d6e69d5c721f, from Nov 15, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.BenAHammond/code-auditor-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.BenAHammond/code-auditor-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.BenAHammond/code-auditor-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.BenAHammond/code-auditor-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:14 UTC.

code-auditor-mcp server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the code-auditor-mcp server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the code-auditor-mcp server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: request_rule.

Can the code-auditor-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the code-auditor-mcp server have?

4 tools: 1 destructive, 3 read. request_rule, get_install_commands, lookup_rule and explain_symptom.

Does the code-auditor-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the code-auditor-mcp server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the code-auditor-mcp server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.