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agenttrust-kye MCP server

io.github.heroson86462-hsnu/agenttrust-kyeheroson86462-hsnustreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Know-Your-Endpoint MCP firewall: checks uptime, Rug-Pull mutations, poisoning & x402 traps.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the agenttrust-kye MCP server can do

The agenttrust-kye MCP server is published by the GitHub account heroson86462-hsnu. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: scan_mcp_tools_locally), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_endpoint_kye_trust); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_endpoint_kye_trust).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • scan_mcp_tools_locallyScan MCP tool definitions for prompt injection, credential exfiltration & Unicode smuggling.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...tool definitions for prompt injection, credential exfiltration & Unicode smuggling."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan MCP tool definitions for prompt injection, credential exfiltration & Unicode smuggling.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • check_endpoint_kye_trustQuery live runtime KYE trust score, Rug-Pull mutation status, and safe fallback before calling external MCP/API.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query live runtime KYE trust score, Rug-Pull mutation status, and safe fallback before calling external MCP/API.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2026-07-28
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agenttrust-kye-edge-gateway.a2a-data-matrix.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_mcp_tools_locally (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agenttrust-kye https://agenttrust-kye-edge-gateway.a2a-data-matrix.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agenttrust-kye https://agenttrust-kye-edge-gateway.a2a-data-matrix.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agenttrust-kye__check_endpoint_kye_trust",
      "mcp__agenttrust-kye__scan_mcp_tools_locally"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agenttrust-kye. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__agenttrust-kye__check_endpoint_kye_trust untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.heroson86462-hsnu/agenttrust-kye/verify?hash=cc262e274bcef0031b177b79940648efcc3df87f0e1c70d5b6640d85f5932ae5" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash cc262e274bce, from Nov 18, 2026, 16:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.heroson86462-hsnu/agenttrust-kye/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.heroson86462-hsnu/agenttrust-kye
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.heroson86462-hsnu/agenttrust-kye.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.heroson86462-hsnu/agenttrust-kye)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 16:18 UTC.

agenttrust-kye MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the agenttrust-kye MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the agenttrust-kye MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the agenttrust-kye MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the agenttrust-kye MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. scan_mcp_tools_locally and check_endpoint_kye_trust.

Does the agenttrust-kye MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the agenttrust-kye MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_endpoint_kye_trust.

Has the agenttrust-kye MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.