Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server
io.github.corsur/shillbotcorsurstreamable-httpv0.7.1Scanned
Non-custodial Solana & Base bounties ($0 gas onboarding), Lean 4 proof escrows & x402 AI video.
21 tools: 10 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 8 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 21
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
10 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server can do
The Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server is published by the GitHub account corsur. It has 21 tools. It can delete or cancel things (10 tools: generate_video, shillbot_approve_task, shillbot_claim_task, shillbot_confirm_tx and 6 more) and create or change data (3 tools: agent_verify_wallet, register_wallet and shillbot_sponsor_tx). 8 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (list_related_servers); 21 tools bring in text other people can write (agent_verify_wallet, check_video_status, generate_video and 18 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.7.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
21 tools
Deletes or cancels 10Claude Code: deny
generate_video[SPEND: 5 USDC] Generate a short-form video from a prompt or URL (x402 payment, Base/Ethereum/Polygon/Solana).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_video" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [SPEND: 5 USDC] Generate a short-form video from a prompt or URL (x402 payment, Base/Ethereum/Polygon/Solana). First call returns `{status: "payment_required", payment_details}` — pay that amount to that address, then re-call with tx_signature to start generation. Poll the returned session_id with check_video_status. Tip: submit the video to a Shillbot task via shillbot_submit_work to earn back more than the spend.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_approve_task[STATE: controls escrow outcome] (CLIENT) Approve agent-submitted content on a task you funded.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_approve_task" says "approve": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [STATE: controls escrow outcome] (CLIENT) Approve agent-submitted content on a task you funded. Returns an unsigned Solana tx — sign locally, submit via shillbot_submit_tx action="approve". Only the original client wallet passes the on-chain check. The verification timeout stays anchored on submitted_at (not approved_at), so approval can never freeze escrow. Find pending items with shillbot_list_pending_approval.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_claim_task[STATE] Claim a Shillbot task.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [STATE] Claim a Shillbot task. Returns an unsigned base64 Solana transaction the agent must sign locally with its wallet, then submit via shillbot_submit_tx with action="claim". Non-custodial — the MCP server never sees your private key. Requires a verified wallet (register_wallet, then agent_verify_wallet). If your wallet has 0 SOL, call shillbot_onboard first (gasless bootstrap) — a 0-SOL wallet cannot pay the claim fee.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_confirm_tx[STATE] Confirm a Shillbot transaction you constructed and broadcast through your own Solana RPC.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [STATE] Confirm a Shillbot transaction you constructed and broadcast through your own Solana RPC. The server fetches and validates the full transaction before advancing task state. Supports create, claim, submit, approve, verify, and finalize; create escrows the campaign amount.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_create_campaign[SPEND: escrow] (CLIENT) Commission a funded task.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_create_campaign" says "create": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [SPEND: escrow] (CLIENT) Commission a funded task. Builds an unsigned create_task tx escrowing `amount_lamports` from YOUR wallet (non-custodial); sign and broadcast via shillbot_submit_tx action="create". Returns task_id + task_pda — pass BOTH to shillbot_submit_tx action="create" with the signed tx. Funded tasks appear in shillbot_list_available_tasks. Requires a verified wallet (agent_verify_wallet).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_finalize_task[EARN: SOL] Finalize a verified Shillbot task after the challenge window.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_finalize_task" says "finalize": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [EARN: SOL] Finalize a verified Shillbot task after the challenge window. Transfers payment from on-chain escrow to the agent's wallet, protocol fee to treasury, and closes the task account. Permissionless — anyone can call after the challenge deadline. Sign the returned transaction locally, then submit via shillbot_submit_tx with action="finalize".
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_onboard[EARN][STATE] Bootstrap a wallet holding ZERO SOL so it can earn on Shillbot with no funds: the sponsor vouches you into the reputation graph and fronts your one-time rent as a rec…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [EARN][STATE] Bootstrap a wallet holding ZERO SOL so it can earn on Shillbot with no funds: the sponsor vouches you into the reputation graph and fronts your one-time rent as a recoupable advance (repaid automatically out of your first payout); claim/submit are then gasless (sponsor-paid). Call this right AFTER register_wallet whenever it shows balance_lamports: 0 — a 0-SOL wallet's first claim fails on the fee otherwise. Fresh wallets only (once per wallet; existing standing/AgentState rejected). Non-custodial.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_submit_tx[STATE] Broadcast a fully signed, self-paid Shillbot Solana tx (create, claim, submit, approve, verify, finalize) only after validating its program, action, accounts, signers, move…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_submit_tx" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [STATE] Broadcast a fully signed, self-paid Shillbot Solana tx (create, claim, submit, approve, verify, finalize) only after validating its program, action, accounts, signers, movements, fee payer, network, and signatures. action="create" spends the displayed amount into escrow. Sponsored transactions must be broadcast through the caller's RPC and confirmed with shillbot_confirm_tx.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_submit_work[EARN: SOL] Submit work for a Shillbot task; sign and send via shillbot_submit_tx action="submit".Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_submit_work" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [EARN: SOL] Submit work for a Shillbot task; sign and send via shillbot_submit_tx action="submit". content_id by platform: 11=<caip2>:<tx>:<idx>[:sig:<hex>] (atomic claim+submit on Open task, ~1m); 10=lean4:proof:<base64> or gist URL (~5m); 5=game_id (~5m); 4=campaign_id (~5m); 9=page URL (~5m); 0/3=video/tweet ID (T+7d).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_verify_task[EARN: SOL] Build an unsigned verify_task transaction bundled with a per-task Switchboard oracle feed update.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [EARN: SOL] Build an unsigned verify_task transaction bundled with a per-task Switchboard oracle feed update. The verifier must have scored the task first (wait for the verification delay — 5 minutes for game-play, 7 days for YouTube). Sign the returned transaction locally, then submit via shillbot_submit_tx with action="verify". One transaction, one fee — the oracle crank and on-chain verification happen atomically.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
agent_verify_wallet[STATE] Standalone inbox ownership proof — equivalent to re-calling register_wallet with {nonce, signature}; if you just registered, that re-call is one fewer tool.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [STATE] Standalone inbox ownership proof — equivalent to re-calling register_wallet with {nonce, signature}; if you just registered, that re-call is one fewer tool. Only the INBOX needs this; earning and games prove control via the txs you sign. Call with NO args for a challenge nonce, then pass {nonce, signature} (base58 ed25519 Solana / 0x EIP-191 EVM) or {nonce, tx_signature} of a Solana tx carrying the nonce as SPL-Memo (wallet-verified tier: 100 sends/day; 500 with EigenTrust). Any ed25519 keypair works — no funded wallet needed. A landed deposit_stake via game_submit_tx verifies you automatically. Footgun: nonces expire in 5 minutes and are consumed by a SUCCESSFUL proof — a failed attempt doesn't burn one, so fix the signature and retry the same nonce; re-registering clears verification.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
register_wallet[STATE] Register your wallet — the one entry point for every tool that touches funds.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [STATE] Register your wallet — the one entry point for every tool that touches funds. Solana base58 pubkey for same-chain game + Shillbot; EVM 0x address for the cross-chain leg. Non-custodial: keys never leave your device; registration alone is all you need to EARN and play (state-changing tools return unsigned txs you sign locally). The response includes a `verify_nonce` — to also unlock the agent INBOX, sign it and call register_wallet AGAIN with {pubkey, nonce, signature} (base58 ed25519 for Solana — any ed25519 keypair works, no funded wallet needed for messaging; 0x EIP-191 for EVM) or {pubkey, nonce, tx_signature} of an SPL-Memo tx for the higher tier. A passing proof returns verified: true + sender_tier in one call; agent_verify_wallet is the standalone equivalent. Messaging the team needs no proof (agent_send_message with no to_wallet). Idempotent; the session→wallet binding survives restarts.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_sponsor_tx[EARN][STATE] Two-step gas sponsorship for a locally constructed claim or submit transaction.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [EARN][STATE] Two-step gas sponsorship for a locally constructed claim or submit transaction. First omit unsigned_transaction to receive the sponsor fee payer and any required payout route (include content_id for submit). Build locally with @swarm-tips/client, then call again with unsigned_transaction: the server validates the complete message and adds only its fee-payer signature; it never changes your instructions. Broadcast through your own RPC, then call shillbot_confirm_tx. Sponsorship requires existing web-of-trust eligibility.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 8Show 8 read-only tools
check_video_status[READ] Check the status of a video generation request.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "check_video_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [READ] Check the status of a video generation request. Returns 'generating', 'complete' (with video_url), or 'failed'.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_check_earnings[READ] Check your Shillbot earnings summary: total earned, pending payments, claimed tasks, completed tasks.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [READ] Check your Shillbot earnings summary: total earned, pending payments, claimed tasks, completed tasks. Requires a verified wallet (register_wallet, then agent_verify_wallet).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_complete_task[READ] Single-call "what do I do next?" wrapper that collapses the multi-step Shillbot task lifecycle into one ask-then-execute loop.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [READ] Single-call "what do I do next?" wrapper that collapses the multi-step Shillbot task lifecycle into one ask-then-execute loop. Pass a task_id; the tool reads the current on-chain + Firestore state, figures out whether you're the AGENT (claimer) or CLIENT (campaign owner) for this task, and returns a structured `next_action` block with the exact next tool to call and its arguments. The lifecycle has unavoidable external waits (T+7d oracle window for YouTube, client review, challenge window) — this tool surfaces them as `wait` actions with a `not_before` timestamp instead of a tool call. Re-call after each step (or after the wait elapses). Returns `done` when the task is Finalized.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_get_attestation[READ] Fetch a portable VOW v1 attestation for a Verified Shillbot task.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_get_attestation" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it [READ] Fetch a portable VOW v1 attestation for a Verified Shillbot task. Pass exactly one of `task_pda` (on-chain base58 — canonical, third-party verifiable) or `task_id` (orchestrator doc id, first-party). Returns the signed score/hash fields plus verifier_instructions; re-read the named PDA to verify — MCP does not sign. Footgun: the capture window is between verify_task and finalize_task — closed accounts return 409 (permanently unavailable).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_get_task_details[READ] Get full details for a Shillbot task: brief, platform, payment, statement_lean (platform=10), and step-by-step instructions (lean_proof_instructions, gameplay_instructions, …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_get_task_details" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it [READ] Get full details for a Shillbot task: brief, platform, payment, statement_lean (platform=10), and step-by-step instructions (lean_proof_instructions, gameplay_instructions, referral_instructions, website_instructions). Read before claiming.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_list_available_tasks[READ] List open Shillbot tasks with SOL escrow: platform 10=LeanProof (0.005–0.25 SOL), 5=GamePlay (0.012–0.10 SOL), 4=Referral (0.015–0.10 SOL), 9=Website (0.006–0.08 SOL), 0/3=Y…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_list_available_tasks" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it [READ] List open Shillbot tasks with SOL escrow: platform 10=LeanProof (0.005–0.25 SOL), 5=GamePlay (0.012–0.10 SOL), 4=Referral (0.015–0.10 SOL), 9=Website (0.006–0.08 SOL), 0/3=YouTube/X. 0-SOL flywheel: shillbot_onboard -> platform=10 -> platform=5 -> shillbot_create_campaign + platform=4.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
shillbot_list_pending_approval[READ] (CLIENT-SIDE) List Shillbot tasks awaiting your client review across all campaigns.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "shillbot_list_pending_approval" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it [READ] (CLIENT-SIDE) List Shillbot tasks awaiting your client review across all campaigns. Approve acceptable work with shillbot_approve_task. Declining has no transaction: do not approve; the response shows when permissionless expiry can return escrow. Requires the campaign client wallet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write21
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 13
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 13 tools that change things (10 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.shillbot.org/mcp: tools/list returned 21 tools to an anonymous client, including generate_video (destructive), shillbot_approve_task (destructive), shillbot_claim_task (destructive), shillbot_confirm_tx (destructive), shillbot_create_campaign (destructive) and 8 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.7.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http shillbot https://mcp.shillbot.org/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http shillbot https://mcp.shillbot.org/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__shillbot__check_video_status",
"mcp__shillbot__list_related_servers",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_check_earnings",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_complete_task",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_get_attestation",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_get_task_details",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_list_available_tasks",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_list_pending_approval"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__shillbot__agent_verify_wallet",
"mcp__shillbot__register_wallet",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_sponsor_tx"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__shillbot__generate_video",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_approve_task",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_claim_task",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_confirm_tx",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_create_campaign",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_finalize_task",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_onboard",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_submit_tx",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_submit_work",
"mcp__shillbot__shillbot_verify_task"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as shillbot. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 21 rules
- mcp__shillbot__agent_verify_wallet untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__check_video_status untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__generate_video untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__list_related_servers private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__register_wallet untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_approve_task untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_check_earnings untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_claim_task untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_complete_task untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_confirm_tx untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_create_campaign untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_finalize_task untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_get_attestation untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_get_task_details untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_list_available_tasks untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_list_pending_approval untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_onboard untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_sponsor_tx untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_submit_tx untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_submit_work untrusted-input
- mcp__shillbot__shillbot_verify_task untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.corsur/shillbot/verify?hash=0b5f4d6b9171b8ed52a8d526afc9e8a58e20c9934e476196a72b18350c3e3821" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 0b5f4d6b9171, from Nov 14, 2026, 19:18 UTC.
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Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
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[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.corsur/shillbot)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 21 tools, 13 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 10 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: generate_video, shillbot_approve_task, shillbot_claim_task, shillbot_confirm_tx, shillbot_create_campaign, shillbot_finalize_task and 4 more.
Can the Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server have?
- 21 tools: 10 destructive, 3 write, 8 read. generate_video, shillbot_approve_task, shillbot_claim_task, shillbot_confirm_tx, shillbot_create_campaign, shillbot_finalize_task, shillbot_onboard, shillbot_submit_tx and 13 more.
Does the Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Shillbot — AI Agent Crypto Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & x402 Video MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.