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mcp-liveness

io.github.agentwares/mcp-livenessagentwaresstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned

Does an MCP server work for a stock client? By registry name or URL. Tool drift too. Free, no key.

5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 4 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the mcp-liveness can do

The mcp-liveness is published by the GitHub account agentwares. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: mcp_liveness_check, mcp_liveness_drift, mcp_liveness_check_auth and mcp_liveness_check_apps), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (mcp_liveness_check, mcp_liveness_check_auth and mcp_liveness_check_apps); 3 tools can send data out of your system (mcp_liveness_check, mcp_liveness_check_auth and mcp_liveness_check_apps).

The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • mcp_liveness_checkMakes one handshake with an MCP server's endpoint — `server/discover` at protocol revision 2026-07-28, then `initialize` for a server on the older revision — with no credential, an…Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...server on the older revision — with no credential, and reports what a stock client gets...."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.skipCredentialCheck.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.skipCredentialCheck.description: "...ut the answer then cannot say whether a credential is obtainable. A URL check never walks..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Makes one handshake with an MCP server's endpoint — `server/discover` at protocol revision 2026-07-28, then `initialize` for a server on the older revision — with no credential, and reports what a stock client gets. The server is named either by its exact official-registry `name`, or by its endpoint `url` when it is not in the registry or is listed under another name; exactly one of the two is accepted. Outcomes: `usable` (it connected and negotiated a protocol version), `needs_credential` (401 or 403 — by name, the answer also says whether a credential can be obtained in-band or whether a person has to create one), `charged` (402, access is for sale), `unreachable` (not an MCP server there: wrong URL, dead host, or a 200 that is not JSON-RPC), and, for a name only, `local_only` (no remote endpoint; it must be spawned as a process) and `not_listed` (no server with that exact name; its endpoint can still be checked by `url`). A `url` must be public https: private, loopback, link-local, multicast and cloud-metadata addresses are refused, redirects are re-checked, and URL checks are limited to 30 a minute per caller. Useful before relying on a server: roughly two in five remote registry listings do not answer a stock client.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check an MCP server's liveness
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • mcp_liveness_check_appsChecks a remote MCP server's MCP Apps UI (SEP-1865 `ui://` resources) from outside, with no credential and without calling any tool, and returns the first step that stops the view …Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ui://` resources) from outside, with no credential and without calling any tool, and retur..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks a remote MCP server's MCP Apps UI (SEP-1865 `ui://` resources) from outside, with no credential and without calling any tool, and returns the first step that stops the view rendering, whose it is (`server`, or `host` for a known host bug with its issue URL), the fix, and the source (the spec, or the host's published page, with the date read). It opens the server as an MCP Apps host would, then reads tools/list, resources/list and resources/read: each tool's link to its view (_meta.ui.resourceUri, or ChatGPT's openai/outputTemplate alias), the view's MIME type (text/html;profile=mcp-app) and HTML, what the HTML loads against the CSP a host builds from _meta.ui.csp, whether it sends ui/initialize, ui.domain for Claude and for ChatGPT, and what OpenAI's directory review checks (explicit tool annotations, descriptions, a public https endpoint, the domain-verification file). Verdicts per host — `spec`, `claude`, `chatgpt`, `chatgpt-directory` — are judged from each host's published pages; no host is run. Use it when a user says an MCP App or ChatGPT app shows a blank or invisible frame, 'Resource not found: ui://', 'Invalid ui.domain format', or a submission error such as annotations_required. `verdict` is ok, at_risk, broken, no_ui, needs_sign_in or unreachable. The URL must be public https; checks are limited to 30 a minute per caller.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check an MCP server's MCP Apps UI
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • mcp_liveness_check_authWalks a remote MCP server's OAuth sign-in chain from outside, with no credential and no client registration, and returns the first step that breaks, whose it is (`server`, `identit…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...uth sign-in chain from outside, with no credential and no client registration, and returns..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Walks a remote MCP server's OAuth sign-in chain from outside, with no credential and no client registration, and returns the first step that breaks, whose it is (`server`, `identity_provider`, or `client` for a known client bug, with its issue URL), the fix, and the spec section that requires it. Steps, in order: one unauthenticated request (it must answer 401 with a WWW-Authenticate challenge); RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata; RFC 8414 or OpenID Connect discovery at the locations the 2026-07-28 MCP spec lists, with the issuer and PKCE S256 checked; and how a client gets a client ID (client ID metadata documents, dynamic registration, or a pasted ID). Then a verdict per client — claude.ai, Claude Code, ChatGPT, VS Code, Cursor — emulated from each client's published requirements and known issues; no client is run. Use it when a user says a connector shows an error such as 'Authorization with the MCP server failed' or 'Dynamic Client Registration not supported', or before publishing a server that needs sign-in. `verdict` is ok, at_risk, broken, no_auth (it asked for no credential) or unreachable. The URL must be public https; checks are limited to 30 a minute per caller.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check an MCP server's OAuth sign-in
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • mcp_liveness_driftGiven a server's exact name in the official MCP registry, reports which of its tools were added, removed, or had their description, input schema or output schema change between a n…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given a server's exact name in the official MCP registry, reports which of its tools were added, removed, or had their description, input schema or output schema change between a named month and the latest monthly snapshot. Useful when a server that worked before behaves differently now, when a prompt or an integration written against its tools has started failing, or before relying on a cached tool description. A liveness check says a server answers today; this says whether it is still the same server that code was written against. The answer names the changed tools and the kind of change. It does not diff the schemas themselves: the snapshots keep content hashes, not bodies, so `detail` hands back the release-asset location of both full months for a caller that needs the exact diff. A month with no snapshot for that server gets an error naming the months that do have one, never an empty diff that would read as `nothing changed`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Diff an MCP server's tools by month
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • mcp_liveness_explain_outcomesReturns the six outcomes this server can report — usable, needs_credential, charged, unreachable, local_only and not_listed — what each means for an agent choosing a server from th…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mcp_liveness_explain_outcomes" says "explain": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the six outcomes this server can report — usable, needs_credential, charged, unreachable, local_only and not_listed — what each means for an agent choosing a server from the registry, and the usual next move for each. A static reference: it makes no network request and its answer never changes between calls.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Explain liveness outcomes
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agentwares-mcp-liveness.vercel.app/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including mcp_liveness_check (write), mcp_liveness_drift (write), mcp_liveness_check_auth (write), mcp_liveness_check_apps (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

4 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http liveness https://agentwares-mcp-liveness.vercel.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http liveness https://agentwares-mcp-liveness.vercel.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__liveness__mcp_liveness_explain_outcomes"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__liveness__mcp_liveness_check",
      "mcp__liveness__mcp_liveness_drift",
      "mcp__liveness__mcp_liveness_check_auth",
      "mcp__liveness__mcp_liveness_check_apps"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as liveness. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__liveness__mcp_liveness_check untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__liveness__mcp_liveness_check_auth untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__liveness__mcp_liveness_check_apps untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.agentwares/mcp-liveness/verify?hash=cb174cd8d13d3cd98b93e5dd7e09b344cdcc3e3e1742079ddcf2e2593776ff1b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash cb174cd8d13d, from Nov 16, 2026, 08:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agentwares/mcp-liveness/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.agentwares/mcp-liveness
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.agentwares/mcp-liveness.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agentwares/mcp-liveness)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:22 UTC.

mcp-liveness: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the mcp-liveness safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the mcp-liveness delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the mcp-liveness do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the mcp-liveness have?

5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. mcp_liveness_check, mcp_liveness_drift, mcp_liveness_check_auth, mcp_liveness_check_apps and mcp_liveness_explain_outcomes.

Does the mcp-liveness need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the mcp-liveness send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): mcp_liveness_check, mcp_liveness_check_auth and mcp_liveness_check_apps.

Has the mcp-liveness changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.