UK Sanctions Screening MCP server
io.github.donniertf-hub/uk-sanctions-screen-mcpdonniertf-hubstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned
Screen names vs the UK Sanctions List (FCDO/OFSI) plus OFAC crypto address checks.
12 tools: 10 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
With Anlyon
10 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the UK Sanctions Screening MCP server can do
The UK Sanctions Screening MCP server is published by the GitHub account donniertf-hub. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (10 tools: sanctions_check, batch_screen, entity_detail, sort_code_check and 6 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
12 tools
Changes things 10Claude Code: ask
batch_screenPRO.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it PRO. Screen up to 200 names at once (customers, suppliers, counterparties) with adjustable match threshold; audit-ready summary with list version and timestamp.
counterparty_checkPRO ($0.05).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it PRO ($0.05). Global counterparty check: screen a person or company name against the UK, EU (FSF) and UN consolidated sanctions lists, and resolve it on GLEIF (by LEI or name), also screening the LEI legal name and its direct/ultimate parents. Each match carries list version, date and freshness.
crypto_address_batch_checkPRO ($0.05).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it PRO ($0.05). Screen up to 100 crypto wallet addresses against the OFAC SDN 'Digital Currency Address' entries in one call; per-address match with chain, SDN name, UID and programs, plus list date and source. Screening aid only, not legal or compliance advice; check the official OFAC list.
crypto_address_checkFREE.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. Screen one crypto wallet address against the OFAC SDN list's 'Digital Currency Address' entries (BTC/XBT, ETH, USDT, TRX, LTC, XMR, SOL and more). EVM 0x addresses match case-insensitively, others exactly. Returns match/no match with SDN name, UID, programs, list date and source. Screening aid only, not legal or compliance advice; check the official OFAC list.
entity_detailPRO.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it PRO. Full record (all aliases, regime, designation date, DOB, nationality) for a UK Sanctions List unique ID.
global_batch_screenPRO ($0.05).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it PRO ($0.05). Screen up to 100 names against the UK, EU (FSF) and UN sanctions lists in one call; per-name best match with list version, date and freshness.
global_entity_detailPRO ($0.05).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it PRO ($0.05). Full record for an EU FSF reference (e.g. EU.27.28) or UN reference (e.g. CDi.001) or UK unique ID, with list version, date and freshness.
sanctions_checkFREE.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. Screen one person or company name against the UK Sanctions List (FCDO/OFSI). Returns best 3 matches with score.
sort_code_batch_checkPRO ($0.01).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it PRO ($0.01). Validate up to 500 UK sort code + account number pairs with the Vocalink/Pay.UK modulus rules (e.g. before a Bacs run or payee import).
sort_code_checkFREE.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. Validate one UK sort code + account number with the Vocalink/Pay.UK modulus checking rules (MOD10, MOD11, double-alternate and all exceptions). No outside lookup.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
lei_lookupFREE.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lei_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. GLEIF LEI lookup: pass an LEI (20 chars) for the full registration record, or a company name for the top 3 GLEIF matches (legal name, status, jurisdiction, registration number, lapsed flag).
regime_listPRO.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "regime_list" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it PRO. Designations by regime (e.g. Russia, Iran) and/or designated since a date.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:33 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 429
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 429.
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 429
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 429; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 429
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http uk-sanctions-screen https://uk-sanctions-screen-mcp.donniertf.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http uk-sanctions-screen https://uk-sanctions-screen-mcp.donniertf.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__regime_list",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__lei_lookup"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__sanctions_check",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__batch_screen",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__entity_detail",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__sort_code_check",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__counterparty_check",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__global_batch_screen",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__global_entity_detail",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__sort_code_batch_check",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__crypto_address_check",
"mcp__uk-sanctions-screen__crypto_address_batch_check"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as uk-sanctions-screen. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.donniertf-hub/uk-sanctions-screen-mcp/verify?hash=b2210e4eab56d7269411770cb437dbf88d1e90cb9db7d1ba4c0549efb17809ab" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b2210e4eab56, from Nov 11, 2026, 10:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.donniertf-hub/uk-sanctions-screen-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.donniertf-hub/uk-sanctions-screen-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 22:19 UTC.
UK Sanctions Screening MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the UK Sanctions Screening MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the UK Sanctions Screening MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the UK Sanctions Screening MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the UK Sanctions Screening MCP server have?
- 12 tools: 10 write, 2 read. sanctions_check, batch_screen, entity_detail, sort_code_check, counterparty_check, global_batch_screen, global_entity_detail, sort_code_batch_check and 4 more.
Does the UK Sanctions Screening MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the UK Sanctions Screening MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the UK Sanctions Screening MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.