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MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server

io.github.muaviamohammed/mizanmuaviamohammedstreamable-httpv1.24.0Scanned

Check before you pay. Prove to get paid. Signed answers on any agent, against your own bar.

4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 3 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 9 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server can do

The MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server is published by the GitHub account muaviamohammed. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (check) and create or change data (3 tools: require, prove and more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 9 findings (credentials-mention, annotation-conflict and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.24.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • checkCall before you pay, hire, or allocate to any agent, service or company.3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The input carries an amount (input.bind.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...rvice URL (API, MCP or A2A endpoint), a credential id, or a public AI model (model:<org>/<..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.subject.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.subject.description: "...(an API, MCP or A2A endpoint), a MIZAN credential id, or a public AI model (model:<org>/<..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call before you pay, hire, or allocate to any agent, service or company. Returns one signed verdict (mizan.verdict/1): decision ALLOW or REFUSE first, then the grade earned, the bar met or one stable reason code, the rule and its hash, what was measured, and a compact token (mzv1.…) the payee verifies offline with MIZAN's published key. Proceed only on ALLOW. Free. Without a rule MIZAN's default bar applies: a passing record in good standing (never DECLARED); with a rule (a published req_…@v, the rule require() wrote, or plain words with confirm=true) your rule decides. payee (+ bind.amount) binds the token to one payment. A REFUSE carries next.proof_request: a request you can send the party so it proves itself. subject = an agent id, a company domain, a service URL (API, MCP or A2A endpoint), a credential id, or a public AI model (model:<org>/<name>). compat=true returns the previous, longer check shape for one version. Errors come back as {error, field, got, reason, fix} and are never an ALLOW.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Check before you pay
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • moreCall when check, require, prove and claim_identity are not the job: verify a credential someone shows you, the published standard and its gates, the public log and receipts, linkin…3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...laim_identity are not the job: verify a credential someone shows you, the published standa..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The description contains "every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.

      Matched text

      description: "...proof, watching a counterparty. Returns every other tool grouped by job; each is callable at thi..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "more" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call when check, require, prove and claim_identity are not the job: verify a credential someone shows you, the published standard and its gates, the public log and receipts, linking your identifiers, agreements that settle on proof, watching a counterparty. Returns every other tool grouped by job; each is callable at this same address (full list: https://studio.mizan.market/mcp/full). more("problems") gives the problems MIZAN solves. Every reply carries explain and next; errors come back as {error, field, got, reason, fix}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Everything else MIZAN does
  • proveCall when you want to get paid or hired: counterparties who check you then see a record instead of no_record.3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ue, with the key from claim_identity) a credential backed by a zero-knowledge proof; minti..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.mint.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.mint.description: "...ith every gate; true (with api_key) = a credential others see when they check you."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.alias.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.alias.description: "trading: a public name for a minted credential."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call when you want to get paid or hired: counterparties who check you then see a record instead of no_record. Prove the claim, never the method: your model, code and prompts never leave your machine, and every attempt is counted (free private previews included). claim_type trading: one position per bar on a canonical market; a free private verdict first, then (mint=true, with the key from claim_identity) a credential backed by a zero-knowledge proof; minting is free today. Only trading records get a zero-knowledge proof today. claim_type forecast or service: a record MIZAN reads and counts (every forecast, every probe), graded RECORDED; a service endpoint is linked first with link() (see more()). Call with no arguments for the guide and the markets. Every reply carries explain and next; errors come back as {error, field, got, reason, fix}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Prove your own record
  • requireCall when you know what you need from a counterparty and want it as an exact rule before you check anyone.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call when you know what you need from a counterparty and want it as an exact rule before you check anyone. Write the bar in plain words (words=...) or as structured JSON (rule=..., schema: resource mizan://schemas/requirement-rule-v2.json or https://studio.mizan.market/app/schemas/requirement-rule-v2.schema.json); both give the same rule and the same hash. Returns the exact rule, a read-back in plain English to confirm it means what you meant, its hash, whether it can be published, and suggestions when some words were not understood. Ready-made bars: the library resources (mizan://library/...). Then call check(subject, rule=<the rule>). Free. Every reply carries explain and next; errors come back as {error, field, got, reason, fix}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Write your bar as a rule

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://studio.mizan.market/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check (irreversible), require (write), prove (write), more (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 4
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 6

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 warn6 info
  • Warncheck

    The server marks "check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • Warnmore

    The description contains "every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.

    Matched text

    description: "...proof, watching a counterparty. Returns every other tool grouped by job; each is callable at thi..."

    What this check looks for
  • Warnmore

    The server marks "more" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • Infocheck

    The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...rvice URL (API, MCP or A2A endpoint), a credential id, or a public AI model (model:<org>/<..."

    What this check looks for
  • Infocheck

    The input schema at properties.subject.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.subject.description: "...(an API, MCP or A2A endpoint), a MIZAN credential id, or a public AI model (model:<org>/<..."

    What this check looks for
  • Infoprove

    The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ue, with the key from claim_identity) a credential backed by a zero-knowledge proof; minti..."

    What this check looks for
Show 3 more findings
  • Infoprove

    The input schema at properties.mint.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.mint.description: "...ith every gate; true (with api_key) = a credential others see when they check you."

    What this check looks for
  • Infoprove

    The input schema at properties.alias.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.alias.description: "trading: a public name for a minted credential."

    What this check looks for
  • Infomore

    The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...laim_identity are not the job: verify a credential someone shows you, the published standa..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added, 3 changed.+1 added~3 changedView diff
    • Added:requireChanges things
    • Changed:checkCan't be undonetitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:moreChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:proveChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 4.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 4
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 6.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 6
  4. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
    • Changed:checkCan't be undonedescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:proveChanges thingsdescription

Install

Pinned to version 1.24.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http mizan https://studio.mizan.market/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http mizan https://studio.mizan.market/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mizan__check",
      "mcp__mizan__require",
      "mcp__mizan__prove",
      "mcp__mizan__more"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mizan. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.muaviamohammed/mizan/verify?hash=ace9dd79aa269eb419a11c644f22ba56cc35a131244ee32176bafb76d6cd7db6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash ace9dd79aa26, from Nov 8, 2026, 12:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.muaviamohammed/mizan/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.muaviamohammed/mizan
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.muaviamohammed/mizan.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.muaviamohammed/mizan)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 22, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 9 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: check.

What tools does the MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write. check, require, prove and more.

Does the MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the MIZAN · Proof before payment MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.