NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server
io.github.fasuizu-br/nlp-toolsfasuizu-brstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Toxicity, sentiment, NER, PII detection, and language identification tools
6 tools: 4 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server can do
The NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server is published by the GitHub account fasuizu-br. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: extract_entities, detect_pii, detect_language and check_nlp_service), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
6 tools bring in text other people can write (analyze_toxicity, analyze_sentiment, extract_entities and 3 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 5, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
check_nlp_serviceCheck health status of NLP API services and loaded models.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check health status of NLP API services and loaded models. Returns: dict with keys: - status (str): 'healthy' or error state - models (dict): Loaded model status per capability - version (str): API version
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check NLP Service
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
detect_languageDetect the language of text.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Detect the language of text. Supports 176 languages using fastText. Sub-1ms inference latency. Returns ISO 639-1 codes with confidence scores. Args: text: Text to identify the language of. top_k: Number of top language predictions to return (default: 3). Returns: dict with keys: - language (str): Top predicted language ISO 639-1 code - confidence (float 0-1): Confidence for top prediction - predictions (list): Top-k predictions, each with: - language (str): ISO 639-1 code - confidence (float 0-1): Prediction confidence
Annotations the server declares
- title: Detect Language
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
detect_piiDetect personally identifiable information (PII) in text.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Detect personally identifiable information (PII) in text. Finds emails, phone numbers, SSNs, credit cards, IP addresses, and person names. Optionally returns redacted text with PII replaced by type labels (e.g. [EMAIL], [PHONE]). BERT-NER + regex ensemble. Args: text: Text to scan for personally identifiable information. redact: If true, return redacted text with PII replaced by [TYPE]. Returns: dict with keys: - pii_found (list): Detected PII items, each containing: - text (str): The PII value found - type (str): PII type (EMAIL, PHONE, SSN, CREDIT_CARD, IP, PERSON) - start (int): Character offset start - end (int): Character offset end - score (float 0-1): Detection confidence - count (int): Total PII items found - redacted_text (str|null): Text with PII replaced (when redact=true) - has_pii (bool): Whether any PII was detected
Annotations the server declares
- title: Detect PII
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
extract_entitiesExtract named entities (NER) from text.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Extract named entities (NER) from text. Identifies persons, organizations, locations, and miscellaneous entities with span offsets and confidence scores. BERT-NER based with sub-50ms latency. Args: text: Text to extract named entities from. Returns: dict with keys: - entities (list): Detected entities, each containing: - text (str): Entity text - label (str): Entity type (PER, ORG, LOC, MISC) - start (int): Character offset start - end (int): Character offset end - score (float 0-1): Confidence score - count (int): Total number of entities found
Annotations the server declares
- title: Extract Entities
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
analyze_sentimentAnalyze text sentiment.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_sentiment" says "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze text sentiment. Returns positive/negative classification with confidence scores. DistilBERT-based with sub-10ms latency. Multiple domain-specific model variants available. Args: text: Text to analyze for sentiment (positive/negative). model: Model variant -- 'general' (default), 'financial', 'twitter'. Returns: dict with keys: - label (str): 'positive' or 'negative' - score (float 0-1): Confidence score for the predicted label - scores (dict): All label scores (positive, negative)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Analyze Sentiment
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
analyze_toxicityAnalyze text for toxic content.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_toxicity" says "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze text for toxic content. Returns scores for 6 categories: toxic, severe_toxic, obscene, threat, insult, identity_hate. Each score is 0.0-1.0. BERT-based classifier with sub-15ms latency on GPU. Args: text: Text to analyze for toxicity (hate speech, insults, threats). Returns: dict with keys: - toxic (float 0-1): Overall toxicity score - severe_toxic (float 0-1): Severe toxicity score - obscene (float 0-1): Obscenity score - threat (float 0-1): Threat score - insult (float 0-1): Insult score - identity_hate (float 0-1): Identity-based hate score - is_toxic (bool): Whether text exceeds toxicity threshold
Annotations the server declares
- title: Analyze Toxicity
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://apim-ai-apis.azure-api.net/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp/nlp/mcp
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://apim-ai-apis.azure-api.net/mcp/nlp/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including extract_entities (write), detect_pii (write), detect_language (write), check_nlp_service (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http nlp-tools https://apim-ai-apis.azure-api.net/mcp/nlp/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http nlp-tools https://apim-ai-apis.azure-api.net/mcp/nlp/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__nlp-tools__analyze_toxicity",
"mcp__nlp-tools__analyze_sentiment"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__nlp-tools__extract_entities",
"mcp__nlp-tools__detect_pii",
"mcp__nlp-tools__detect_language",
"mcp__nlp-tools__check_nlp_service"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as nlp-tools. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__nlp-tools__analyze_toxicity untrusted-input
- mcp__nlp-tools__analyze_sentiment untrusted-input
- mcp__nlp-tools__extract_entities untrusted-input
- mcp__nlp-tools__detect_pii untrusted-input
- mcp__nlp-tools__detect_language untrusted-input
- mcp__nlp-tools__check_nlp_service untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.fasuizu-br/nlp-tools/verify?hash=5a69cef98ec763158545c61a996f40648d600190271bb5b47e8f4946dfd8824f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5a69cef98ec7, from Nov 5, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.fasuizu-br/nlp-tools/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.fasuizu-br/nlp-tools)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:33 UTC.
NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 4 write, 2 read. extract_entities, detect_pii, detect_language, check_nlp_service, analyze_toxicity and analyze_sentiment.
Does the NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the NLP Tools - Sentiment, NER, Toxicity & Language Detection MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 5, 2026.