AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server
io.github.agenttrust-ai/agenttrustagenttrust-aistreamable-httpv1.0.4Scanned
Check an AI agent endpoint before you call it: read-only, no API key, returns a trustDecision.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server can do
The AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server is published by the GitHub account agenttrust-ai. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_agent_trust and assess_agent), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.4.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
assess_agentUse-or-avoid decision about an AI agent or MCP server endpoint, built from AgentTrust's stored observations of its exact URL.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Use-or-avoid decision about an AI agent or MCP server endpoint, built from AgentTrust's stored observations of its exact URL. Returns decision (allow_with_caution, avoid, or insufficient_evidence), confidence, reasonCodes, reachability (the latest stored observation, with its age), initialRisk, the historical reliability score and trustDecision, limitations, and freshness. Read-only, no account or API key. It never contacts endpointUrl. Reachability is not safety: allow_with_caution does not mean the agent's behavior is safe. A URL AgentTrust has not observed returns decision insufficient_evidence.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Assess Agent
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
check_agent_trustPre-invocation trust check for an unknown AI agent or MCP server endpoint.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Pre-invocation trust check for an unknown AI agent or MCP server endpoint. Pass the exact URL you are about to call as endpointUrl to get what AgentTrust has observed about it: status, endpoint-ownership verification, reliability score (when available), and a trustDecision (recommended, confidence, reasons). Read-only, no account or API key. It never contacts endpointUrl; it only reads AgentTrust's stored monitoring history. A URL AgentTrust has not observed returns { matched: false }.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check Agent Trust
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://getagenttrust.com/api/mcp/public: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_agent_trust (write), assess_agent (write)
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
- Added:assess_agentChanges things
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 2.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agenttrust https://getagenttrust.com/api/mcp/publicclaude mcp add --transport http agenttrust https://getagenttrust.com/api/mcp/publicRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__agenttrust__check_agent_trust",
"mcp__agenttrust__assess_agent"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agenttrust. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.agenttrust-ai/agenttrust/verify?hash=7028077842f6959e38d625af134eb1c62e563e47c8b220a4c156b6e9818cc545" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7028077842f6, from Nov 16, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agenttrust-ai/agenttrust/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agenttrust-ai/agenttrust)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:22 UTC.
AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. check_agent_trust and assess_agent.
Does the AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentTrust — Pre-Invocation AI Agent Trust & Reliability Checks MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 3, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.