toolkit-mcp-server
io.github.cyanheads/toolkit-mcp-servercyanheadsstreamable-httpv2.4.1Scanned
Generate IDs, QR codes, and hashes, encode values, geolocate IPs, plus gated host diagnostics.
5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the toolkit-mcp-server can do
The toolkit-mcp-server is published by the GitHub account cyanheads. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: toolkit_hash_value, toolkit_generate_id, toolkit_generate_qr and toolkit_encode_value), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (toolkit_geolocate_ip).
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 2.4.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
toolkit_encode_valueEncode or decode a value across base64, base64url, hex, or URL (percent) encoding, in either direction.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Encode or decode a value across base64, base64url, hex, or URL (percent) encoding, in either direction. Set operation to "encode" to transform raw UTF-8 text into the chosen encoding, or "decode" to recover the original bytes from an encoded value. Decoded bytes come back as UTF-8 text by default; set outputEncoding to "hex", "base64", or "base64url" (unpadded, the form JWK members, JWS signatures, and PKCE code challenges use) to receive them re-encoded instead, which is lossless for binary data and transcodes between encodings (a base64 digest to hex, or hex key bytes to base64url, for example). Decoding never substitutes replacement characters: bytes that are not valid UTF-8 text are reported as a recoverable error that points at outputEncoding. Whitespace in hex, base64, and base64url values is ignored, so line-wrapped MIME bodies and PEM bodies decode as-is (drop PEM's -----BEGIN/END----- lines, which are not base64). base64url uses the URL-safe alphabet (- and _ instead of + and /); url applies encodeURIComponent and percent-decoding. A value that is malformed for the chosen encoding is reported as a recoverable error, not a silent best-effort.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
toolkit_generate_idMint cryptographically-random identifiers using the platform CSPRNG — the correct source for IDs that must be unpredictable, unlike model-generated values.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "toolkit_generate_id" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "toolkit_generate_id" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "toolkit_generate_id" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Mint cryptographically-random identifiers using the platform CSPRNG — the correct source for IDs that must be unpredictable, unlike model-generated values. type selects the format: uuid_v4 (random, the default), uuid_v7 (time-ordered, sortable by creation), or ulid (26-char Crockford-base32, lexicographically sortable). Set count to mint a batch in one call (up to 1000); the returned ids array always contains exactly count values and is never truncated. For uuid_v7 and ulid, a batch is monotonic — strictly increasing even within the same millisecond — so the ids array stays in sorted creation order; ids minted in the same millisecond are separated by random gaps, so no id in a batch can be derived from another. IDs from this tool feed into toolkit_generate_qr (pass ids[0] as data) to create a scannable code.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
toolkit_generate_qrEncode text or a URL into a QR code.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "toolkit_generate_qr" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "toolkit_generate_qr" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "toolkit_generate_qr" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Encode text or a URL into a QR code. data is the content to encode (a link, a generated identifier such as toolkit_generate_id's ids[0], or any string). format selects the output: svg returns inline SVG markup sized in pixels, png_base64 returns base64-encoded PNG bytes (with mimeType and byteLength), and terminal returns plain Unicode half-block characters (no escape codes) for a monospace display, drawn for a dark background: light modules, quiet zone included, are blocks and dark modules are spaces. errorCorrection (L/M/Q/H) trades data capacity for damage tolerance, margin sets the quiet-zone width in modules, and scale sets pixels per module for svg and png_base64, so both are (modules + 2 × margin) × scale pixels per side. The returned version (1–40) reflects how dense the encoded data is. png_base64 rejects an image past 2048 px per side with a typed raster_too_large error, so a dense symbol needs a lower scale; svg is vector markup and carries no such limit.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
toolkit_hash_valueGenerate a cryptographic digest or HMAC of a value, or verify a value against an expected digest.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,307 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ing a download against a vendor-published checksum or a lockfile integrity entry."
- Warn
The server marks "toolkit_hash_value" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate a cryptographic digest or HMAC of a value, or verify a value against an expected digest. Set operation to "generate" for a digest, or "compare" to constant-time-check value against the expected digest — compare is timing-safe and avoids manual string equality checks. Omitting operation compares when expected is supplied and generates otherwise. Algorithm defaults to sha256; sha384 and sha512 are also secure, while md5 and sha1 are exposed ONLY for checksum and file-integrity compatibility and for verifying existing HMAC-SHA1 signatures, and must not be used for passwords, new signatures, or any other security purpose. Set secret to compute HMAC(algorithm, secret, value) instead of a plain digest, for generate and compare alike — the check behind webhook signatures such as GitHub's X-Hub-Signature-256 (pass the header value as expected) and HS256 JWT signatures; secretEncoding says how secret is written (utf8 default, hex, base64, or base64url for a JWK k), the result carries hmac: true, and the secret is never echoed back. digestEncoding selects the generated digest form: lowercase hex (default), base64, base64url (unpadded, the JWS signature form), or sri (<algorithm>-<base64>, the npm lockfile integrity and Subresource Integrity form, sha256/sha384/sha512 only, plain digests only). expected is recognized by its shape at the algorithm's digest length, so a published checksum can be pasted as-is: a bare hex, base64, or base64url digest; SRI, which may hold several space-separated entries as an npm integrity field can and matches when any entry for algorithm does; one checksum-file line as sha256sum, shasum, md5, or openssl dgst prints it (<hex> <file>, or SHA256 (<file>) = <digest>); or a digest prefixed sha256: or sha256= (OCI and release-asset digests, webhook signature headers). A tag or prefix naming another algorithm fails rather than being ignored, a multi-line checksum file must be cut to the one line for the file, and with secret an SRI value or a tagged line fails, since both carry plain digests. inputEncoding controls how value is read before hashing (utf8 default, or hex/base64 for raw binary data) so binary blobs need no decode round-trip. The canonical use is matching a download against a vendor-published checksum or a lockfile integrity entry.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
toolkit_geolocate_ipResolve a public IP or dotted hostname to country, region, city, coordinates, ASN, AS holder and name, organization, ISP, timezone, and proxy/hosting/mobile flags.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve a public IP or dotted hostname to country, region, city, coordinates, ASN, AS holder and name, organization, ISP, timezone, and proxy/hosting/mobile flags. Supply target for one lookup or targets for an ordered batch, never both; blank target and empty targets are unset. Batches process the first 100 positions (duplicates retained) and disclose every remainder in unprocessedTargets; at most 1000 inputs are accepted. Each batch position reports its result or an error with recovery, so cached and local outcomes survive quota refusals. The provider is called directly, never the target. Hostnames are DNS-resolved and resolvedIp names the located address. Private/reserved addresses have no public geolocation. Results are best-effort, city-level at best; VPNs, proxies, mobile NAT, and anycast defeat IP-to-location. Read proxy, hosting, and mobile before trusting coordinates: true describes infrastructure, not the user. org can name a customer or sub-allocation rather than the network operator; read isp, asHolder, and asName for the operator. Absent metadata remains unknown. Provider-supplied names are third-party registry text; content[] escapes them so they read as literal text, never as Markdown. source names the provider. Single and batch quotas are independent; cache hits consume neither quota.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:34 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://toolkit.caseyjhand.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including toolkit_hash_value (write), toolkit_generate_id (write), toolkit_generate_qr (write), toolkit_encode_value (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "toolkit_hash_value" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
The server marks "toolkit_generate_id" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "toolkit_generate_id" says "generate": a word for a change.
The server marks "toolkit_generate_qr" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "toolkit_generate_qr" says "generate": a word for a change.
The description is 2,307 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ing a download against a vendor-published checksum or a lockfile integrity entry."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:toolkit_hash_valueChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:toolkit_encode_valueChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:toolkit_geolocate_ipOnly readsdescription
- Changed:toolkit_hash_valueChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 2.4.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http toolkit https://toolkit.caseyjhand.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http toolkit https://toolkit.caseyjhand.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__toolkit__toolkit_geolocate_ip"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__toolkit__toolkit_hash_value",
"mcp__toolkit__toolkit_generate_id",
"mcp__toolkit__toolkit_generate_qr",
"mcp__toolkit__toolkit_encode_value"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as toolkit. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__toolkit__toolkit_geolocate_ip untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.cyanheads/toolkit-mcp-server/verify?hash=97e98804c8796019b2ecaa94556feacebc380f0f21003536c8e14d0b89513a56" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 97e98804c879, from Nov 16, 2026, 11:19 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.cyanheads/toolkit-mcp-server/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.cyanheads/toolkit-mcp-server)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
toolkit-mcp-server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the toolkit-mcp-server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the toolkit-mcp-server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the toolkit-mcp-server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the toolkit-mcp-server have?
- 5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. toolkit_hash_value, toolkit_generate_id, toolkit_generate_qr, toolkit_encode_value and toolkit_geolocate_ip.
Does the toolkit-mcp-server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the toolkit-mcp-server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the toolkit-mcp-server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.