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mercury-x402-mcp server

io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcpmercuryx402streamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Agent-payable web data over x402: 18 keyless services an agent pays per call.

18 tools: 14 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 14 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 17
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

14 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the mercury-x402-mcp server can do

The mercury-x402-mcp server is published by the GitHub account mercuryx402. It has 18 tools. It can create or change data (14 tools: extract, markdown, metadata, links and 10 more), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (fetch, diff and batch); 17 tools can send data out of your system (fetch, extract, markdown and 14 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

18 tools

Changes things 14Claude Code: ask
  • availabilityURL → a signed uptime/status probe: up/down, HTTP status + class, reachability reason, final URL after redirects, and a measured responseMs — wrapped in an offline-verifiable prove…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL → a signed uptime/status probe: up/down, HTTP status + class, reachability reason, final URL after redirects, and a measured responseMs — wrapped in an offline-verifiable provenance receipt that makes "it was up/down at T" provable SLA evidence. Deterministic verdict (responseMs is telemetry, not signed). Keyless, no LLM, no signup. — $0.005/call
  • dnsDomain → a SIGNED, timestamped DNS snapshot (A, AAAA, MX, NS, TXT, CNAME, SOA), normalised + sorted into a byte-stable record set with an offline-verifiable provenance receipt — pr…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Domain → a SIGNED, timestamped DNS snapshot (A, AAAA, MX, NS, TXT, CNAME, SOA), normalised + sorted into a byte-stable record set with an offline-verifiable provenance receipt — proving exactly what the zone resolved to at that moment. Keyless, no LLM, no signup. (Normalisation is deterministic; DNS itself is mutable across time/TTL/geo — which is the very reason the snapshot is timestamped + signed.) — $0.006/call
  • extractTYPED structured extract for autonomous agents — URL + schema → a clean, type-safe JSON record.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    TYPED structured extract for autonomous agents — URL + schema → a clean, type-safe JSON record. Where /buy/fetch returns page TEXT (and ?extract= returns string-only fields), THIS returns the schema-conformant object an LLM/RAG/trading pipeline actually consumes: pass ?url=…&schema=title,price:number,rating:number,inStock:boolean and get back { title:"…", price:19.99, rating:4.5, inStock:true } — numbers as numbers, booleans as booleans, absent fields null (honest). `schema` accepts the URL-friendly compact form (field[:type], type in string|number|integer|boolean) OR a Firecrawl/OpenAI-style JSON-Schema object ({"properties":{"price":{"type":"number"}}}). That is Firecrawl's paid 'JSON mode' headline guarantee — type-safety, 'numbers as numbers not strings' — done DETERMINISTICALLY from the page's own JSON-LD/OpenGraph/meta/microdata: keyless, NO LLM call, NO API key, NO signup, $0.004/call, paid in-band over HTTP 402 (x402, USDC on Base mainnet). The typed record is folded into the SIGNED provenance attestation too (EIP-191, ecrecoverable OFFLINE), so a buyer can prove the EXTRACTED FIELDS — not just raw bytes — are exactly what MERCURY resolved. Honest charge-per-ATTEMPT: every call returns a structured result (success OR an ok:false reason). Same SSRF guard, 5s timeout, 10MB cap, no mint. — $0.004/call
  • feedRSS/Atom feed URL → a SIGNED, normalized item list [{title,link,published,summary}] unified across RSS 2.0/RDF + Atom 1.0: CDATA unwrapped, HTML stripped, entities decoded, dates →…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    RSS/Atom feed URL → a SIGNED, normalized item list [{title,link,published,summary}] unified across RSS 2.0/RDF + Atom 1.0: CDATA unwrapped, HTML stripped, entities decoded, dates → ISO-8601 (publishedRaw kept verbatim, never fabricated). Deterministic — same feed bytes ⇒ byte-identical items; no LLM. Core 4 fields only (not full-content/media/author). Receipt = EIP-191 over the canonical item list. — $0.005/call
  • headersURL → a deterministic HTTP security-headers audit (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame, X-Content-Type, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy + more) with a letter grade and concrete findings, wrappe…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL → a deterministic HTTP security-headers audit (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame, X-Content-Type, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy + more) with a letter grade and concrete findings, wrapped in a signed, offline-verifiable provenance receipt. Keyless, no LLM, no signup. — $0.005/call
  • markdownURL → clean, LLM-ready markdown (boilerplate/nav/ads stripped, headings + lists + links preserved) with a signed provenance receipt pinning the markdown to its source — the RAG-ing…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL → clean, LLM-ready markdown (boilerplate/nav/ads stripped, headings + lists + links preserved) with a signed provenance receipt pinning the markdown to its source — the RAG-ingest primitive. Deterministic (no LLM): same URL + same source bytes ⇒ byte-identical markdown. — $0.005/call
  • metadataURL → one typed, SIGNED metadata record (JSON-LD + OpenGraph + Twitter-card + standard <meta> + canonical + title), by source.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL → one typed, SIGNED metadata record (JSON-LD + OpenGraph + Twitter-card + standard <meta> + canonical + title), by source. Deterministic, keyless, no LLM — the social-card/SEO/schema.org record an agent can PROVE. — $0.006/call
  • notarizeNotarize any content (inline ?content= or a fetched ?url=) into a signed, offline-verifiable provenance receipt — sha256 contentHash + witnessed timestamp, attested by Mercury's pi…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Notarize any content (inline ?content= or a fetched ?url=) into a signed, offline-verifiable provenance receipt — sha256 contentHash + witnessed timestamp, attested by Mercury's pinned key. Deterministic, keyless, no LLM. The signed receipt is the product: it witnesses that these exact bytes existed in this exact form at this time (the one thing your own sha256() can't — a third-party witness). — $0.008/call
  • readabilityURL → a clean ARTICLE record { title, byline, publishedAt, article text } with boilerplate (nav/header/footer/sidebar/ads/share-bars/comment-forms) stripped via deterministic DOM d…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL → a clean ARTICLE record { title, byline, publishedAt, article text } with boilerplate (nav/header/footer/sidebar/ads/share-bars/comment-forms) stripped via deterministic DOM density heuristics, plus a signed provenance receipt pinning the cleaned article to its source — the clean-citation primitive distinct from raw markdown. Deterministic (no LLM): same URL + same source bytes ⇒ byte-identical output. — $0.005/call
  • redirectURL → a SIGNED redirect/canonical resolution: the full hop chain [{url,status}] from the link you have to where it ACTUALLY lands, the final resolved URL + status, the page's <link…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL → a SIGNED redirect/canonical resolution: the full hop chain [{url,status}] from the link you have to where it ACTUALLY lands, the final resolved URL + status, the page's <link rel=canonical>, hop count, cross-origin flag and distinct origins traversed (affiliate-cloak / link-safety signal). Deterministic — same redirects ⇒ byte-identical resolution; no LLM. Follows HTTP 3xx only (no JS/meta-refresh execution — meta-refresh target surfaced un-followed). Receipt = EIP-191 over the resolved chain. — $0.005/call
  • robotsDomain → signed, timestamped per-AI-crawler allow/block audit from robots.txt + llms.txt + ai.txt (GPTBot, ClaudeBot, PerplexityBot, Google-Extended, Bytespider, …).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Domain → signed, timestamped per-AI-crawler allow/block audit from robots.txt + llms.txt + ai.txt (GPTBot, ClaudeBot, PerplexityBot, Google-Extended, Bytespider, …). Deterministic, no LLM. EU-AI-Act / TDM opt-out evidence: the signed verdict proves the crawler policy as it stood at fetch time. — $0.005/call
  • sitemapDomain/URL → a SIGNED snapshot of the site's PUBLISHED sitemap: discovers the sitemap via robots.txt Sitemap: lines then /sitemap.xml fallback, parses <urlset> + <sitemapindex> (fo…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Domain/URL → a SIGNED snapshot of the site's PUBLISHED sitemap: discovers the sitemap via robots.txt Sitemap: lines then /sitemap.xml fallback, parses <urlset> + <sitemapindex> (follows up to 5 child sitemaps), returns a deduped, bounded (≤2000) URL inventory with lastmod/changefreq/priority. The receipt signs the DECLARED URL list (deterministic — same sitemap bytes ⇒ byte-identical list). Optional ?fetch=N (≤10) adds a HARD-BOUNDED same-domain liveness probe (title+status+bytes per URL) — that probe is the ONLY non-deterministic part and is NOT covered by the signature. SSRF-guarded; the crawl is bounded at every axis. — $0.01/call
  • tableURL in → the page's main HTML <table>(s) parsed into typed, header-keyed rows (JSON) + clean RFC-4180 CSV, with a signed provenance receipt over the exact extracted grid.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL in → the page's main HTML <table>(s) parsed into typed, header-keyed rows (JSON) + clean RFC-4180 CSV, with a signed provenance receipt over the exact extracted grid. Deterministic, keyless, no LLM — x402, USDC on Base mainnet. — $0.006/call
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • batchList of URLs (≤20) → clean content for each + ONE signed receipt committing to a MERKLE ROOT over every page's contentHash.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.urls), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.urls): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    List of URLs (≤20) → clean content for each + ONE signed receipt committing to a MERKLE ROOT over every page's contentHash. Tamper-evident multi-page snapshot with per-page membership proofs (selective disclosure). Deterministic (no LLM): same URL set + same source bytes ⇒ byte-identical root + proofs. SSRF-guarded per url; keyless x402, USDC on Base mainnet. — $0.02/call
  • diffURL + prior content-hash (or prior text) -> refetch, deterministic change-proof: changed?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "diff" says "diff": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL + prior content-hash (or prior text) -> refetch, deterministic change-proof: changed? + a NEW signed receipt binding fromHash->toHash. Stateless; receipts chain into a tamper-evident audit trail of a page's evolution. Keyless x402, Base mainnet USDC. — $0.006/call
  • fetchVERIFIABLE keyless web-read for autonomous agents.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,169 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...arded, 5s timeout, 10MB cap. Pure data, no mint — delivers in prod. — $0.003/call"

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    VERIFIABLE keyless web-read for autonomous agents. Every result ships a cryptographically SIGNED provenance receipt (EIP-191 over sha256(text)+url+status+time) — the wedge a free scraper structurally CANNOT match: Jina r.jina.ai is free+keyless too, but its bytes are HEARSAY (no proof of what/where/when). MERCURY's `attestation` is ecrecoverable OFFLINE, forever, by you OR any downstream agent you forward the bytes to — proving the content is genuine + untampered (key pinned at /.well-known/mercury-attestation). For RAG, trading and agent-to-agent commerce that need provenance, that is the gap between data and evidence. Beyond that it's the keyless web-read primitive — NO API key, NO signup, NO account, NO monthly plan, the one fetch SKU a fresh agent can onboard to by itself instead of stopping to ask a human for a key. Give a ?url= and get back clean readable page text + title + status. Agent-native extras (opt-in): ?format=markdown for structure-preserving markdown, ?links=1 for an outbound-link graph (crawl frontier), and the headline wedge — STRUCTURED EXTRACT: ?extract=title,price,author,publishedAt returns a clean JSON record { title, price, author, publishedAt }, an LLM-ready row not a wall of text. That is Firecrawl's paid 'JSON mode' (they need an LLM call + an API key for it) done here DETERMINISTICALLY from the page's own JSON-LD/OpenGraph/meta/microdata — keyless, no LLM, $0.003. (?extract=1 still returns the legacy description + wordCount.) The extracted record is folded into the SIGNED attestation too, so a buyer can prove the FIELDS — not just the raw bytes — are exactly what MERCURY resolved. You pay in-band over HTTP 402 (x402, USDC on Base mainnet) — the wedge those tools can't match: they ALL gate behind a human-created API key + a credit-card plan, so an agent can't onboard itself. This one an agent finds in the x402 Bazaar and pays with zero human in the loop. Honest charge-per-ATTEMPT: every call returns a structured result (success OR an ok:false failure with a reason) — never a silent charge-then-500. Follows redirects, SSRF-guarded, 5s timeout, 10MB cap. Pure data, no mint — delivers in prod. — $0.003/call
  • validateURL (a JSON/API endpoint) + a JSON Schema in → a deterministic pass/fail with per-field errors (missing/wrong-type/enum/range/pattern), plus a signed provenance receipt binding the…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate" says "validate": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    URL (a JSON/API endpoint) + a JSON Schema in → a deterministic pass/fail with per-field errors (missing/wrong-type/enum/range/pattern), plus a signed provenance receipt binding the verdict to the exact response bytes AND the exact schema. Deterministic, keyless, no LLM — x402, USDC on Base mainnet. — $0.005/call

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out17
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
14
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 14 tools that change things (14 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://network.mercury-hq.com/mcp: tools/list returned 18 tools to an anonymous client, including extract (write), markdown (write), metadata (write), links (write), robots (write) and 9 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • Infofetch

    The description is 2,169 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...arded, 5s timeout, 10MB cap. Pure data, no mint — delivers in prod. — $0.003/call"

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http mercury-x402 https://network.mercury-hq.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http mercury-x402 https://network.mercury-hq.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mercury-x402__fetch",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__extract",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__markdown",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__metadata",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__links",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__robots",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__diff",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__notarize",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__headers",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__table",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__feed",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__availability",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__validate",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__batch",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__sitemap",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__dns",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__readability",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__redirect"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mercury-x402. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 17 rules
  • mcp__mercury-x402__fetch untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__extract outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__markdown outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__metadata outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__links outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__diff untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__notarize outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__headers outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__table outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__feed outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__availability outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__validate outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__batch untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__sitemap outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__dns outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__readability outbound
  • mcp__mercury-x402__redirect outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp/verify?hash=e86beeb41360424395fcf69d55a49611043cd728a0996a9d413a8cad4fd5165e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e86beeb41360, from Nov 20, 2026, 03:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:40 UTC.

mercury-x402-mcp server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the mercury-x402-mcp server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 18 tools, 14 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the mercury-x402-mcp server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the mercury-x402-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the mercury-x402-mcp server have?

18 tools: 14 write, 4 read. extract, markdown, metadata, links, robots, notarize, headers, table and 10 more.

Does the mercury-x402-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the mercury-x402-mcp server send data to outside services?

17 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): fetch, extract, markdown, metadata, links, diff and 11 more.

Has the mercury-x402-mcp server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.