On-chain Forensics MCP server
io.github.leohoudinisanders-byte/forensics-mcpleohoudinisanders-bytestreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned
Token due diligence for AI agents: a letter grade before a buy, mint checks, settle-safe screens.
6 tools: 6 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
With Anlyon
6 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the On-chain Forensics MCP server can do
The On-chain Forensics MCP server is published by the GitHub account leohoudinisanders-byte. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: forensics_info, token_verdict, settle_safe, wallet_screen and 2 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
6 tools bring in text other people can write (forensics_info, token_verdict, settle_safe and 3 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
diligence_memo$0.25 composed Token Due-Diligence Memo (decision-grade, reproducible, no LLM calls): verdict + supply/flow forensics + settle-safe screen + narrative risk assessment.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it $0.25 composed Token Due-Diligence Memo (decision-grade, reproducible, no LLM calls): verdict + supply/flow forensics + settle-safe screen + narrative risk assessment. $0.35 when counterparty is provided (adds the settlement counterparty trust screen). EVM or XRPL.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Due-diligence memo
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
forensics_infoFREE.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. Service directory for the On-chain Forensics MCP server: endpoint catalog, chains supported (Base, Ethereum, XRPL), pricing, tokenized-equity aliases (btsla, bcspx, rlusd, bitstamp-usd, ...) and usage examples.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Forensics directory and prices
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
settle_safe$0.02.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it $0.02. FLAGSHIP pre-trade settle-safe screen for AI agents trading tokenized equities/RWAs: canonical-asset check against the verified registry (EVM: btsla/bcspx/bnvda/aapl/nvda/usdy/ousg/...; XRPL issuers: rlusd, gatehub-usd, bitstamp-usd/eur), freeze/clawback flags, trustline breadth, optional counterparty wallet trust tier.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Settle-safe screen
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
token_profile$0.05.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it $0.05. Full ERC-20 forensics profile on Base or Ethereum: exact 24h net supply change, recent mint/burn events, holder concentration, top transfers, whale moves.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Token profile
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
token_verdict$0.02.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it $0.02. Token verdict card for any ERC-20 on Base or Ethereum (address+chain), any registered alias (token=btsla|ondo|edel|...), or any XRPL issued currency (chain=xrp + issuer + currency): activity score 0-100, verdict tier (RED_HOT/HEAVY_FIRE/ACTIVE/THIN/SUSPICIOUS_THIN/DORMANT), transfers, unique wallets, mints/burns, concentration, whale flags, plain-English take.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Token verdict
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
wallet_screen$0.05.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it $0.05. Wallet trust screen for any wallet on Base, Ethereum or XRPL (chain=xrp): balance, tx count, flows, top counterparties, contract-interaction risk, trust tier. For XRPL also trustlines and issuer screens.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Wallet trust screen
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:28 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 402
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 402.
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 402; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff
- Changed:diligence_memoChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:forensics_infoChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:settle_safeChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:token_profileChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:token_verdictChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:wallet_screenChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http forensics https://solene-fa2010da.base44.app/functions/forensicsMcpclaude mcp add --transport http forensics https://solene-fa2010da.base44.app/functions/forensicsMcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__forensics__forensics_info",
"mcp__forensics__token_verdict",
"mcp__forensics__settle_safe",
"mcp__forensics__wallet_screen",
"mcp__forensics__token_profile",
"mcp__forensics__diligence_memo"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as forensics. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__forensics__forensics_info untrusted-input
- mcp__forensics__token_verdict untrusted-input
- mcp__forensics__settle_safe untrusted-input
- mcp__forensics__wallet_screen untrusted-input
- mcp__forensics__token_profile untrusted-input
- mcp__forensics__diligence_memo untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.leohoudinisanders-byte/forensics-mcp/verify?hash=12ee3e168dacf7deb9796c8ada6ecb047e897359855df6ada5832053dec8c40e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 12ee3e168dac, from Nov 11, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.leohoudinisanders-byte/forensics-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.leohoudinisanders-byte/forensics-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 11, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
On-chain Forensics MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the On-chain Forensics MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the On-chain Forensics MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the On-chain Forensics MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the On-chain Forensics MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 6 write. forensics_info, token_verdict, settle_safe, wallet_screen, token_profile and diligence_memo.
Does the On-chain Forensics MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the On-chain Forensics MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the On-chain Forensics MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.