Skip to content

PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server

io.github.base-buzz/x402-payment-safetybase-buzzstreamable-httpv0.8.17Scanned

x402 payment safety: judge a payment against your policy before signing. No keys, never signs.

10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 7 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 7 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 6 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server can do

The PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server is published by the GitHub account base-buzz. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (decode_payment_required) and create or change data (7 tools: evaluate_mcp_payment, evaluate_outstanding_auths, evaluate_hip3_trade, evaluate_velocity and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (list_outstanding_auths, evaluate_outstanding_auths, evaluate_hip3_trade and 2 more).

The fixed checks matched 6 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.8.17.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • decode_payment_requiredverify the recipient.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "decode_payment_required" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "decode_payment_required" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "decode_payment_required" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    verify the recipient. Call this first when a 402 response arrives and you cannot read the payment-required header. Returns the decoded x402 v2 challenge: scheme, network, asset, atomic amount, payee, resource and timeout. Pure decoding: no network call, no signature, no verdict — use evaluate_mcp_payment when you want a decision. Fails closed with a named error if the header is malformed or not base64. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Decode a payment-required header (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • evaluate_batchtransaction scope.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_batch" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "evaluate_batch" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_batch" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    transaction scope. Call this when an agent might pay several times in one turn and you want one policy decision covering all of them. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay per item, in input order, with reason codes — so the agent can stop at the first refusal rather than discovering it after three payments. Read-only, holds no keys, never signs. Cheaper and more consistent than calling evaluate_mcp_payment in a loop: same policy, one round trip. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Evaluate a batch of x402 payments (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • evaluate_hip3_tradetransaction scope.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_hip3_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "evaluate_hip3_trade" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_hip3_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    transaction scope. Call this BEFORE an agent places a HIP-3 / trade.xyz order. Verdict is allow | review | do_not_trade, with the rule that fired (notional above cap, market not allowed, leverage too high). Returns the decision and a one-line reason. Local policy only: this is not financial advice, holds no keys, and cannot place or cancel an order. Prices come from a read-only market query. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Evaluate a HIP-3 trade (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • evaluate_mcp_paymentverify the recipient.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_mcp_payment" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "evaluate_mcp_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_mcp_payment" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    verify the recipient. Call this BEFORE signing any x402 payment. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay, each with stable reason codes (e.g. 'amount 1.00 USDC exceeds max_amount 0.05 USDC'). Fail-closed by design: do not invent authority — when policy, identity, cost or evidence is missing the answer is a refusal or a review, never a pay. Returns the decision plus a signed receipt you can verify offline with verify_receipt. Read-only: holds no keys, never signs, never moves funds. A refusal costs nothing. This tool evaluates locally, so it makes no network calls and returns no seller reputation; the hosted HTTP API adds `seller_reputation` (domain and certificate age) because it can reach the network.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Evaluate an x402 payment (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • evaluate_outstanding_authsspending limits.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_outstanding_auths" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "evaluate_outstanding_auths" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_outstanding_auths" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    spending limits. Call this when an agent already holds authorisations and you need to know which are dangerous. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay per authorisation, with reason codes naming the rule that fired (unlimited allowance, expiry already passed, spender not on the allow-list). Returns per-authorisation decisions plus a summary action. Read-only: never revokes, never signs. Revocation is a transaction you send yourself. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Evaluate outstanding token authorizations (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • evaluate_velocitytransparent risk assessments.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_velocity" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "evaluate_velocity" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_velocity" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    transparent risk assessments. Call this when an agent is about to make its Nth payment and you need to know whether the rate itself is the risk. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay over a rolling window (per-hour and per-day spend, count of payees). Returns the decision plus which window was breached. Read-only: it reads the history you pass in, holds no keys, and calls no external service. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Evaluate payment velocity (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • request_testnet_fundstest funds.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_testnet_funds" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    test funds. Call this when you need Base Sepolia USDC to exercise the paid path end to end — one drip of 0.5 USDC per address per 24 hours, and the refusal tells you when it resets rather than just failing. Reads a public faucet: no key needed, no account, and it can only ever send testnet USDC. Use a throwaway address for anything automated; the cap is per address, so a script that generates a new address per call is not clever, it is why faucets get closed. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Request testnet funds (writes a testnet tx, never touches mainnet)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_receiptverify the recipient.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    verify the recipient. Call this when you have a receipt and want to know whether it is genuine, without trusting the server that issued it. Returns VALID with the verdict it attests to, INVALID if the payload was altered, or UNVERIFIABLE when the key cannot be fetched — and UNVERIFIABLE is a refusal, not a pass. Needs only the receipt JSON and a network connection; no account, no shared secret. Fetches the signing key from a published URL you can pin with key_url. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify a receipt against the published key (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • list_outstanding_authsspending limits.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_outstanding_auths" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    spending limits. Call this when auditing what an agent could still spend without a new signature — ERC-20 allowances, Permit2 and EIP-3009 authorisations. Returns each authorisation with spender, amount and expiry. Read-only and needs only a public RPC; no key, no funds moved. Use it after an incident to see what remains exposed, not to revoke anything (this tool cannot revoke). Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List outstanding token authorizations (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • validate_policyspending limits.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_policy" says "validate": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    spending limits. Call this before wiring a policy into anything: a policy that fails validation makes every evaluation refuse, which looks like a product bug and is not one. Returns valid: true, or the exact field and message that is wrong. No payment needed, no network call, no key. Use it in CI on the policy file your agent ships with. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Validate a spending policy (read-only, never signs)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
8
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including decode_payment_required (irreversible), evaluate_mcp_payment (write), evaluate_outstanding_auths (write), evaluate_hip3_trade (write), evaluate_velocity (write) and 3 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

6 warn
  • The server marks "evaluate_mcp_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_mcp_payment" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "evaluate_outstanding_auths" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_outstanding_auths" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "evaluate_hip3_trade" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_hip3_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "evaluate_velocity" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_velocity" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "decode_payment_required" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "decode_payment_required" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "evaluate_batch" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_batch" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools10 changed.~10 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.8.17. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http x402-payment-safety https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http x402-payment-safety https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__list_outstanding_auths",
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__validate_policy"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__evaluate_mcp_payment",
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__evaluate_outstanding_auths",
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__evaluate_hip3_trade",
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__evaluate_velocity",
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__verify_receipt",
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__decode_payment_required",
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__request_testnet_funds",
      "mcp__x402-payment-safety__evaluate_batch"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as x402-payment-safety. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__x402-payment-safety__list_outstanding_auths untrusted-input
  • mcp__x402-payment-safety__evaluate_outstanding_auths untrusted-input
  • mcp__x402-payment-safety__evaluate_hip3_trade untrusted-input
  • mcp__x402-payment-safety__verify_receipt untrusted-input
  • mcp__x402-payment-safety__request_testnet_funds untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.base-buzz/x402-payment-safety/verify?hash=89a7d5aa19cc7187a6a2117c8588beeb0826ac219dbb77b1750a7e80a28a94bf" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 89a7d5aa19cc, from Nov 20, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.base-buzz/x402-payment-safety/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.base-buzz/x402-payment-safety
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.base-buzz/x402-payment-safety.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.base-buzz/x402-payment-safety)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: decode_payment_required.

What tools does the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 irreversible, 7 write, 2 read. decode_payment_required, evaluate_mcp_payment, evaluate_outstanding_auths, evaluate_hip3_trade, evaluate_velocity, verify_receipt, request_testnet_funds, evaluate_batch and 2 more.

Does the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.