PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server
io.github.base-buzz/mcpbase-buzzstreamable-httpv0.8.13Scanned
x402 payment safety: stop your agent paying a drainer before the wallet signs.
10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 7 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- 6 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server can do
The PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server is published by the GitHub account base-buzz. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (decode_payment_required) and create or change data (7 tools: evaluate_mcp_payment, evaluate_outstanding_auths, evaluate_hip3_trade, evaluate_velocity and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (list_outstanding_auths, evaluate_outstanding_auths, evaluate_hip3_trade and 2 more).
The fixed checks matched 6 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.8.13.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
decode_payment_requiredverify the recipient.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "decode_payment_required" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "decode_payment_required" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "decode_payment_required" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it verify the recipient. Call this first when a 402 response arrives and you cannot read the payment-required header. Returns the decoded x402 v2 challenge: scheme, network, asset, atomic amount, payee, resource and timeout. Pure decoding: no network call, no signature, no verdict — use evaluate_mcp_payment when you want a decision. Fails closed with a named error if the header is malformed or not base64.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Decode a payment-required header (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
evaluate_batchtransaction scope.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "evaluate_batch" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "evaluate_batch" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_batch" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it transaction scope. Call this when an agent might pay several times in one turn and you want one policy decision covering all of them. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay per item, in input order, with reason codes — so the agent can stop at the first refusal rather than discovering it after three payments. Read-only, holds no keys, never signs. Cheaper and more consistent than calling evaluate_mcp_payment in a loop: same policy, one round trip.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Evaluate a batch of x402 payments (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
evaluate_hip3_tradetransaction scope.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "evaluate_hip3_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "evaluate_hip3_trade" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_hip3_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it transaction scope. Call this BEFORE an agent places a HIP-3 / trade.xyz order. Verdict is allow | review | do_not_trade, with the rule that fired (notional above cap, market not allowed, leverage too high). Returns the decision and a one-line reason. Local policy only: this is not financial advice, holds no keys, and cannot place or cancel an order. Prices come from a read-only market query.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Evaluate a HIP-3 trade (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
evaluate_mcp_paymentverify the recipient.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "evaluate_mcp_payment" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "evaluate_mcp_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_mcp_payment" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it verify the recipient. Call this BEFORE signing any x402 payment. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay, each with stable reason codes (e.g. 'amount 1.00 USDC exceeds max_amount 0.05 USDC'). Returns the decision plus a signed receipt you can verify offline with verify_receipt. Read-only: holds no keys, never signs, never moves funds. A refusal costs nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Evaluate an x402 payment (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
evaluate_outstanding_authsspending limits.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "evaluate_outstanding_auths" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "evaluate_outstanding_auths" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_outstanding_auths" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it spending limits. Call this when an agent already holds authorisations and you need to know which are dangerous. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay per authorisation, with reason codes naming the rule that fired (unlimited allowance, expiry already passed, spender not on the allow-list). Returns per-authorisation decisions plus a summary action. Read-only: never revokes, never signs. Revocation is a transaction you send yourself.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Evaluate outstanding token authorizations (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
evaluate_velocitytransparent risk assessments.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "evaluate_velocity" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "evaluate_velocity" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_velocity" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it transparent risk assessments. Call this when an agent is about to make its Nth payment and you need to know whether the rate itself is the risk. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay over a rolling window (per-hour and per-day spend, count of payees). Returns the decision plus which window was breached. Read-only: it reads the history you pass in, holds no keys, and calls no external service.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Evaluate payment velocity (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
request_testnet_fundstest funds.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_testnet_funds" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it test funds. Call this when you need Base Sepolia USDC to exercise the paid path end to end — one drip of 0.5 USDC per address per 24 hours, and the refusal tells you when it resets rather than just failing. Reads a public faucet: no key needed, no account, and it can only ever send testnet USDC. Use a throwaway address for anything automated; the cap is per address, so a script that generates a new address per call is not clever, it is why faucets get closed.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Request testnet funds (writes a testnet tx, never touches mainnet)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
verify_receiptverify the recipient.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it verify the recipient. Call this when you have a receipt and want to know whether it is genuine, without trusting the server that issued it. Returns VALID with the verdict it attests to, INVALID if the payload was altered, or UNVERIFIABLE when the key cannot be fetched — and UNVERIFIABLE is a refusal, not a pass. Needs only the receipt JSON and a network connection; no account, no shared secret. Fetches the signing key from a published URL you can pin with key_url.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify a receipt against the published key (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
list_outstanding_authsspending limits.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_outstanding_auths" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it spending limits. Call this when auditing what an agent could still spend without a new signature — ERC-20 allowances, Permit2 and EIP-3009 authorisations. Returns each authorisation with spender, amount and expiry. Read-only and needs only a public RPC; no key, no funds moved. Use it after an incident to see what remains exposed, not to revoke anything (this tool cannot revoke).
Annotations the server declares
- title: List outstanding token authorizations (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
validate_policyspending limits.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_policy" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it spending limits. Call this before wiring a policy into anything: a policy that fails validation makes every evaluation refuse, which looks like a product bug and is not one. Returns valid: true, or the exact field and message that is wrong. No payment needed, no network call, no key. Use it in CI on the policy file your agent ships with.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Validate a spending policy (read-only, never signs)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 8
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including decode_payment_required (irreversible), evaluate_mcp_payment (write), evaluate_outstanding_auths (write), evaluate_hip3_trade (write), evaluate_velocity (write) and 3 more
Posture changes
- Nov 19, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 8
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "evaluate_mcp_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_mcp_payment" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
The server marks "evaluate_outstanding_auths" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_outstanding_auths" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
The server marks "evaluate_hip3_trade" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_hip3_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
The server marks "evaluate_velocity" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_velocity" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
The server marks "decode_payment_required" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "decode_payment_required" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- Warnevaluate_batch
The server marks "evaluate_batch" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_batch" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 8.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 8
Tools1 added, 9 changed.+1 added~9 changedView diff
- Added:request_testnet_fundsChanges things
- Changed:decode_payment_requiredCan't be undonedescription
- Changed:evaluate_batchChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:evaluate_hip3_tradeChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:evaluate_mcp_paymentChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:evaluate_outstanding_authsChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:evaluate_velocityChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:list_outstanding_authsOnly readsdescription
- Changed:validate_policyOnly readsdescription
- Changed:verify_receiptChanges thingsdescription
Tools8 added, 1 changed.+8 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:decode_payment_requiredCan't be undone
- Added:evaluate_batchChanges things
- Added:evaluate_hip3_tradeChanges things
- Added:evaluate_outstanding_authsChanges things
- Added:evaluate_velocityChanges things
- Added:list_outstanding_authsChanges things
- Added:validate_policyChanges things
- Added:verify_receiptChanges things
- Changed:evaluate_mcp_paymentChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 0.8.13. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http base-buzz https://api.paystage.xyz/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http base-buzz https://api.paystage.xyz/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__base-buzz__list_outstanding_auths",
"mcp__base-buzz__validate_policy"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__base-buzz__evaluate_mcp_payment",
"mcp__base-buzz__evaluate_outstanding_auths",
"mcp__base-buzz__evaluate_hip3_trade",
"mcp__base-buzz__evaluate_velocity",
"mcp__base-buzz__verify_receipt",
"mcp__base-buzz__decode_payment_required",
"mcp__base-buzz__request_testnet_funds",
"mcp__base-buzz__evaluate_batch"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as base-buzz. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__base-buzz__list_outstanding_auths untrusted-input
- mcp__base-buzz__evaluate_outstanding_auths untrusted-input
- mcp__base-buzz__evaluate_hip3_trade untrusted-input
- mcp__base-buzz__verify_receipt untrusted-input
- mcp__base-buzz__request_testnet_funds untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.base-buzz/mcp/verify?hash=072a733ae2674dded0bc3ef453cdc2937ad9a366fbe53140394acabd6ef182f6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 072a733ae267, from Nov 18, 2026, 06:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.base-buzz/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.base-buzz/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 08:17 UTC.
PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: decode_payment_required.
What tools does the PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 1 irreversible, 7 write, 2 read. decode_payment_required, evaluate_mcp_payment, evaluate_outstanding_auths, evaluate_hip3_trade, evaluate_velocity, verify_receipt, request_testnet_funds, evaluate_batch and 2 more.
Does the PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the PayStage — x402 payment safety MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.