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Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server

io.github.agentwares/readiness-scoreragentwaresstreamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned

Probe a signup URL you own and score whether an AI agent can sign up unaided.

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server can do

The Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server is published by the GitHub account agentwares. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: readiness_request_scan), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (readiness_get_verification_token and readiness_request_scan); 2 tools can send data out of your system (readiness_get_verification_token and readiness_request_scan).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.1.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • readiness_request_scanStep 2.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "readiness_request_scan" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 2. Verifies domain ownership (DNS TXT / meta tag / .well-known must carry the token from readiness_get_verification_token), then queues a Playwright probe that tries to sign up, accept the terms and mint an API key with no human. Returns the scan id and the public results URL. Fails with DOMAIN_NOT_VERIFIED (with instructions) or RATE_LIMITED (3 scans per host per day). Never solves CAPTCHAs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • readiness_get_scanStep 3.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "readiness_get_scan" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 3. Poll a scan by id. While status is queued/running only metadata is returned; when done you get the 0-100 score, grade, per-item rubric points with evidence, the fix list, and what could not be observed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • readiness_get_verification_tokenStep 1 of a readiness scan.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "readiness_get_verification_token" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 1 of a readiness scan. Returns the domain-ownership token for the URL's host plus the three ways to publish it (DNS TXT record, <meta> tag, /.well-known file). The token is deterministic for the host, so calling this again returns the same value. Nothing is stored.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agentwares-readiness.vercel.app/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including readiness_request_scan (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http readiness-scorer https://agentwares-readiness.vercel.app/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http readiness-scorer https://agentwares-readiness.vercel.app/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__readiness-scorer__readiness_get_scan"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__readiness-scorer__readiness_get_verification_token",
      "mcp__readiness-scorer__readiness_request_scan"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as readiness-scorer. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__readiness-scorer__readiness_get_verification_token untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__readiness-scorer__readiness_request_scan untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.agentwares/readiness-scorer/verify?hash=60fcf2942c94fc4185da53d81786c581f3bd9886ed5afbdbbffdd7360a64b4f1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 60fcf2942c94, from Nov 16, 2026, 08:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agentwares/readiness-scorer/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.agentwares/readiness-scorer
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.agentwares/readiness-scorer.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agentwares/readiness-scorer)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:22 UTC.

Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. readiness_request_scan, readiness_get_verification_token and readiness_get_scan.

Does the Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): readiness_get_verification_token and readiness_request_scan.

Has the Readiness scorer — can an agent sign up to your SaaS? MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.