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VPS Hardening MCP server

io.github.NoteSupreme/vps-hardeningNoteSupremestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Read-only security checklists: VPS hardening, Docker, secrets, Supabase, Stripe, auth, AI agents.

5 tools: 5 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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What the VPS Hardening MCP server can do

The VPS Hardening MCP server is published by the GitHub account NoteSupreme. It has 5 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • vpshardening__get_blueprint_overviewRead the human-AUTHORED overview prose for the Ship (omit node_id) or for one section.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "vpshardening__get_blueprint_overview" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the human-AUTHORED overview prose for the Ship (omit node_id) or for one section. Useful only where someone has written a summary; it is not the way to navigate — vpshardening__get_ship_digest is the map, call that first. When no summary has been written this falls back to the same section map vpshardening__get_ship_digest returns, drilled with { section_id } and paged with { cursor }.
  • vpshardening__get_ship_digestOrient on this Ship — ALWAYS call this first.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "vpshardening__get_ship_digest" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Orient on this Ship — ALWAYS call this first. With no arguments it returns the section MAP and nothing else: every top-level section with its description and child_count, which is small and cheap even on a Ship of hundreds of nodes. Then pass { section_id } to list one section's direct children, and vpshardening__read_node for the ones worth reading. A large section arrives in pages — continue it with { cursor }.
  • vpshardening__list_ship_nodesList every node: node_id, title, parent_id, node_type, plus type/description/tags/resource when set.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "vpshardening__list_ship_nodes" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every node: node_id, title, parent_id, node_type, plus type/description/tags/resource when set. No bodies. This is a flat list of the WHOLE Ship — on a large one it is long and arrives in pages, so pass { cursor } to continue. To navigate rather than enumerate, use vpshardening__get_ship_digest.
  • vpshardening__read_nodeRead one node's full markdown body + frontmatter by node_id.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "vpshardening__read_node" says "read": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one node's full markdown body + frontmatter by node_id. Response includes outbound_links[] (resolved graph edges) unless with_links:false, plus source attribution. Pass heading (e.g. "Tactics") to get ONLY that markdown section — a few hundred chars instead of the whole body; every heading read, hit or miss, carries the node's headings list, and a miss is heading_not_found — so a guessed heading is cheap (heading "" just lists the headings). A heading read is partial — never write it back as a node's content; re-read without heading first. A long body is returned one page at a time — when the response says truncated, call again with { cursor } to continue it.
  • vpshardening__search_nodesSearch nodes by text, node_type, and/or semantic `type`.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "vpshardening__search_nodes" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search nodes by text, node_type, and/or semantic `type`. Token-AND across title + description + tags. Primary retrieval path — use it before reading bodies. Results are ranked best match first — `score` on each row is the match strength (title hits count double). Page 1 is the top of the ranking. A one-word query can match hundreds of rows — put two or more terms in `query` so the top rows are the answer, not a dump. Terms are AND-ed: if two return nothing, drop one. Reports total_matches; when more matches exist than fit in one response, narrow the query or pass { cursor } for the next page (a cursor is only valid for the query that produced it).

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://notesupreme.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/p/vps-hardening
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http vps-hardening https://notesupreme.com/p/vps-hardening?token=nsp_6bmDN1j4mZCnQJCfL0rgDA
claude mcp add --transport http vps-hardening https://notesupreme.com/p/vps-hardening?token=nsp_6bmDN1j4mZCnQJCfL0rgDA

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__vps-hardening__vpshardening__read_node",
      "mcp__vps-hardening__vpshardening__search_nodes",
      "mcp__vps-hardening__vpshardening__list_ship_nodes",
      "mcp__vps-hardening__vpshardening__get_ship_digest",
      "mcp__vps-hardening__vpshardening__get_blueprint_overview"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as vps-hardening. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.NoteSupreme/vps-hardening/verify?hash=002940af17080c82ecdc15f2690537f7f35376a37a07f786087ec3c2a0345203" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 002940af1708, from Nov 19, 2026, 09:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.NoteSupreme/vps-hardening/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.NoteSupreme/vps-hardening
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.NoteSupreme/vps-hardening.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.NoteSupreme/vps-hardening)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

VPS Hardening MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the VPS Hardening MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the VPS Hardening MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the VPS Hardening MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the VPS Hardening MCP server have?

5 tools: 5 read. vpshardening__read_node, vpshardening__search_nodes, vpshardening__list_ship_nodes, vpshardening__get_ship_digest and vpshardening__get_blueprint_overview.

Does the VPS Hardening MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the VPS Hardening MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the VPS Hardening MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.