sanctions-screening-mcp-server
io.github.cyanheads/sanctions-screening-mcp-servercyanheadsstreamable-httpv0.7.0Scanned
Screen eleven sanctions/export-control lists; resolve GLEIF entities offline. Screening aid.
7 tools: 3 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the sanctions-screening-mcp-server can do
The sanctions-screening-mcp-server is published by the GitHub account cyanheads. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: sanctions_screen_name, sanctions_screen_identifier and sanctions_trace_ownership), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 3 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.7.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
sanctions_screen_identifierLook up an identifier — a vessel or company IMO number, a SWIFT/BIC code, a digital-currency wallet address, a passport or national ID number, or any other identifier a list publis…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up an identifier — a vessel or company IMO number, a SWIFT/BIC code, a digital-currency wallet address, a passport or national ID number, or any other identifier a list publishes — against loaded sanctions and export-control watchlists — OFAC SDN + Consolidated, EU, UK, UN, and the six BIS/State CSL lists. Check sanctions_list_sources for coverage. Exact match after normalization, with no fuzzy or partial matching and no score: spacing, letter case, and the separators - . / are ignored, an IMO number matches with or without its IMO prefix, a SWIFT/BIC code compares on its first eight characters so a branch code matches its institution, and a wallet address folds case only where its encoding is case-insensitive (hex, bech32, cashaddr — never base58). Returns every designation that publishes a matching identifier, one per designation — an OFAC party both OFAC lists publish under one entry ID is one hit, its sources naming both lists — with the identifiers that matched as published; sanctions_get_designation pulls the full record. This is a screening AID for a human/compliance review, NOT a compliance determination: a hit means "review this candidate against the official source," and an empty result never means "cleared" — an identifier a list prints only in free-text remarks, or bundled with other numbers in one field, does not match.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sanctions_screen_nameScreen a name (person, company, vessel, aircraft) against loaded sanctions and export-control watchlists — OFAC SDN + Consolidated, EU, UK, UN, and the six BIS/State CSL lists — al…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen a name (person, company, vessel, aircraft) against loaded sanctions and export-control watchlists — OFAC SDN + Consolidated, EU, UK, UN, and the six BIS/State CSL lists — alias- and fuzzy-aware. Check sanctions_list_sources for coverage before interpreting an empty result; zero-record CSL lists are not loaded. Returns scored potential matches with the source list, sanctioning program, designation date, and the matched alias; an OFAC party both OFAC lists publish under one entry ID is one hit, its sources naming both lists. Strict mode (default) matches exact-normalized then all-tokens-present, a legal form matching any spelling of the same form (Ltd and Limited, LLC and OOO), then runs a fuzzy pass over each selected list strict finds nothing on, and over the UK and UN lists either way for a name holding a letter outside the Latin script: a full pass when strict finds nothing on any list, otherwise one that adds only candidates covering every word of the name other than legal forms, articles and other function words, and the jurisdiction codes uk, usa, uae, and rf, by spelling or by sound, ranked after the strict hits. Fuzzy mode runs the fuzzy pass over every selected list. It adds Jaro-Winkler and phonetic matching and labels hits approximate with a raw 0–1 similarity score plus the count of query tokens the candidate covers, which orders candidates that tie on score; fuzzySources names the lists it searched. Results are paged: totalAvailable and hasMore report matches beyond the returned page, and nextOffset retrieves them. This is a screening AID for a human/compliance review, NOT a compliance determination: a hit means "review this candidate against the official source," and an empty result never means "cleared."
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sanctions_trace_ownershipTrace a paged GLEIF Level 2 ownership segment from a 20-character LEI (use sanctions_resolve_entity to obtain one).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Trace a paged GLEIF Level 2 ownership segment from a 20-character LEI (use sanctions_resolve_entity to obtain one). Direction both walks parents and children separately from the root, never sideways into siblings or co-parents; parents-side placement wins cycles. Ultimate-parent edges are shortcuts, never walked hops; ultimate-only nodes are flagged reachedVia: ultimate. Drain nextCursor with the same query, then re-root each boundary with its LEI, same-side direction and depth, including at depth five; deduplicate branch roots and edges across segments. Pages emit nodes, then edges, then boundaries: limit records each (50 default, 100 maximum), the last page the remainder. Edges reference nodes across assembled pages. Cursors bind query and topology; changed topology requires restarting without a cursor. Entity and screening values read current mirrors, not an immutable snapshot. Set screenNodes to cross-reference only this page of nodes as sanctions_get_entity does: legal, other and transliterated names strict (exact then all tokens present, a legal form matching any spelling of the same form, never fuzzy), LEI and country-matched registration number as exact non-document identifiers, with merged designation hits and matchedOn inputs. A node missing Level 1 is screened by LEI alone. Every hit is a candidate to verify; no hit is a clearance. Each eligible node retains direct and ultimate parentStatus: relationship, reporting exception and its reasons, none, or unknown when exceptions are not loaded. Read hasMore and truncationReasons separately from segment-wide missingEntityCount and page-local missingEntityLeis, screening counts and per-node ten-hit cap disclosures. A screening aid, not a compliance determination; a finished segment never proves full beneficial ownership.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
sanctions_get_designationFetch the full record for one sanctions designation by source list + entry ID, the list's published reference number, or, for a UK or EU designation, the UN reference number it imp…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "sanctions_get_designation" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the full record for one sanctions designation by source list + entry ID, the list's published reference number, or, for a UK or EU designation, the UN reference number it implements — the drill-in after sanctions_screen_name or sanctions_screen_identifier surfaces a candidate, or the lookup for a reference a notice cites (UN QDe.004, EU EU.27.28, UK OFSI Group ID, or UN TAe.010 on the UK list). Returns all published aliases, identifiers (passport, national ID, tax and registration numbers, SWIFT/BIC codes, digital-currency addresses, vessel call signs, aircraft tail and serial numbers, phone numbers, email addresses, websites), addresses, dates and places of birth at the precision the source published, nationalities, descriptive features (a vessel's flag, type, and tonnage; an aircraft's model and operator; a title or gender; sanctions notes; the UK measures imposed and designation source), sanctioning program, legal basis, designation date, and the UN reference number a UK or EU designation implements. The record reflects exactly what the source published; missing fields mean the source omitted them. This is a screening aid — the designation record supports a compliance review, it is not itself a determination.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sanctions_get_entityFetch the full GLEIF Level 1 record for one LEI: legal name, other/trading names, legal and headquarters addresses, registration status, entity status and successor entities, juris…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "sanctions_get_entity" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the full GLEIF Level 1 record for one LEI: legal name, other/trading names, legal and headquarters addresses, registration status, entity status and successor entities, jurisdiction, registration authority and ID, and last-update date — plus a sanctions cross-reference against all loaded watchlists. The cross-reference screens the legal name and every other and transliterated name strict (exact, then all tokens present with a legal form matching any spelling of the same form, such as Ltd and Limited or LLC and OOO — never fuzzy, unlike sanctions_screen_name), and looks up the LEI and the registration number as exact non-document identifiers, the registration number matching only an identifier published for the country of the entity's legal jurisdiction. Hits merge to one per designation, an OFAC party both OFAC lists publish to one hit whose sources names both: matchedOn names every input that produced each, and a hit only an identifier produced carries matchedIdentifiers and no matchedName. The screening cross-reference is a screening AID: a hit is a candidate to verify against the official source, and no hit is not a clearance. screeningStatus says whether that cross-reference actually ran — an empty sanctionsHits under not_ready means the sanctions mirror was unavailable, not that nothing matched. sanctionsScreen says whether the hit list is the whole set: it reports how many potential matches existed before the cap, so a capped cross-reference is distinguishable from a complete one. A retired, merged, or duplicate LEI can name successors, the entities that took it over: pass a successor's LEI to sanctions_get_entity or sanctions_trace_ownership, since successors are listed, never screened or followed; entityStatusLoaded false means the record was stored before entity status and successors were read, not that it has none. LEI must be a 20-character GLEIF identifier (18 alphanumerics + 2 check digits).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sanctions_list_sourcesList supported watchlists (OFAC SDN + Consolidated, EU, UK, UN, BIS Entity/Denied Persons/Unverified/Military End User, State ITAR Debarred/Nonproliferation) and GLEIF datasets wit…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "sanctions_list_sources" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List supported watchlists (OFAC SDN + Consolidated, EU, UK, UN, BIS Entity/Denied Persons/Unverified/Military End User, State ITAR Debarred/Nonproliferation) and GLEIF datasets with current mirrored counts, source URLs, licenses, readiness, and as-of timestamps. Each sanctions list carries lastHarvestedAt, its last successful harvest, and publishedAt, the date its publisher put on that document (not when the list's content last changed); both are absent until this server records a harvest of the list. lastRefresh reports a sanctions refresh that is running or failed and names the lists that failed; sanctionsAsOf is the last refresh in which every list harvested. coverageNotice names unloaded CSL lists and how to refresh them; prior mirror readiness does not establish coverage of newly added lists. For GLEIF, reports Level 2 ownership relationships, reporting-exception coverage, alternate-name index readiness, and whether entity status and successors are loaded. Use this for provenance, freshness, and coverage on any result. Attribution: UK data is under the Open Government Licence v3.0; BIS and State CSL data is supplied by the International Trade Administration under its published terms. This product uses the International Trade Administration’s Data API but is not endorsed or certified by the International Trade Administration.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sanctions_resolve_entityResolve a company or organization name (with an optional jurisdiction: a country code, which includes its subdivisions, or an ISO 3166-2 subdivision code) to candidate GLEIF Legal …No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "sanctions_resolve_entity" says "resolve": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve a company or organization name (with an optional jurisdiction: a country code, which includes its subdivisions, or an ISO 3166-2 subdivision code) to candidate GLEIF Legal Entity Identifiers (LEIs), ranked. This turns a free-text counterparty name into a stable global identifier that sanctions_get_entity and sanctions_trace_ownership key off. Every name GLEIF publishes takes part: the legal name, previous legal names, trading names, alternative-language legal names, and ASCII transliterations of a legal name in another script — each candidate reports the name it matched on and that name's type, one candidate per LEI. Strict mode (default) matches exact-normalized then all-tokens-present; fuzzy mode (or auto when strict is empty) adds Jaro-Winkler scoring labeled approximate with a raw 0–1 score plus the count of query tokens the matched name covers, which orders candidates that tie on score. Results are paged: totalAvailable and hasMore report candidates beyond the returned page, and nextOffset retrieves them. Returns potential matches to confirm against the GLEIF record — name resolution is a candidate ranking, not an authoritative identification.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:34 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://sanctions-screening.caseyjhand.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including sanctions_screen_name (write), sanctions_screen_identifier (write), sanctions_trace_ownership (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
- Changed:sanctions_get_designationOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_get_entityOnly readsdescription
- Changed:sanctions_list_sourcesOnly readsdescription
- Changed:sanctions_screen_nameChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_trace_ownershipChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
- Changed:sanctions_get_entityOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_resolve_entityOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_screen_identifierChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_screen_nameChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_trace_ownershipChanges thingsinputSchema
Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
- Changed:sanctions_get_designationOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_list_sourcesOnly readsdescription
- Changed:sanctions_screen_identifierChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_screen_nameChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_trace_ownershipChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.7.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http sanctions-screening https://sanctions-screening.caseyjhand.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http sanctions-screening https://sanctions-screening.caseyjhand.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__sanctions-screening__sanctions_get_designation",
"mcp__sanctions-screening__sanctions_list_sources",
"mcp__sanctions-screening__sanctions_resolve_entity",
"mcp__sanctions-screening__sanctions_get_entity"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__sanctions-screening__sanctions_screen_name",
"mcp__sanctions-screening__sanctions_screen_identifier",
"mcp__sanctions-screening__sanctions_trace_ownership"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sanctions-screening. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.cyanheads/sanctions-screening-mcp-server/verify?hash=a13a7ef1925cd301e93c05cd8366f235f6d5b81c66a0bb78ba1ef46264f0454c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a13a7ef1925c, from Nov 19, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.cyanheads/sanctions-screening-mcp-server/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.cyanheads/sanctions-screening-mcp-server)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
sanctions-screening-mcp-server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the sanctions-screening-mcp-server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the sanctions-screening-mcp-server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the sanctions-screening-mcp-server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the sanctions-screening-mcp-server have?
- 7 tools: 3 write, 4 read. sanctions_screen_name, sanctions_screen_identifier, sanctions_trace_ownership, sanctions_get_designation, sanctions_list_sources, sanctions_resolve_entity and sanctions_get_entity.
Does the sanctions-screening-mcp-server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the sanctions-screening-mcp-server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the sanctions-screening-mcp-server changed its tools?
- Yes, 3 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.