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IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server

io.github.JcJamet/ia-qa-securityJcJametstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Agent security: prompt injection, PII & secret scans, TLS/header/CORS audits, MCP checks. Free.

30 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 21 change things and 8 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 21 write, 8 read.

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server can do

The IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server is published by the GitHub account JcJamet. It has 30 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: rate_tool) and create or change data (21 tools: prompt_injection_scan, guardrail_test, redact_pii, secret_scan and 17 more). 8 tools only read.

10 tools bring in text other people can write (mcp_server_evaluate, shield_analyze, security_headers_check and 7 more); 7 tools can send data out of your system (mcp_server_evaluate, security_headers_check, cors_test and 4 more).

The fixed checks matched 11 findings, 1 of them high severity (credentials-mention, annotation-conflict and sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

30 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • rate_toolGive honest usage feedback on an IA-QA MCP tool.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: ".... Comments are screened: one carrying a credential is not stored, personal data becomes pl..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Give honest usage feedback on an IA-QA MCP tool. Give a score (1-5) and a comment. Rate low (1-2) if the tool was wrong, irrelevant, or a poor fit; rate high (4-5) only if it genuinely solved your need. Maintainers read ratings, one vote per agent and tool a month: comments and per-tool scores are not published, only the overall average and vote count. Comments are screened: one carrying a credential is not stored, personal data becomes placeholders — describe what happened, not what a model should do. Skip routine successes: signal, not praise. Example: rate_tool({ tool_name: "format_json", score: 2, comment: "Tried to pretty-print a JSON5 file, it rejected trailing commas — not usable for my case." })

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 21Claude Code: ask
  • cors_checkerWould a browser on this origin be allowed to read this URL?Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.credentials.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.credentials.description: "True for fetch with credentials: "include""

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Would a browser on this origin be allowed to read this URL? Verdict allowed | blocked | unknown, the reason, and the header to add. Only GET and HEAD are really sent: other methods measure the preflight alone. Many origins at once: cors_test.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • cors_testAudit a URL for CORS misconfigurations across several origins: wildcard with credentials, reflected origin, null origin, subdomain bypass, missing Vary.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...s across several origins: wildcard with credentials, reflected origin, null origin, subdoma..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit a URL for CORS misconfigurations across several origins: wildcard with credentials, reflected origin, null origin, subdomain bypass, missing Vary. Returns risk level (safe/low/medium/high/critical) plus per-origin results. "unknown" means nothing was tested: every origin failed to connect, answered 5xx, or was refused with no CORS header (a 404, a firewall); never read it as "safe".

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • decode_jwtDecode a JWT (JSON Web Token) and return its header and payload without verifying the signature.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Decode a JWT (JSON Web Token) and return its header and payload without verifying the signature. Also reports whether the token is expired and the exact expiry date. Use to inspect claims (sub, iss, exp, roles) during debugging or when integrating with an auth provider.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • detect_secretsScan code or config files for hardcoded secrets: AWS keys, GitHub tokens, OpenAI/Anthropic API keys, Stripe secrets, JWTs, Slack/Teams/Discord webhook URLs, session cookies, databa…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • High

      The input schema at properties.filename.description refers to ".env".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.filename.description: "Optional filename for context (e.g. ".env", "config.js")"

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan code or config files for hardcoded secrets: AWS keys, GitHub tokens, OpenAI/Anthropic API keys, Stripe secrets, JWTs, Slack/Teams/Discord webhook URLs, session cookies, database connection strings, and generic passwords. Returns findings with severity.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • function_call_validateValidate an LLM function call / tool_use output: check that function name is in allowed list, arguments match expected schema (types, enums, ranges), no extra/missing args.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "function_call_validate" says "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "function_call_validate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "function_call_validate" says "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate an LLM function call / tool_use output: check that function name is in allowed list, arguments match expected schema (types, enums, ranges), no extra/missing args. Reads the definitions as OpenAI (`parameters`), MCP (`inputSchema`) or Anthropic (`input_schema`) write them, or as plain `required_args`/`optional_args`; reads the call as `arguments` (object or JSON string), `input` (Anthropic tool_use) or an OpenAI `{function:{…}}` wrapper.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • generate_hmacCompute an HMAC signature for a message using a secret key.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_hmac" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_hmac" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_hmac" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compute an HMAC signature for a message using a secret key. Supports SHA-256 (default), SHA-512, SHA-1, and MD5. Used for API request signing, webhook verification (GitHub, Stripe, Twilio), and JWT validation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • generate_passwordGenerate a cryptographically secure random password using crypto.randomBytes.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_password" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_password" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_password" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a cryptographically secure random password using crypto.randomBytes. Configurable length (4–128), uppercase letters, digits, and symbols. Use when resetting user passwords, seeding test accounts, or generating API secrets.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • guardrail_testTest an LLM response against a set of guardrail rules: must-include, must-not-include, max length, required format, language, forbidden patterns, and custom regex.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Test an LLM response against a set of guardrail rules: must-include, must-not-include, max length, required format, language, forbidden patterns, and custom regex. Returns pass/fail per rule.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • hash_textCompute a cryptographic hash of a text string.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compute a cryptographic hash of a text string. Use when you need to verify data integrity, generate content fingerprints, hash passwords (prefer SHA-256+), or produce a fixed-length digest of any input. Supports SHA-256 (default), SHA-512, SHA-1, and MD5.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • latency_benchmarkMeasure response time of one or more HTTP endpoints (GET/POST).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoints): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Measure response time of one or more HTTP endpoints (GET/POST). Runs N iterations and returns min/max/avg/p95 latency. Useful for API and MCP server benchmarking.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • mcp_schema_lintLint one MCP tool definition with the same rules as mcp_server_health_check: errors break the MCP spec (FAIL), documentation_issues are what its strict mode refuses — a parameter w…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lint one MCP tool definition with the same rules as mcp_server_health_check: errors break the MCP spec (FAIL), documentation_issues are what its strict mode refuses — a parameter without description or type (FIX, never an A) — and suggestions are style only (snake_case) and change nothing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • mcp_server_evaluateCheck that a live MCP server over Streamable HTTP speaks the protocol, 2026-07-28 or earlier: handshake or server/discover, tools/list and its definitions, error codes, one tools/c…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mcp_server_evaluate" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "mcp_server_evaluate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "mcp_server_evaluate" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check that a live MCP server over Streamable HTTP speaks the protocol, 2026-07-28 or earlier: handshake or server/discover, tools/list and its definitions, error codes, one tools/call, structuredContent against outputSchema, latency. Returns PASS/FIX/BLOCK with a 0-100 score, or INCONCLUSIVE (score null) when authorization is required. The verdict covers the PROTOCOL, never whether tools answer correctly: what_this_does_not_prove lists what was not measured. Called: only test_tool_name, or a tool annotated readOnlyHint: true. A refusal of invented arguments is not scored (tool_behaviour: refused_placeholder); pass test_tool_args to exercise the tool. Private addresses and stdio are out of reach: paste tools/list into mcp_server_health_check.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • mcp_server_health_checkCheck an MCP server's tool definitions without contacting it — for a server not deployed yet, a stdio server, or a CI gate.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an MCP server's tool definitions without contacting it — for a server not deployed yet, a stdio server, or a CI gate. Paste the answer to tools/list (raw JSON-RPC or its result), a bare array of tools, one tool definition, or a manifest carrying name/description; input_shape says which one was read. Validates every tool against the MCP spec (name 1-128 chars of A-Z a-z 0-9 _ - .; camelCase and a tool with no parameters are valid; inputSchema of type object; required fields listed in properties) and, with strict, documentation (description ≥ 20 chars, every parameter with a description and a type). verdict: FAIL when a tool breaks a rule or no tool is found, WARN when only a manifest's server name/description is missing, PASS otherwise. A tools/list carries no server name, so those two checks are not scored on it (the name comes from initialize). Gate on verdict or on checks[tool_quality].pass.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • parse_http_headersParse a raw HTTP headers block into a structured JSON object.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Parse a raw HTTP headers block into a structured JSON object. Detects multi-value headers, masks Authorization values, and optionally audits for missing security headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, etc.).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • prompt_injection_scanScan user input or prompts for prompt injection patterns.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan user input or prompts for prompt injection patterns. Pattern-based: it recognises known phrasings and structures, not intent — an uncovered paraphrase or language reads clean, so clean is not proof of safety. Instruction overrides are covered in 11 languages (EN, FR, ES, DE, IT, PT, NL, RU, ZH, JA, AR), also after removing invisible characters, lookalike letters, spacing and leetspeak (marked `obfuscated`). Detects overrides, jailbreaks, role manipulation, encoding tricks, chat-template delimiters and fake role headers, template injection ({{…}}, ${…}) and requests to repeat the preceding context. A match inside quoted or fenced text is reported one level lower and marked `quoted`, never suppressed; a quote introduced by a live imperative keeps its severity.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • redact_piiAutomatically detect and redact Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from text.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Automatically detect and redact Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from text. Replaces emails, phone numbers, SSNs, IBANs, credit cards, IP addresses, and JWT tokens with [REDACTED_TYPE] placeholders. Safe to use before logging or sending to an LLM.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • secret_scanScan text or code for leaked secrets: API keys (AWS, GCP, Azure, OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, GitHub, GitLab, Slack, Twilio, SendGrid, HuggingFace), Slack / Teams / Discord webhook U…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan text or code for leaked secrets: API keys (AWS, GCP, Azure, OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, GitHub, GitLab, Slack, Twilio, SendGrid, HuggingFace), Slack / Teams / Discord webhook URLs, private keys, JWTs, database connection strings, Bearer and Basic auth headers, and hard-coded values assigned to password/secret/token names (a value read at run time — Cypress.env(), os.getenv() — is not flagged). Returns findings with type, severity, line and a redacted preview. Regex-based, no network.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • toxicity_scanScan text for toxic language, hate speech, bias/stereotype framing, violence, sexual and self-harm content.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan text for toxic language, hate speech, bias/stereotype framing, violence, sexual and self-harm content. Lexical + structural pattern matching (identity term + predicate), not a semantic classifier — returns per-category risk plus the named rules that fired, so every finding can be checked. Languages: English for every category; French for insults, coarse language, direct threats and self-harm intent; anything else reads clean, so clean is not proof of safety. Text is also matched after undoing leetspeak and lookalike letters. Self-harm is critical only on a first-person intent — a mention ("call 988 if you have suicidal thoughts") is medium. Useful for LLM safety guardrail testing and triage; signal-only, not a calibrated CI gate.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • validate_agent_trajectoryRun declarative assertions on an agent trace (OpenAI tool calls, Anthropic tool_use, LangChain run trees, ReAct logs).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_agent_trajectory" says "validate": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "validate_agent_trajectory" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "validate_agent_trajectory" says "validate": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run declarative assertions on an agent trace (OpenAI tool calls, Anthropic tool_use, LangChain run trees, ReAct logs). Deterministic, no LLM. Assertions: order (tool A before B), must_call, must_not_call, max/min calls, no_error, recovery (a successful step after the last error), no_injection, no_pii. A step is errored when the trace marks it (is_error, status error/failed, success:false) or its text starts with Error:/Traceback — prose is never keyword-scanned. Verdict PASS / FAIL / INCONCLUSIVE (0 steps parsed, never PASS).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • web_security_auditRun a comprehensive web security audit combining headers, SSL, CORS, and cookies checks — then use an LLM to produce a prioritised remediation plan.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "web_security_audit" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run a comprehensive web security audit combining headers, SSL, CORS, and cookies checks — then use an LLM to produce a prioritised remediation plan. Orchestrates security_headers_check + ssl_certificate_check + cors_test + cookie_security_audit in parallel, merges all findings, then asks an AI model to: (1) rank vulnerabilities by real-world exploitability, (2) generate a remediation roadmap, (3) produce fix code snippets for the detected stack. Returns both raw audit data and the AI analysis. Use this as a one-click security posture assessment.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 8Show 8 read-only tools
  • bias_detectAnalyse a set of LLM responses generated from the same prompt template but with different demographic variants (gender, origin, age, tone).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "analyse": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Analyse a set of LLM responses generated from the same prompt template but with different demographic variants (gender, origin, age, tone). Returns a bias score (0-100), sentiment analysis per variant, pairwise Jaccard similarity, and a human-readable verdict. No API key needed — runs entirely locally.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • find_toolSearch available MCP tools by keyword or category before calling them.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_tool" says "find": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...ueries are logged 90 days, screened for credentials and personal data. Categories: data, de..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search available MCP tools by keyword or category before calling them. Returns names, descriptions and, on request, inputSchemas. Queries are logged 90 days, screened for credentials and personal data. Categories: data, dev, encoding, eval, integrations, llm, meta, qa, rag, security, text, web.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • http_status_lookupLook up detailed information about any HTTP status code: class, name, description, cacheability, typical causes, and handling best practices.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "http_status_lookup" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "http_status_lookup" says "status" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up detailed information about any HTTP status code: class, name, description, cacheability, typical causes, and handling best practices. Covers every code in the IANA HTTP Status Code Registry (1xx-5xx, including 226, 425, 451, 508, 511 and the WebDAV codes) with its defining RFC; anything outside the registry is reported as `registered: false` rather than described. `cacheable` means heuristically cacheable by default per RFC 9110 §15.1.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • security_headers_checkAnalyse the HTTP security headers of a public URL OR of raw response headers you paste in.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "analyse": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "analyse" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Analyse the HTTP security headers of a public URL OR of raw response headers you paste in. Grades each header (A–F) for: Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, X-XSS-Protection, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy, Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy, and Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy. Returns an overall score (0–100), per-header grades, missing headers, and fix snippets for Express, Nginx, and Apache. For localhost/private targets the remote server cannot reach, pass the `headers` parameter instead of `url`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • shield_analyzeOne-call safety gate for an LLM response: grounding (with source), prompt injection on the response AND the prompt (checks.injection / checks.injection_prompt), toxicity, PII, guar…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "shield_analyze" says "analyze": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One-call safety gate for an LLM response: grounding (with source), prompt injection on the response AND the prompt (checks.injection / checks.injection_prompt), toxicity, PII, guardrail rules, quality, plus an LLM review on Groq (server key; model "none" skips it and sends nothing out). Returns PASS/FIX/BLOCK, a 0-100 safety score, per-check results and fixes. PII gates the verdict: SSN or card → BLOCK, email → FIX, phone/IP flagged only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • ssl_certificate_checkAnalyse the SSL/TLS certificate of any HTTPS host.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "analyse": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "analyse" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Analyse the SSL/TLS certificate of any HTTPS host. Returns certificate subject, issuer, validity dates, days until expiry, protocol version, cipher suite, key exchange info, and an overall grade (A+, A, B, C, F). Detects expired, self-signed, and weak certificates. Use this to audit TLS posture before production deployment or during security reviews.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • validate_mcp_responseValidate that an MCP tool response conforms to expected format, schema, and content rules.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_mcp_response" says "validate": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate that an MCP tool response conforms to expected format, schema, and content rules. Use this to QA-test any MCP server tool. Supply the tool's actual JSON result and a set of checks to perform.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • validate_urlParse and validate a URL.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_url" says "validate": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Parse and validate a URL. Returns decomposed components: protocol, hostname, port, path, query parameters, hash, and origin.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write10
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out7
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
23
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 23 tools that change things (1 destructive, 22 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.ia-qa.com/mcp/security: tools/list returned 31 tools to an anonymous client, including rate_tool (destructive), prompt_injection_scan (write), guardrail_test (write), redact_pii (write), secret_scan (write) and 18 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 18, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 22 to 23
  2. Nov 4, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 23 to 22

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high6 warn4 info
  • The input schema at properties.filename.description refers to ".env".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.filename.description: "Optional filename for context (e.g. ".env", "config.js")"

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "validate_agent_trajectory" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "validate_agent_trajectory" says "validate": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "mcp_server_evaluate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "mcp_server_evaluate" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "function_call_validate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "function_call_validate" says "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "web_security_audit" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "generate_password" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_password" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
Show 5 more findings
  • The server marks "generate_hmac" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_hmac" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...ueries are logged 90 days, screened for credentials and personal data. Categories: data, de..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...s across several origins: wildcard with credentials, reflected origin, null origin, subdoma..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.credentials.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.credentials.description: "True for fetch with credentials: "include""

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: ".... Comments are screened: one carrying a credential is not stored, personal data becomes pl..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 22 -> 23.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 22 to 23
  2. Tools30 changed.~30 changedView diff
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 23 -> 22.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 23 to 22

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ia-qa-security https://www.ia-qa.com/mcp/security
claude mcp add --transport http ia-qa-security https://www.ia-qa.com/mcp/security

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__find_tool",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__validate_mcp_response",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__bias_detect",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__shield_analyze",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__ssl_certificate_check",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__validate_url",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__http_status_lookup"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__prompt_injection_scan",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__guardrail_test",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__redact_pii",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__secret_scan",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__validate_agent_trajectory",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__mcp_server_health_check",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__mcp_server_evaluate",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__toxicity_scan",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__function_call_validate",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__mcp_schema_lint",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__security_headers_check",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__cors_test",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__cors_checker",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__cookie_security_audit",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__web_security_audit",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__decode_jwt",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__parse_http_headers",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__detect_secrets",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__latency_benchmark",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__hash_text",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__generate_password",
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__generate_hmac"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__ia-qa-security__rate_tool"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ia-qa-security. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 10 rules
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__mcp_server_evaluate untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__shield_analyze untrusted-input
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__security_headers_check untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__ssl_certificate_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__cors_test untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__cors_checker untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__cookie_security_audit untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__web_security_audit untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__http_status_lookup untrusted-input
  • mcp__ia-qa-security__latency_benchmark untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.JcJamet/ia-qa-security/verify?hash=ade3719256757c8dbea915bc84797cf556fd6e289abdcd818e98d83d50f70f66" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash ade371925675, from Nov 9, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.JcJamet/ia-qa-security/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.JcJamet/ia-qa-security
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.JcJamet/ia-qa-security.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.JcJamet/ia-qa-security)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 26, 2026, 22:17 UTC.

IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 30 tools, 22 of which can change, send or delete something, and 11 findings (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: rate_tool.

Can the IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server have?

30 tools: 1 destructive, 21 write, 8 read. rate_tool, prompt_injection_scan, guardrail_test, redact_pii, secret_scan, validate_agent_trajectory, mcp_server_health_check, mcp_server_evaluate and 22 more.

Does the IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server send data to outside services?

7 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): mcp_server_evaluate, security_headers_check, cors_test, cors_checker, cookie_security_audit, web_security_audit and 1 more.

Has the IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.