screenshot MCP server
io.github.DataLeadsPRO/screenshotDataLeadsPROstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Pixel-perfect webpage screenshots rendered in a real browser, full-page or viewport, via one POST.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the screenshot MCP server can do
The screenshot MCP server is published by the GitHub account DataLeadsPRO. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: session_create), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (screenshot); 1 tool can send data out of your system (screenshot).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 4, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
session_createV1 Session CreateNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "session_create" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it V1 Session Create
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
screenshotV1 ScreenshotReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "screenshot" says "screenshot": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it V1 Screenshot
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:28 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 404
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 404; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http screenshot https://data.dataleads.pro/mcp/screenshotclaude mcp add --transport http screenshot https://data.dataleads.pro/mcp/screenshotRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__screenshot__screenshot",
"mcp__screenshot__session_create"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as screenshot. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__screenshot__screenshot untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.DataLeadsPRO/screenshot/verify?hash=3ebb40e5411fd03c68e287160bfc322c96993a2e60fe4b3ada9d7a4d3695a2a2" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3ebb40e5411f, from Nov 4, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.DataLeadsPRO/screenshot/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.DataLeadsPRO/screenshot)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:15 UTC.
screenshot MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the screenshot MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the screenshot MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the screenshot MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the screenshot MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. session_create and screenshot.
Does the screenshot MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the screenshot MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): screenshot.
Has the screenshot MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 4, 2026.