Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server
io.github.conorbronsdon/chain-of-thought-podcast-mcpconorbronsdonstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Search and cite Chain of Thought podcast transcripts and episodes.
4 tools: 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
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- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server can do
The Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server is published by the GitHub account conorbronsdon. It has 4 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_episode and get_transcript_excerpt).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
get_episodeReturns one episode by number or slug (a full chainofthought.show episode URL also works): title, date, duration, guests with companies, summary, chapters with timestamps, and link…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_episode" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns one episode by number or slug (a full chainofthought.show episode URL also works): title, date, duration, guests with companies, summary, chapters with timestamps, and links to the episode page, YouTube and audio. Does not return the transcript; use search_transcripts or get_transcript_excerpt for passages. Cite the url.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_transcript_excerptReturns up to 16 consecutive transcript segments from one episode around a timestamp (m:ss or h:mm:ss), a segment_index from search results, or a passage url or its #t- anchor.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_transcript_excerpt" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns up to 16 consecutive transcript segments from one episode around a timestamp (m:ss or h:mm:ss), a segment_index from search results, or a passage url or its #t- anchor. Defaults: 2 segments before and 5 after. Each segment has its own url to cite.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_episodesFinds Chain of Thought episodes by topic, guest name, company, title or chapter title.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_episodes" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Finds Chain of Thought episodes by topic, guest name, company, title or chapter title. Returns up to 20 episodes ranked by relevance with number, title, date, guests, a short summary, matching chapter titles and the episode page url to cite.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_transcriptsFull-text search over Chain of Thought transcripts.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_transcripts" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Full-text search over Chain of Thought transcripts. Returns up to 20 passages ranked by relevance, each with episode number and title, guests, speaker, timestamp, a snippet of about 600 characters, and a url for that moment on the episode page (#t-N). Cite that url. Optional `episode` limits the search to one episode. Use get_transcript_excerpt for context. Transcripts are machine-generated; check exact quotes against the recording.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:03 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http chain-of-thought-podcast https://mcp.chainofthought.show/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http chain-of-thought-podcast https://mcp.chainofthought.show/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__chain-of-thought-podcast__search_transcripts",
"mcp__chain-of-thought-podcast__search_episodes",
"mcp__chain-of-thought-podcast__get_episode",
"mcp__chain-of-thought-podcast__get_transcript_excerpt"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as chain-of-thought-podcast. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__chain-of-thought-podcast__get_episode untrusted-input
- mcp__chain-of-thought-podcast__get_transcript_excerpt untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.conorbronsdon/chain-of-thought-podcast-mcp/verify?hash=1cfe6599f64728e3791a83a950b05a3136267a3d3d8928c9802945577f1f020f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1cfe6599f647, from Nov 16, 2026, 14:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.conorbronsdon/chain-of-thought-podcast-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.conorbronsdon/chain-of-thought-podcast-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:28 UTC.
Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 read. search_transcripts, search_episodes, get_episode and get_transcript_excerpt.
Does the Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Chain of Thought podcast archive MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.